Plotinus on Eternity and Time
Ennead III.7

Text, Translation, and Commentary

KIT TEMPEST-WALTERS

STUDIES IN PLATONISM, NEOPLATONISM, AND THE PLATONIC TRADITION

BRILL

Plotinus on Eternity and Time (Ennead III.7)

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Foreword

This is a work greatly to be welcomed. Having had the pleasure of being an external examiner for the doctoral thesis from which this work arises, I had already the strong conviction that it had much of importance to say about Plotinus' views on eternity and time, and this view is greatly reinforced by an inspection of the work in its present form. I had indeed hoped that we could have included Dr. Tempest-Walters' edition in the Plotinus series that I am editing, with Professor Andrew Smith, for the Parmenides Press, but, alas, it had already been assigned, so I am very glad to see the work appearing in this Brill series.

One of the most important features of this edition, in my view, is that it propounds the argument that, in the author's words, "the One does not only emanate its exoteric nature to Intellect and Soul to form the three hypostases, but that it also emanates its esoteric nature to eternity and time which can be understood only in relation to the human soul and its path of liberation rather than as objects within the hypostases." Indeed, the presentation of Eternity and Time as *esoteric* phenomena, corresponding to Intellect and Soul as their exoteric counterparts, is a major insight of the author which I find most valuable.

It is important, I think, when addressing the philosophy of Plotinus, to recognize that it must be approached as *lived experience* as well as an objective body of doctrine, and in this connection, Tempest-Walters' edition seems to me to make a significant contribution. His excellent commentary carries on in detail the exposition of the position that he has set out in the introduction, and makes this a most valuable addition to Plotinian scholarship.

Professor John Dillon

Acknowledgments

I wish to express my appreciation to Royal Holloway, University of London for providing funding for my PhD thesis, as well as to Oxford University Press for granting permission to use the Oxford Classical Text of Plotinus' treatises for the present publication. I am especially indebted to Professor Anne Sheppard for her suggestions, insights, and unwavering support as the main supervisor of my doctoral thesis and as a mentor in preparation for this book, as well as to Professor John Dillon for his tremendous kindness, generosity, and belief in my work. Professor John Finamore and Ms Helena Schöb must also be acknowledged for their considerable guidance in transforming my original PhD thesis into its current book form.

I also express deep thanks to Professor Charles Drage and Mr Konstantinos Lerounis for bringing their considerable expertise in ancient Greek to bear on my translation of III.7 as well as the Greek text within the publication. A further debt of gratitude is owed to Dr Peter Singer for his penetrating insights; Dr Richard Hawley for his continued encouragement; as well as to Mr David Thaw, Dr Desmond Biddulph, Mr Ian Brinton, and Mr Jasper Jinu for their belief and support in my formative years. Nobody has been more important to me in the pursuit of this project than my mother, Mary Tempest. I would like to thank her for her love and guidance. I would also like to thank my father, Ewart James Walters, and my sister, Zara Tempest-Walters, for their support throughout my doctorate and in preparing this book for publication.

Abbreviations

Ancient Authors

Albinus		
	Is.	*Isagoge*
"Alcinous"		
	Didasc.	*Didascalicus*
Alex. Aphrod.	Alexander of Aphrodisias	
	De temp.	*De tempore*
	In Metaph.	*In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria*
	Mund.	*De mundo*
Anon.	Anonymous Authors	
	In Tht	*Commentarium in Platonis Theaetetum*
Apul.	Apuleius	
	De Plat.	*De Platone et eius dogmate*
	Met.	*Metamorphoses*
[Archyt.]	Pseudo-Archytas	
	Cat.	*Categoriae*
Arist.	Aristotle	
	Cael.	*De caelo*
	De an.	*De anima*
	De Pyth.	*De Pythagoriis, fragmenta*
	Eth. Nic.	*Ethica Nicomachea*
	Metaph.	*Metaphysica*
	Ph.	*Physica*
Aug.	Augustine	
	Conf.	*Confessiones*
Boeth.	Boethius	
	De consol. philos.	*De consolatione philosophiae*
	De trin.	*De trinitate*
Boethus of Sidon		
	Schol. in Arist. Organon	*In Categorias* apud T. Waitz, *Scholia in Aristotelis Organon*
Cic.	Cicero	
	Tusc.	*Tusculanae disputations*
Diog. Laert.	Diogenes Laertius	
	Vitae	*The Lives of Eminent Philosophers*
Epicurus	*Ep. Her.*	*Epistula ad Herodotum*

Heraclit.	Heraclitus of Ephesus	
Homer	*Il.*	*Iliad*
Iambl.	Iamblichus	
	In Nicom Ar.	*In Nicomachi arithmeticam introductionem*
Lucr.	Lucretius	
	De rerum natura	
Max. Tyr.	Maximus Tyrius	
	Or.	*Orationes*
Nicom.	Nicomachus of Gerasa apud Phot. Bibl cod.	
	Ar.	*Introductio arithmetica*
Num.	Numenius	
Parm.	Parmenides	
Philo	Philo Judaeus	
	Deus	*Quod Deus sit immutabilis*
	Mut.	*De mutatione nominum*
	Opif.	*De opificio mundi*
Philop.	Johannes Philoponus	
	In De an.	*In Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria*
	In Ph.	*In Physica*
Pl.	Plato	
	Cra.	*Cratylus*
	Leg.	*Leges = Laws*
	Phd	*Phaedo*
	Phlb.	*Philebus*
	Resp.	*Respublica = Republic*
	Soph.	*Sophista = Sophist*
	Tht.	*Theaetetus*
	Ti.	*Timaeus*
[Pl.]	pseudo-Plato	
	Epin.	*Epinomis*
	Plut.	Plutarch
	De E ap. Delph.	*De E apud Delphos*
	De Is. et Os.	*De Iside et Osiride*
	Quaest. conu.	*Quaestionum convivialium libri*
	Quaest. Plat.	*Quaestiones Platonicae*
Porph.	Porphyry	
	Sent.	*Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes*
	VP	*Vita Plotini*
Procl.	Proclus	
	In Eucl.	*In primum Euclidis Elementorum librum commentarii*

Sen.	Seneca (the Younger)	
	Ep.	*Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*
Sext. Emp.	Sextus Empiricus	
	Math.	*Adversus Mathematicos*
Simpl.	Simplicius	
	In Ph.	*In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria*
	In Ti.	*In Platonis Timaeum commentarii*
Themist.	Themistius	
	In Ph.	*In Aristotelis physica paraphrasis*

Modern Text Collections and Reference Works

Dox.Gr.	Diels, Hermann. 1965. *Doxographi Graeci*. 4th ed. Berolini: apud Walter de Gruyter et socios. Orig. publ. 1879, Berolini: apud G. Reimerum.
DK	Diels, Hermann, and Walther Kranz. 1951–1952. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. 6th ed. Berlin: Weidmann.
LSJ	Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart Jones. 1940. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. 9th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
SVF	von Arnim, Hans Friedrich August. ed. 1903–1924. *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*. 4 vols. Lipsiae et Stutgardiae: in aedibus B.G. Teubneri.Repr.1964, Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner.

Editions

This book follows the text of Henry, P. and H.-R. Schwyzer 1964–1982. *Plotini opera*. (Editio minor.) Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Principal Translations

In this book, all translations of *Ennead* III.7 are my own. Translations of passages from the other treatises in the *Enneads* are those of Armstrong 1966–1988.

Introduction

> We must not go after other first principles but put this first, and then after it Intellect, that which primally thinks, and then Soul after Intellect … it remains to investigate in our present discussion, if we are to posit more than these three, whatever other natures there could be beside them.
>
> II.9.1.12–20

This book wishes to justify three main claims pertaining to *Ennead* III.7.

Firstly, that eternity and time are not features of human experience but rather modes which make human experience possible. Therefore, we claim that the notions of eternity and time are in themselves *how* we experience rather than *what* we experience. This first claim has a number of implications. For example, although eternity and time are the *how* rather than the *what* of experience, the eternal and temporal modes unlock access to different strata of reality. And thus, entering into the eternal mode allows man to experience the intelligible realities and Intellect itself, whereas entering into time conceals these realities from man and allows him to perceive only the sensible objects of Soul in the context of present, past and future. Furthermore, since eternity and time are the *how* of experience, there is the possibility that one might perceive the *what* of experience in different modes. For example, when man exists within the intelligible realm, if he begins to desire more than the timeless presence of Intellect, he will find himself entering into an artificial mode of perception within the non-artificial and real realm of Intellect. The inverse is also true: while in the realm of Soul, man may recognise and rest in his original state of presence and thus discover eternity within the world of generation and destruction. This means that man is first temporal and intelligible before he enters into a physical body, and first eternal and embodied before escaping further incarnations and returning to Intellect. Therefore, while eternity corresponds more closely to Intellect, and time more closely to Soul, Soul can be perceived eternally and temporal consciousness can be traced back to Intellect. And thus, Plotinus neither conceives of time as a purely sensible realm, nor of eternity as a purely abstract realm distinct from physical existence. Rather he conceives of time as the mode which ushers us into physical existence and of

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eternity as that mode which must be discovered while we exist in physical form, so that we may finally be liberated from our physical form and return to original formless existence.

The second claim is that the modes of eternity and time are emanations of the One which pertain to man's subjective states. We therefore say that eternity and time have a different emanatory character to Intellect and Soul since Intellect and Soul pertain to objective features of reality such as the intelligible and sensible realities which are experienced within man's perception rather than as a state of his perception. Therefore the One can be thought of as the peak of a mountain with two sides descending from it. One of these sides represents the objective emanation of the One and features Intellect and Soul. The other of these sides represents the subjective emanation of the One and features eternity and time. The objective side descends from the One as hypostases containing elements like mathematical sets. The subjective side descends from the One as modes pertaining to these hypostases. And indeed, we trace the hypostases and modes as descending from the One in this way, since the One can be thought of both as a mode and as a hypostasis. For on the one hand, the modal nature of the One captures its ineffable and transcendent nature which cannot be grasped conceptually. This esoteric[1] aspect of the One then transfers its ineffable, hidden and mysterious nature to the modes of eternity and time, since neither eternity nor time can be grasped in experience, arising as they do as modes of experience which can never be known objectively. Thus we claim that there are three modes of the esoteric: the One, eternity and time. On the other hand, the exoteric[2] nature of the One as a cause and container of things, is transferred to the hypostases of Intellect and Soul which cause and contain the intelligible and sensible realities respectively. We therefore claim that there are also three exoteric levels: the One, Intellect and Soul. The first mode of the esoteric leads to union with all things; the second mode of the esoteric, eternity, unlocks access to the second exoteric level of Intellect; and the third mode of the esoteric, time, unlocks access to the third exoteric level of Soul. Once this third mode of the esoteric has unlocked access to Soul, Soul produces the 'before' and 'after' which we call mechanical time, and which

1 We will use the term 'esoteric' to refer to the internal conditions of possibility for human experience; these modes of human subjectivity are *hidden* from objective human experience and are *private* and *personal*, pertaining to the states of each individual human soul.

2 We will use the term 'exoteric' to refer to those hypostases which represent the totality of the objects which they cause and contain. The term 'exoteric', as the antonym of 'esoteric', has the advantage of conveying that these hypostases are both *accessible* to objective human experience and *impersonal*, since they exist as external conditions of possibility for human experience rather than as subjective modes of the human soul.

exists distinct from the essence of time as a mode which we call psychological time. We therefore not only present the claim that eternity and time are modes but justify this reading by placing these principles within the context of the One and showing how the paradoxically esoteric-exoteric nature of the One lends certain qualities to eternity and time, and others to Intellect and Soul.

The third claim that we wish to justify is that we as human beings are responsible for the modes which we inhabit. We point to certain passages such as 6.1–9, 7.1–5, 11.1–4, 11.20–27 and 12.4–25[3] to support the claim that the human soul first falls into time through its desire for physical existence and that it is able to recognise its identity with eternity by stopping this desire itself. This is why we call time a desiring mode: for it is only because human beings desire something more than timeless presence that they enter into a physical body in the realm of Soul. Similarly, eternity is the mode of desirelessness, for as soon as man stops the desire for physical existence and temporal succession, he enters into the eternal mode and recognises his nature as eternity itself. We argue therefore that man is in control of his own destiny according to the choice he makes between seeking the 'next' and 'after' and remaining content with a life of timeless presence. He is even able to attain to the One, or the first mode of the esoteric, by ridding himself of identification with the intelligible realities and eternity after he has transcended the sensible realities and temporal consciousness. We therefore claim that while man is not able to change the objective features of existence, such as the sensible realities and intelligible realities, he does have control over whether he experiences one set of realities or the other (or neither and both simultaneously in the case of the One). For the *what* of experience is already set out for man by the exoteric emanation of the One, whereas the *how* of experience, pertaining to the modes produced by the esoteric emanation of the One, relates to man's inner nature and his ability to recognise and honour this inner nature. And thus, we may say that by failing to honour his innermost nature, man co-creates the essence of time with the One, for which it is the final stage of esoteric emanation.

The first claim, namely that eternity and time are modes of experience, is an original way of placing these principles in relation to the hypostases of Intellect and Soul. For as Kalligas 2014, 586 observes in his comments on 2.10–19, 'inasmuch as eternity constitutes a property of intelligible beings, it cannot be identical either to any one of these or to their totality'. Kalligas is right to

3 In this book, all such incomplete references, without an Ennead number, will always be to III.7.

concede that Plotinus identifies eternity neither as an intelligible reality nor as Intellect itself (cf. Smith 1996, 201). However, to present eternity as a property of the intelligibles is also difficult to grasp. For in what way can the forms of Love, Truth and Beauty be said to possess the qualities of presence if such a claim does not appeal to subjectivity in any way? For what distinguishes the concept of presence from that of abstract Being would seem to be the sense of a here-now which can only be understood in relation to subjectivity. One could ascribe to the intelligible realities a kind of consciousness which would enable us to say that they are present to themselves (this kind of personification occurs in 4.33–42 for example). However, Kalligas does not do this. We are therefore left uncertain of what the difference is between Being, or 'what is', and the sense of presence which accompanies that stable identity. For if eternity is simply 'what is' considered in an objective sense, then this makes it difficult to distinguish it from Intellect. Indeed, if we reduce terms used to describe eternity such as 'activity' (ἐνέργεια), life (ζωή) or mode of life (βιός) (see for example 3.11–27 and 3.36–38) to objective features of Intellect then the concept of eternity appears to be no more than the empty self-assertion on the part of Intellect that it is what it is. And although the proclamation of Being is a function of eternity (as described in 5.19–22), its identity exceeds the bounds of Intellect, for as Plotinus at one point even claims, eternity is logically prior to Intellect as the partless whole in which the intelligibles exist (2.9–20). Therefore, it would seem that we are left with three options. The first is to accept that eternity is an objective aspect of the intelligible world which cannot be easily defined or posited in relation to human experience. The second is to take on the challenge of defining eternity more precisely as an objective feature of Intellect, which seems to be a very difficult task. The third option (which we take) is to posit eternity as a subjective mode, which solves the problem of positing it in relation to experience (since it is the source of experience) and saves it from being the empty function of self-assertion on the part of Intellect. The closest that a scholar has come to this subjectivist turn is José Baracat Jr, 2013, 32 who in his article 'Soul's Desire and the Origin of Time in the Philosophy of Plotinus' posits that Plotinus' conception of eternity is identical with that of νόησις, and that his conception of time is nothing more than διάνοια. While it is reasonable to associate intelligible reason with eternity and discursive reason with time, we attempt to show that eternity and time are more primordial than these forms of thought, since they represent not only a thinking relationship between subject and intelligible and sensible objects, but the desireless and desiring dispositions of the soul which make such interaction possible in the first place.

The second claim, namely that eternity and time are emanations representing the esoteric aspect of the One is also an original contribution to the

literature on III.7. For although Beierwaltes 1967, 11–21 in his 'Herkunft' seeks to investigate the natures of eternity and time by going back to first principles and examining how the One came to differentiate itself rather than remaining alone in its own nature, he does not distinguish the emanatory path proceeding from the One to Intellect and Soul from that which progresses from the One to eternity and time. Furthermore, Kalligas 2014, 597 fails to map out a conception of the precise relationship between eternity and the One in his comments on 6.9–21 and Smith 1996, 203, claims that eternity is directed to the One by virtue of being the life of real Being but does not attempt to show how eternity is directed towards the One in a different way to Intellect.

The third and final claim that we are responsible for the modes we inhabit is only original insofar as we define eternity and time as modes. For we agree with Armstrong 1966–1988, vol. III, 338, n. 1; Smith 1996, 209 and Baracat Jr, 2013, 32–33; and *pace* Beierwaltes 1967, 238–239, Rist 1983, 137–138, Kalligas 2014, 612 and Gerson 2018a, 347, that in 11.15–20, Plotinus holds the human soul responsible for the original creation of time through the desire for an exciting narrative in the future. For we believe that in order to make sense of Plotinus' statements in 11.1–4, namely that 'it is necessary to take ourselves back into that disposition which we were saying existed in eternity', in 6.1–9 that 'this nature is therefore what we are seeking and dwelling in this way is being eternity' and in 7.1–5 that 'it is necessary that we ourselves also have a share in eternity', we must believe that Plotinus presents us with a way in which we can recognise our eternal nature and take responsibility both for the original creation and the eventual dissolution of time. For if Plotinus did not believe that we had created time through our own desire, then it would not be at all clear how human beings came to find themselves in time, let alone how they could go about transcending it. But it is clear from passages both within III.7 (for example 5.7–12) and beyond that Plotinus believes that we can return to our eternal nature through the necessary purifications. Take, for example, IV.7.10.30–40 where Plotinus claims that man may 'apprehend the eternal by its eternity, and all the things in the intelligible world, having become himself an intelligible universe full of light'. For this reason, we take Plotinus to be referring to the human soul rather than the hypostasis of Soul in 11.15–27 and 12.4–25 and therefore use a small rather than a capital 's' in our translation and commentary.[4] Therefore, not only do we assume that Plotinus attributes the creation and dissolution of time to

4 In this book, all translations of *Ennead* III.7 are my own and follow the text of the editio minor of Henry and Schwyzer (1964–1982). Translations of passages from the other treatises in the *Enneads* are those of Armstrong 1966–1988.

the human soul but we attempt to show why this can be the case, and to remain consistent in our interpretation of the overall text with our theory of modes.

Since the interpretation of III.7 as an investigation of esoteric modes may be seen to be a somewhat bold claim, we attempt to justify this reading through the close textual analysis presented in the commentary and in the translation. Furthermore, my approach to the text does not presuppose that there are large doctrinal differences between the earlier and later treatises in the *Enneads* but rather attempts to conceive of Plotinus' thought as a whole whose parts can be reconciled with one another. My approach therefore reflects the sentiment of Gerson 1994, xvii. He writes, 'I am very sceptical about claims regarding a development of Plotinus' thought in the *Enneads* following the chronological ordering. I think the fact that we have a relative chronology has just been a temptation to search for such schemes. There are certainly variations in nuance and emphasis, but I have not detected any substantial alterations in doctrinal content throughout the corpus. Accordingly, in this book I have felt free to draw on texts everywhere in the *Enneads* as evidence for an interpretation.' Whilst I include material from many treatises in the *Enneads*, there are passages within III.7 itself which have been placed in square brackets by the editors of the Greek text which I do not necessarily comment on in my commentary if (as is the case in 5.28–30) they are reiterations of analyses Plotinus has already presented earlier on in the treatise.

In this first section, we will attempt to show how the One may be conceived as the first mode of the esoteric and to extrapolate its main characteristics, so that we will then be able to see the way in which eternity exists in and is 'orientated towards' it. After mapping out the view that the One is the first mode of the esoteric, we will be able to explain why eternity can be conceived as the second mode of the esoteric, pertaining to the negation of the desire for physical experience, and finally why time can be understood as the third mode of the esoteric, pertaining to the state of desire for physical experience. For we argue that Plotinus' treatise 'On Eternity and Time' is an account of three modes, the first of which is presupposed, and the second and third of which are investigated and brought to light.

1 The First Mode of the Esoteric

On the journey of liberation, man must understand that he has to negate his qualities and attributes in order to encounter the ultimate principle. He must therefore see that there is a way for him to achieve union with the One. While logically it may seem very easy to realise such a truth, namely that the man

who seeks in fact seeks nothing other than himself (since all the hypostases exist within him: V.1.10.1–6; V.3.17.33–38), it may take a long time to know this in experience. For the esoteric eludes man not by existing far away from him but rather by being so close (and even identical to) his very nature, so that by looking for it through his senses or through concepts, man continually seeks outside his own nature that which can only be found by turning inwards in silence. For the sake of explication therefore, we must take the vantage point of the man who wants to realise the One and map out the journey of negation which may lead him to this principle. For it is not by adding but rather by taking away that man will be able to encounter his true nature.

Man's journey of liberation includes the subtraction of all things which exceed the numerical value of One. This means that he must subtract everything, since anything which is a thing, whether a hypostasis or an intelligible or sensible reality is greater than the absolute from which it springs. Thus, he must rid himself of identification with Intellect and Soul (which Plotinus describes as multiplicities in III.8.9.1–5, VI.6.9.29–31 and V.1.5.13–14 for example), the corresponding intelligible realities and myriad forms of Soul in order to reach the One. Man cannot subtract anything from his own nature with the presupposition that it is outside himself. Instead, he must recognise that the One, the Intellect and Soul exist within him and remove all identification with these secondary and tertiary realities so that he may realise his nature as the ultimate and primary principle (see III.8.9.19–28, V.3.17.33–38, VI.7.36.21–27, and VI.9.4.24–30). By achieving this he 'rushes to (the) One' (V.5.4.8–11) ready for 'fulfilment and illumination by the first nature' (VI.9.7.12–17). This is every man's end, for there is nothing more precious than to attain the absolute union with this ultimate principle. In order to subtract everything which is quantitatively greater than the principle of the One, man must begin by negating the principle of plurality associated with the realm of Soul. Let us therefore map out the way in which he must negate the plurality associated with Soul before showing how he can transcend the realm of Intellect. In order to transcend Soul, he must rid himself of the idea that he has only partial existence. He can achieve this by completing three tasks.

The first task man must complete is to remove the desire for physical experience. For the root cause of man's descent into the temporal realm of Soul is his soul's desire to 'govern itself, be by itself and … to seek more than the present' (11.15–20). This can only be achieved by entering into a limited physical body through which he perceives an outside world and believes himself to be isolated and separate from everything around him. Through the desire for physical experience, man becomes enchanted with the partial existence of sensible realities so that he only perceives the primary realities such as Beauty, Love and

Truth in the context of physical objects and not as pure forms existing in themselves. In order to reverse this fate, man must imitate the intelligible realities by extinguishing the desire for the physical realm in the knowledge that he is already complete (see IV.4.8.48–51). He must therefore follow in Plotinus' footsteps by curtailing his desire for physical experience, which entails going beyond merely theoretical enquiry. For like Plotinus, who according to Porphyry 'never relaxed his self-turned attention except in sleep' and reduced his sleep 'by taking very little food' (VP.8.19–24), man may attempt to turn back the activity of soul to Intellect and in this way negate the causes of his descent into the temporal realm of Soul.

The second and closely related task that man must perform in order to destroy his illusory belief that he possesses only partial existence is to cut away his identification with the body. For as soon as man thinks that he is the physical body, he falls into the illusory belief that he is only a small part of a grand physical cosmos and thus strays from his true nature. He must instead realise that the soul is separate from the body, (even if it becomes divided by entering into it: IV.3.19.1–8) and that death spells the end for the body alone (I.6.6.9–11). In order to realise these claims on an experiential rather than a solely theoretical level, he must practise viewing the body (and each sensible thing around him) as nothing more than an empty image so that it is not given undue attention or admiration. For once his attention shifts away from the sensible realm, it will then land upon the higher realities, including his own original nature, which are intelligible and substantial. He will then understand why Plotinus was purportedly ashamed to have a body (*VP*.1.1–2) and why he refused to sit for a painter or sculptor to have his portrait made. For Plotinus realised that sensible existence was nothing more than a pale and fleeting reflection of the substantial and eternal intelligible realm and thus queried, 'why, really is it not enough to have to carry the image in which nature has encased us, without your requesting me to agree to leave behind me a longer-lasting image of the image, as if it was something genuinely worth looking at?' (*VP*.1.7–9). It is in this context that we must receive his encouragement to 'remove what is superfluous, straighten up what is crooked, clean up what is dark and make it bright … until the godlike splendour of virtue shines forth' (I.6. 9.7–24). For unless we ensure that 'nothing extraneous is mixed within' (Ibid.) by rejecting the attribution of sensible qualities to our own natures, we will continue to miss the requirements for an intelligible life. He must instead seek to avoid further incarnations (see VI.7.17–23) by realising that he is not a partial physical reality but a whole intelligible reality.

The final task which man must achieve in order to negate his false conception of himself as a partial reality is to transcend his discursive reason. For

discursive reason takes as its subject the whole of nature and attempts to comprehend it part by part, so that it splits up what is always whole and complete. As Plotinus claims, discursive reason 'makes the one be not one, and we bring forward as it were parts of it and posit these, each of them as one and call it a genus, being unaware that we do not know the whole all at once, but bring forward piece by piece and join them up again, being unable to hold them back for long as they hasten to themselves' (VI.2.3.26–30). As long as we turn to discursive reason as the primary means for attempting to access reality, we will always be drawn back to a world of parts, existing in a state of extension and separation, since by employing discursive reason we can only 'consider one thing after another' (V.3.17.21–24) and therefore have the power to grasp only that which exists in a dual state of being: this and that; here and there; subject and object. In this state of being, we employ a tool for accessing a realm of duality to try to comprehend the absolutely simple. We therefore approach the intelligible realities such as Justice and Beauty as though they were 'axioms' and 'expressions' rather than seeing that they exist in a supreme state of identity with one another (V.5.1.38–41). This means turning to non-discursive comprehension like the wise men of Egypt by discarding 'the forms of letters which follow the order of words and propositions and imitate sounds and the enunciations of philosophical statements' (V.8.6.1–5) so that we can directly encounter reality rather than simply thinking about it theoretically. We will then perceive that the real awaits us in eternal presence without admitting any kind of extension or thinking.

By negating the multiple, man destroys the causes of his embodiment and shifts from a life of plurality to unity. He strips away his false identifications and comes to rest in unity. For once a man has purified himself of physical desire 'he will see an Intellect which sees nothing perceived by the senses, none of these mortal things, but apprehends the eternal by eternity, and all these things in the intelligible world, having himself become a universe full of light' (IV.7.10.30–36). Through purification of the sensible, therefore, man achieves union with all the primaries, forms and the intelligible realm itself as he recognises himself as an intelligible reality. Indeed, since Plotinus contends that man's fall from his original form came from 'a restless nature' (11.15), it would make sense that 'stopping this life, which (is neither) … orientated towards nor dwelling in itself' (12.4–7), would lead back to the intelligible realm and thus restore to man the original state of his soul. When man undertakes this first level of purification of sensible realities, he enters into the second mode of the esoteric, called eternity. For his mode of experience arising from his practice of purification shifts to unity, so that he while he is still embodied, he perceives that which has no extension in time and space, and after the death of the body, is released

from any consideration of the spatio-temporal. He enters into the intelligible away from the sensible.

While the achievement of man to recognise his original nature in the intelligible realm should not be taken lightly, overemphasising such an achievement prevents man from realising the true end of his journey which does not exist in opposition to anything, called the One, or the Good. Indeed, Plotinus claims that there are no differentiations in the One (VI.2.9.13–14) nothing can be contrary to the transcendent Good (I.8.6.27–28): for since the Good 'is not of a particular quality' and since it 'transcends substance' it is not contrary to anything, unlike substance itself which is contrary to non-substance (I.8.6.32). The ascension into the One, which is a purer unity than Intellect, is therefore man's greatest challenge: for the soul's encounter with the One is the moment of the death of the subject-object distinction; a death which occurs outside not only time and space but also eternity and the intelligible realm. Once the soul reaches this great principle, it loses its existence as a separate subject and becomes everything. Instead of being seduced by the multiple, it acknowledges it as its creation, and the multiple in return bows to it, in the knowledge that it is bowing to its source. The order of emanation is therefore restored to ultimate perfection, with no distinction between the sacred and profane. And thus, in order to journey from the second mode of the esoteric to the first, he must negate his identification with all the eternal and intelligible characteristics and forms. This means removing identification with all the attributes of eternity from his perception of his own nature. Upon entering into the intelligible realm, he must therefore cease to identify himself as an archetype or even as Being itself. For only by resisting the temptation to say, 'I am this' can man demonstrate that he has transcended the desire even for Being, Beauty and the Good. Indeed, he will have negated subject-object altogether, since by refusing even his existence, he destroys the conditions for separation from the One and thereby becomes it.

We can therefore see that an act of absolute negation is required to enter into this modeless mode. We call the result of absolute negation a mode because it pertains to an individual's subjective experience. However, we also call it modeless because in the case of the One the shift in subjectivity must be so radical that the subject-object distinction is extinguished by the absolute in the process, which in turn is not only a stratum of reality but the source of all reality itself. Indeed, by being content to transcend the subject-object dichotomy, man transforms into the purest unity which at once transcends and embraces all things as its own kin rather than remaining an intelligible reality which rejects from its domain all sensible realities. Herein therefore lies the difference between the first and second modes of the esoteric: the first mode entails

ultimate sacrifice, ultimate negation and the corresponding acceptance of all things whereas the second mode entails sacrifice only of the sensible realities and thus both negates and accepts only a limited range of characteristics and realities. The second mode is therefore a state of negating physical experience on the one hand and affirming intelligible experience on the other. For the realm of the intelligible is a realm of identity and Being which rests in itself and refuses to go out into the realm of appearances. On the other hand, we can see that the first mode of the esoteric is contradictory at heart: by journeying beyond Being, man encounters all beings as part of himself.

We have so far explored the One as a principle pertaining to absolute negation. For Plotinus is very clear that the principle which he calls the One only has a name to guide the seeker towards the negation of multiplicity and that even the term 'the One' must be negated when man comes to encounter the principle in his lived experience (V.5.6.26–36, VI.9.5.20–24). This is because the One transcends all knowledge, language and even the majestic principle of Intellect because Intellect is still something and the One is the absolute existing before 'something' came to exist (V.3.13.1–6). This in turn is why man can only enter its solitary nature in total solitude (VI.9.11.38–43): for as long as he is in multiplicity and carries 'a burden which hinders his vision' (VI.9.4.16–24) he will be 'taking something with him which keeps him from the One' (Ibid.). It is clear therefore that Plotinus believes that an encounter takes place when the soul of the human being has reached the One but that the encounter, as well as that which is encountered is barred from conceptual knowledge. We can therefore say that the One, conceived as the absolutely negative principle which transcends reality and evades all description, is absolutely mysterious and esoteric.

However, there are also passages in which Plotinus insists that the One is a positive principle. As the absolute monad, it is the first of all numbers existing in all other numbers 'primarily or secondarily' (V.5.5.7–12) and is therefore within all things since they all share in its monadic form. After the One, the monad is closest to Intellect since Intellect exists as a 'One-Many' (V.3.15.10–11; VI.7.14.11–12) by possessing all things in eternal actuality (IV.7.10.32–35) while falling short of the absolute unity of the One (III.2.1.26–34). Thus both Intellect and the intelligible realities are very close to the One by existing in its image, one step down in the order of nature. After Intellect, Soul also possesses the form of the monad, albeit in a less direct sense than Intellect, since it exists as a One-and-many (V.1.8.23–27) by containing all things 'as a multiple with one part in one place and one in another' (V.1.2.38–40) and by 'producing its activities one after the other, and then another which succeeds that which precedes it' (11.35–40). Therefore, even Soul, along with the sensible realities it contains,

is connected to the One as 'an expression and a kind of activity of Intellect, just as Intellect is of the One' (v.1.6.41–46). This means that all entities, whether intelligible or sensible, possess the nature of the monad in one way or another. And thus, Plotinus presents the One as totally immanent as well as absolutely transcendent. This exoteric aspect of the One is further supported by Plotinus' claims that the One is the cause of all things (v.3.15-27-39) which can be thought of as the King at the summit of reality, presiding over Intellect and Soul below it (v.v.3.6–15). For as the grandest and most majestic principle, the One exists both as the cause of all things and as a kind of divine autocrat which looks over his great kingdom atop a lofty throne. And therefore, it is also 'God' and the 'First' (v.1.7.17–21 and v.5.9.33–35), since it is not only a mechanical first cause but also the first life of all things which must be revered as ultimately sacred. All these descriptors place the One at the top of the hierarchy of nature by presenting it either as first cause, or as the principle to which all beings must bow in acknowledgment of the divine context of their existence.

It is therefore evident that there is not only an esoteric aspect of the One accessible by the *via negativa*, but also an exoteric aspect which can be affirmed as the cause and container of all things (v.3.15.24–30). While absolute negation will yield us an ineffable encounter with the One as the principle of absolute transcendence and thus absolute absence from any knowable hypostasis or object (whether intelligible or sensible), it is also the case that by being absolutely negative, the One is also able to be absolutely positive and to produce and affirm the great order of nature, all the way from the lofty heights of pure Intellect to the heavy and earth-leaden depths of matter in Soul. For it is by virtue of the fact that the One is wholly transcendent that it refuses to be limited to the concept of transcendence and makes itself known by becoming fully immanent to and through the great chain of Being. Rather than existing as a principle of pure negation which negates without a trace of affirmation, the One negates absolutely, so that it negates not only the lower hypostases and the realities they contain but also its own very identity as a negative principle. By negating its own identity as a negative principle, it thereby exists simultaneously as absolutely positive principle from which all things arise. Plotinus makes this point by claiming that 'life and thought and all things come from the One, because that God is not one of all things … and is not confined to any shape' (v.1.7.17–21), that 'it is because there is nothing in it that all things come from it' and 'because it seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing (that it) overflows, as it were, and … makes something other than itself' (v.2.1.5–10). For if the One were a 'something' or clung to identity of any kind, it would exist in opposition to something else with a different identity and could not therefore be the ultimate principle existing beyond identity. Rather, it is only by being completely empty

of identification of any kind that the One is able to contain the multiple while remaining a simple and transcendent unity. The One is therefore absolutely transcendent by negating all positive attributions and absolutely immanent by negating its own identity as a negative principle. We come closest to its nature by claiming that it endlessly negates and that it is therefore both positive and negative (since through this radical negation it affirms all things) and neither positive nor negative (since this same act of negation denies all things). The internal nature of the One therefore manifests itself dialectically to discursive reason, since every time the mind tries to capture its essence (of which there is none), it finds that the One has already negated its concept and remained one step ahead of it.

We have now discovered that the two aspects which we thought were distinct and contradicted one another are in fact part of one unified nature. For the esoteric transforms into the exoteric and vice versa, so that there are no longer two distinct principles of esoteric and exoteric but one esoteric-exoteric phenomenon. In fact, once we have unified these aspects in our minds, this new unified concept then dissolves since each individual word only has meaning in the context of opposition and contrast to its complementary principle. The same can be said of the human soul which wishes to access the One in lived experience, which must 'touch that light (of the One) … by the light which is also its means of seeing' (v.3.17.32–36) by recognising itself as that empty and luminous nature which it mistakenly believed existed outside itself. We must therefore take the notions of the esoteric versus exoteric; purity versus impurity; experiential knowledge versus conceptual knowledge; and mode of experience versus external cause of experience merely as devices which help us on the path towards the realisation of the supreme principle. For in the end we must get rid of all such distinctions if we wish to arrive at 'the ultimate which is the first … (and) beautiful of itself.' (v.9.2.1–18)

Having investigated how man may achieve the One by entering into the first modeless mode of the esoteric through the act of absolute negation, we may turn to III.7 and use the investigation into the One to help us illuminate Plotinus' propositions regarding the natures of eternity and time. For it is the claim of this book that the One does not only emanate its exoteric nature to Intellect and Soul to form the three hypostases, but that it also emanates its esoteric nature to eternity and time which can be understood only in relation to the human soul and its path of liberation rather than as objects within the hypostases. We will therefore claim that eternity and time can be conceived as the second and third modes of the esoteric, since they come into being through man's subjective disposition and give him access to the hypostases of Intellect and Soul respectively. By defining eternity and time as modes of the esoteric, we

will be able to map out the way in which their emanatory characters differ from those of Intellect and Soul which we will describe as exoteric principles which can be understood objectively. We will therefore see why eternity shares much in common with time by being subjective modes which make experience possible, in contrast to Intellect and Soul which are those conditions of possibility for experience which are knowable objectively and which are therefore exoteric. We will also see that eternity is like Intellect and unlike time by being a principle of purity, and that time and Soul are principles of impurity. Finally we will aim to show why eternity is the mode of comportment to Intellect and why time is the mode of comportment to Soul. In this way we aim to demonstrate that on all levels of nature, man cannot separate what he experiences from his own mode of subjectivity.

2 The Second Mode of the Esoteric

Now that we have discovered what it takes for man to reach the ultimate level of reality (which is beyond reality), we must descend to the next level of reality below the One and attempt to discover once more the content of man's experience and the conditions of possibility for such content. We may now use the word 'experience', for on this level there is no doubt that the individual human soul encounters objects and that the link between the soul and such objects can be labelled experience, unlike in the case of the One where no separate identity is able to survive. For in the realm below the One, man experiences the intelligible realities, which include the pure forms, the primaries and the great kinds. However, we must also attempt to reveal how Plotinus aims to make sense of such experience by showing how it is possible for man to encounter this realm of purity, wholeness and completion. Plotinus does this by naming and explicating three different but intimately related principles which make pure experience possible. The first is Intellect; the second is eternity; and the third is Being. It is arguable that one of the major aims of III.7 is to find out the unique role of eternity as a condition of possibility for pure experience as distinct from those of Intellect and Being. This therefore also means understanding the role that the principles of Intellect and Being play in making the experience of the intelligible realities possible as well. Once we have discovered how eternity, Intellect and Being function as distinct conditions of possibility, we will see how the One emanates its power in different ways upon these three principles. We will attempt to argue that eternity is the mode of experience which man must enter in order to experience the intelligible realities; that Intellect is the

cause of the intelligible beings independent of man; and that Being is the state of conformity between eternity and Intellect, which comprise its two aspects.

Let us first enquire into the nature of Intellection in order to discover why Plotinus claims that eternity is different from Intellect (see 2.10–15), while being identical to it in some way (see 5.19–22). The main difference that Plotinus identifies between eternity and Intellect in III.7 is that eternity exists as a partless whole (2.17–19, 3.15–19, 4.37–43 and 6.47–50) whereas Intellect exists as a whole in relation to its parts (2.17–19). This is because Intellect is devoid of life without eternity, and therefore ceases to stand in relation to the experience of partless unity and instead becomes an object of theoretical enquiry whose unity is perceived in relation to multiple parts. Indeed, Intellect is that hypostasis which has unfurled from the absolute unity of the One into the unity which expresses the multiplicity of pure forms (see III.8.8.32–38; V.3.10.7–16; VI.7.17.39–43 and VI.9.5.12–16) or the 'One-Many' (V.3.15.10–11; VI.7.14.11–12) which is a plurality-in-unity (see III.2.1.26–34 for example). This means that the principle of Intellect only achieves its unity by subsuming multiplicity in such a way that no part or form is 'cut off from the whole … (so that) the whole life of it … lives and thinks all together in one and makes the part the whole and all bound in friendship with itself' (III.2.1.30–32). This multiplicity of parts is not only a feature of the identity of Intellect but is central to its very nature: for Intellect achieves its unity by representing the unified summation of the intelligible realities. Thus, 'Intellect does not apprehend objects which pre-exist it—as sense does sense—objects—but … itself is its objects' (V.4.2.45–48) so that it can be described as all things intelligible (see II.9.6.28–34; III.3.3.20–23; V.1.4.19–21; VI.2.20.20–23 and VI.6.7.1–4) and not solely as that which contains them. Intellect therefore not only encompasses the intelligible realities 'as a genus does a species and a whole its parts' (V.9.6.9–10) but is also 'a composite of all … with all its contents' (VI.2.18.12–17). Thus, just as it is impossible to conceive of intelligible realities without Intellect; it is also impossible to conceive of Intellect without the intelligible realities.

While on the one hand Intellect exists as the sum total of the things it contains and therefore cannot be conceived without the existence of the intelligible realities, Plotinus also maintains that it is logically prior to its parts (VI.2.19.18–21). We may attempt to grasp the paradoxical nature of Intellect both being and, in some sense, transcending its elements, by comparing it to that of a mathematical set. According to Georg Cantor, the creator of set theory, a set is a 'gathering together into a whole of definite, distinct objects of our perception (Anschauung) or of our thought—which are called elements of the set.' (Cantor 1895, 481) Intellect may also be described as a 'gathering together into a

whole' of distinct objects of thought, namely the intelligible realities. For Intellect is a whole (V.3.5.43–46; V.3.6.7–8; V.9.6.9–10; VI.2.21.3–11) which is made up of distinct intelligible realities (see VI.2.20–23) which are distinct objects of intellection (see VI.4.14.3–5). These distinct objects are in turn elements of the set of all intelligible realities known as Intellect (see VI.2.20.25–29; V.9.8.3–7 and VI.9.2.21–27). Intellect can therefore be conceived as a kind of metaphysical set standing in relation to the elements it contains. For on the one hand, Intellect is logically prior to its elements because if the set of intelligible realities (Intellect) did not exist, then necessarily no intelligible realities would exist either, in the same way that there could be no even numbers without the set of even numbers; no odd numbers without the set of odd numbers; and no prime numbers without the set of prime numbers. However, unlike the relationship between a Form and its particular, where there is only a one-way dependence of the particular upon the form (for example, a particular instantiation of beauty in the material world requires the existence of Beauty in the realm of the forms but not vice versa), Intellect, existing in a similar fashion to a set-theoretical concept, requires its elements as much as its elements require it. For just as there could be no set of even numbers without the existence of two, four, six and eight to provide its content, so there can be no set of intelligible realities without the intelligible realities themselves. And thus, there is no Intellect without the form of beauty; the form of the triangle; or the form of the table. However, although this biconditional dependence exists between the concept of Intellect and the intelligible realities, Plotinus still claims that Intellect is logically prior to its elements because Intellect itself represents the unity of the intelligibles (see for example VI.7.14.11–18) and it is precisely this unity which separates the intelligibles from the spatio-temporal objects of Soul. It is also on account of the logical priority of Intellect that Plotinus designates it as the cause of the intelligibles (see for example, VI.2.20.25–29) since its unity logically precedes and therefore accounts for the unified existence of each individual intelligible reality. And thus, we can now understand why Plotinus claims that Intellect is inclusive as a whole which 'stands in relation to its parts' (2.17–19): for it represents the unified completion (as well as the cause) of the distinct intelligible realities.

Furthermore, Intellect stands in relation to a very specific range of parts. We have already seen that Intellect contains the forms, such as the form of good (as distinct from the Good itself) and the form of beauty (as distinct from Beauty itself);[5] and we also know that it employs the great kinds in its

5 As Gerson 2018b, § 2 states, the Platonic Form of the Good should not be confused with the concept of goodness as an intelligible attribute. The former is the supreme principle which is

act of intellection in order to distinguish itself from those intelligible realities which it contains, making it a One-Many. However, there are also many things which Intellect does not include by virtue of its ontological status being either too great or too lowly. For example, Intellect does not include sense objects (IV.7.10.32–40; V.4.2.47–49 and VI.9.3.22–27 for example) or discursive reason (IV.8.1.1–11; V.3.3.19–21 and V.9.7) because it transcends Soul, whose life entraps its elements into a state of deficiency, extension, generation and destruction (see for example 11.54–59). Neither, on the other hand, does Intellect include the One (V.4.2.42–43), the Good (V.9.2.23–28) or Absolute Beauty since these things transcend it by existing beyond Being. Intellect can therefore be understood as the set of intelligible parts and intelligible parts only, which separates it from the Soul and the One since it transcends the Soul (which contains only non-intelligible parts) and falls short of the One (which contains everything and nothing at the same time in a paradoxical act of transcendence). Thus, like all sets which are neither universal (containing all elements) nor empty (containing no elements), Intellect includes certain elements which can be called its members (and thus conforms to the set theoretical principle of inclusion) and excludes those things which do not meet its conditions of entry (conforming to the principle of exclusion).

Of those elements which Intellect includes, the human soul is unique in sharing in the domain of Soul which is lower than Intellect because it is divided into a higher and a lower part (see for example V.1.10.1–18 with regards to the higher part and IV.8.1.1–11; IV.8.4.21–31; IV.8.8.1–13; III.4.3.18–27 and V.1.10 with regards to the lower part) and therefore represents the intersection of the two hypostases in its embodied state by sharing in both principles at the same time (see V.3.3.36–40). It is therefore clear that Intellect is inclusive of parts in the way that a (non-universal and non-empty) set includes its elements,[6] since both represent a specific domain which contains and excludes certain elements and which can share certain elements with other domains without contradiction (like the human soul in the case of Intellect and Soul, or the number two in the case of the set of even numbers and the set of prime numbers).

Now that we have mapped out an overall picture of the way in which Intellect exists as a whole in relation to its parts, we may attempt to identify the emanatory character of Intellect in relation to the One so that we may then be able to distinguish this principle from eternity, which emanates from the One

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synonymous with the One, whereas the latter is the manifestation of goodness on the level of Being (see VI.7.15.9–11). Similarly, Beauty may be seen as synonymous with the Good (I.6.6.21–24) and is distinct from its manifestation in the intelligible world.

6 For an accessible introduction to set theory, see: Pollard, Stephen, 2015.

in a different way so that it 'contains the totality of the intelligible realities simultaneously, not as parts' (2.18). We have already seen that the One contains an esoteric and an exoteric aspect: an exoteric aspect pertaining to the relational qualities of the One which can be grasped objectively, and an esoteric aspect pertaining to the non-relational qualities of the One which can only be encountered through the subjective mode of absolute negation. We said that the former exoteric aspect was the hypostatic nature of the One as cause and container of all reality, whereas the latter esoteric aspect was the nature of the One as an ineffable unity which could not be understood relationally but rather encountered as something utterly transcendent. The exoteric aspect was posited independently of man's subjective path of liberation, whereas the esoteric aspect was postulated in the context of man's journey to enlightenment. And thus, we stated that the innermost nature of the One was only accessible to the man who had negated everything and thus satisfied the necessary epistemological conditions for union with the absolute metaphysical principle. How then shall we trace out the hypostasis of Intellect as a principle arising from the One? And in what way does it imitate the One while at the same time straying from its absolute nature? For while we know that Intellect is an expression of the One (V.1.6.41–46) and that it is produced by it (V.2.1.13–16), we must presently investigate the nature of this expression and production in order to identify Intellect and thereby pave the way to understand eternity as a different principle existing on the same ontological level.

The first thing which Intellect receives from the One is its purity. For since both Intellect and the One are pure (see VI.2.8.4–11 and V.5.4.5–6 respectively) and Intellect is an expression of the One, we can deduce that Intellect receives its pure nature as a direct emanation from the One. However, while the One is pure by rejecting any differentiation (VI.2.9.13–14) and by being absolutely transcendent, Intellect is pure by 'separating itself by differentiation into parts which are not cut off from each other, (while being) altogether forever' (IV.3.4.9–10). The purity of the One is therefore associated with the fact that it is unpolluted by any identification, even with Being itself (see for example, I.7.1.19–20) so that it is able to flout the law of non-contradiction and exist as all things and nothing all at the same time (V.2.1.1). On the other hand, Intellect is pure by rejecting from its domain that which does not match its ontological status and therefore contains only the intelligible realities (VI.2.8.1–4) and outlaws entities in Soul such as sensible objects and the lower part of the human soul (though it accounts for these realities by providing their archetypal form: III.6.6.10–14; V.9.9.1–8). Thus, one could claim that the One remains pure by being untouched by the multiple it contains (VI.2.10.14–15) whereas Intellect falls short of the absolute purity and simplicity of the One by becoming a part

of the multiple (see for example, V.4.2.9–10; VI.2.21.3–11 and VI.6.9.29–31) and achieves only a lower level of purity by subsuming this multiplicity into one unified concept which Plotinus calls a One-Many. Since the One accepts all things unconditionally, it is the principle of both that which is pure (or intelligible) and that which is not pure (non-intelligible). Therefore, we can say that the One transfers its purity to Intellect so that Intellect is also a principle of purity, but that through the process of emanation the purity of the One is diluted so that the purity of Intellect is not absolute and all-encompassing like the One which accepts pure and impure realities alike, but is instead limited to an elite group called the intelligibles. Therefore, while the One and Intellect are both pure, the One is the principle of both the pure and the impure alike, whereas Intellect is the principle only of the pure.

The second thing which Intellect receives from the One is an exoteric nature. We may recall that the One has an exoteric and hypostatic nature which can be grasped objectively. For as we have seen, the One is described in V.2.1.1 as 'all things' (affirming the objects it stands in relation to), as the 'productive power of all things' in V.1.7.9–10 (affirming its nature as cause) and as that in which all things have their existence (V.3.15.24–30). These qualities of the One as a hypostatic principle can clearly be grasped by the mind and require no special mode or path of negation to comprehend. This is why we say that the One has an exoteric nature which can be accessed intellectually and an esoteric aspect which requires spiritual transformation. The former is associated with relational concepts such as containment and cause which can clearly be understood without recourse to purification or spiritual practice and pertains to the principle of the One as a hypostasis rather than as an ineffable and mysterious singularity. And it is this aspect which is transferred to Intellect which, when separated from the notion of eternity, is simply a hypostatic principle and nothing else. For as we have seen, Plotinus' notion of Intellect is presented as a kind of set-theoretical concept which can only be grasped in relation to its parts but which is at the same time logically prior to and the cause of the realities which it contains. Since this set of attributes exhausts the nature of Intellect, we could claim that Intellect is a purely exoteric principle. For Intellect does not possess any of the characteristics which esoteric principles do: it is not an internal mode symbolising a level of maturity which unlocks access to certain realities and is not arrived at through the negation of desire or physical existence. Thus it provides the objective rather than the subjective features of man's experience. This means that, like all hypostases, Intellect can be understood as a stage on the additive process of emanation proceeding from the pure simplicity of the One, and that it is somewhat detached from man and his subjective journey of libera-

tion since its objective existence is always statically present regardless of man's ability to negate the objects of his experience and rise to a higher level of reality.

However, the principle of Intellect does provide the content of man's experience of the intelligibles (if this experience is indeed possible) since it is the cause and the sustainer of the intelligibles. It must therefore have something to do with man's subjective journey of liberation since this journey is inextricably linked to man's experience of all stages of reality, from the lowest level of matter to the highest level of the One. What is not immediately clear is how man could come to have lived experience of a hypostasis and its contents when the hypostases themselves are purely objective principles which exist independently of man's subjective modes. For the only reason that man is able to experience the One is not because of its exoteric, hypostatic nature but because it also has an esoteric aspect which is not objective and which can be encountered directly after man has undergone the necessary purifications. How then could man experience Intellect or the intelligibles if Intellect does not have an esoteric aspect? The answer would seem to be that for every hypostasis under the One, there exists an esoteric principle which provides its counterpart and which makes man's experience of the contents of that hypostasis possible. In the case of Intellect, this counterpart is called eternity or the second mode of the esoteric. For whereas Intellect exists as a cause existing independently of man, eternity exists as a mode constituting man's innermost nature; whereas Intellect functions as a metaphysical set which affirms its parts, eternity stands as a subjective principle which negates parts; and whereas Intellect can be understood objectively, eternity evades such an understanding. We may therefore claim that unlike Intellect which is an exoteric principle, eternity is an esoteric principle. The reason that we say that Intellect and eternity are counterparts is that Plotinus insists that they are both secondary (and not tertiary) principles directly below the One: the former representing the second level of the exoteric through the imitation of the hypostatic nature of the One and the latter representing the second mode of the esoteric as that which imitates the ineffable and non-relational aspect of the One. As we will see, both principles are necessary (and together sufficient) principles for man's experience of the intelligible realities which can in the end be seen as the two complementary aspects of Being.

Having explored Intellect as the secondary exoteric principle, let us now turn to eternity as the second mode of the esoteric. We must first seek to understand the way in which eternity can be described as a mode constituting man's innermost nature. In 11.15–27 Plotinus claims that we 'produced time as an image of eternity' by means of 'an unquiet power' which desired something more than the experience of eternal presence. The human responsibility for the genera-

tion of time is reiterated in 11.43–45 when Plotinus claims that 'time is the life of the soul in a movement that changes from one way of life to another'; in 12.4–12 where he says that if we put a stop to the activity which is 'involved in creation and generation' then nothing would exist except eternity and in 12.19–22 where he claims that when soul goes away from that activity time is destroyed since this activity of the soul generates time. It is therefore the desire for some future state and for the world of sense and physical experience which comes along with the activity of the making and production of the human soul which produces time. Since the desire for 'the next and the after' (11.17–18) is the cause of time, it makes sense that desireless resting and quietude (see 11.1–4) would link man to the eternal. For in Plotinus' descriptions of time are the clues which we need to return to eternity: for example, we should allow 'the all to be continuously present to (us)' (11.22–23); we should remain as 'a quiet seed' (11.23) rather than 'proceed(ing) into a weaker extension' (11.26–27); and we should resist going towards 'according to the principle and nature of the 'after'' (11.5–6) and instead 'make this power turn back again and stop this life' (12.4–5) so that we can be 'at rest, identical to itself and the same and already boundless' (11.45–46). However, there is an asymmetry between Plotinus' two descriptions of the way man's desiring state relates to time and the way in which his desireless state relates to eternity. For whereas Plotinus claims that man's desire generates time, he does not claim that man generates eternity. For while time is directly produced by man and Soul's self-enslaving dispositions (11.20–33), eternity is not created in any way but exists simply as 'what is' or as Being (3.34–36; 6.12–14). We must therefore seek to understand how it is possible that on the one hand man's desiring consciousness generates time but on the other that his non-desiring consciousness does not produce eternity. We will do this by introducing an analogy that can help us to resolve this issue so that we will be able to see more clearly why for Plotinus time is a product of man's consciousness but not eternity; what eternity is in and of itself; and why we can claim that eternity is an esoteric principle which can be separated from Intellect as an exoteric principle.

Let us now imagine that a person goes to a cinema to see a film. At the cinema, there are five conditions of possibility for man's experience of the film which we will consider. The first is the desiring consciousness of man wishing to see the film; the second is the conscious awareness of the person watching the film; the third is the film itself; the fourth is the filmmaker; and the fifth is the world outside the film in which the film is seen and projected. Let us begin with the desiring consciousness of the man who wants to see the film. When the person begins to watch the film, he soon becomes so involved with the film and identified with the protagonist that he begins to share his fears and desires

to become invested in the overall narrative centred around him. The person goes to see the film because he is bored with his everyday experience and wants the excitement of losing himself in a film. He therefore chooses to 'seek more than the present' by becoming emotionally involved in a narrative with a past, present and future, thereby becoming constantly invested in the 'next and the after' of the film (see 11.15–20). This activity of seeking excitement in a narrative is a pre-requisite for the person's becoming involved with the time of the film. For if he were content with his present state without the film, he would not have gone. Furthermore, the time of the film only exists because he, along with other people like him, wish to go to watch such exciting films as these. It is therefore the seeking of an exciting narrative with a past, present and future which is met by the film-making process. In a similar way, according to Plotinus, man in his eternal state seeks the excitement of a before and an after in time and thereby enters into a physical existence which is at the same time the result of his desire to enter into it and co-created by an external force (by Soul in the case of physical existence or by a filmmaker in the case of the analogy). Time for Plotinus, like the film time, is therefore produced by the desire for the narrative of a before and after and this then sets in motion the process of the creation of an appropriate realm in which such experience can occur, such as the realm of physical experience or the film itself. The analogy helps to clarify what Plotinus means when he says that time is the result of an activity of making and production: for just as there would be no film timeline without the making of the film, so there would be no time without the making and production of the human soul and the hypostasis of Soul.

Let us now turn to the conscious awareness of the man watching the film. If time is the activity of immersion in the before or after and the forgetting of the present, then the eternal is the constant presence before and behind the before and after. If the person continues to watch the film and identify with the character, he will be in a state of utter insecurity associated with the former principle. For instead of experiencing his true nature as a whole (4.13), he will view himself as an incomplete and deficient being constantly seeking in the future the happiness which can only be found in the present (see for example, 1.5.2). Due to his ignorance of the true reality existing outside the film, this man will embark on an endless pursuit for lasting contentment in the film, but will always fail to find it since such lasting (eternal) contentment is attainable only by the turning of attention away from the objects of experience and back to the subject of experience, the watcher of the film (see 12.4–12). In Plotinus' philosophy, turning one's attention back means to 'escape to the upper world' of the intelligible realm (III.4.2.12–15) and thus to avoid the never-ending pattern of incarnation on earth (VI.7.7.17–23). To the man watching the

film, this means cultivating a state of detachment from the destiny of the plot and seeing through all events in the context of his own conscious awareness which remains untouched by such illusory circumstances. The recognition of immutable conscious awareness in relation to the film (insofar as it cannot be destroyed or threatened in any way by the events within it) is not merely an analogy for but is also a representation of eternity and man's eternal state of being. For just as man is able to escape any illusion of being trapped in the timeline of the film through detached and desireless observation, so he is able to transcend the illusion of time itself and achieve eternity by adopting this desireless orientation in everyday life. The shift from a forgetful and transfixed state to his original detached state of observation therefore represents the same process in both the case of the film and everyday existence. For both in the cinema and in everyday life, the man who loses himself in the objects of experience will be enslaved to a timeline, whereas he who keeps his awareness double-pointed by experiencing objects in the knowledge of his transcendent nature will rise above his timeline and therefore exist in a state of timeless presence (either in a relative sense in relation to the particular timeline of the film, or in an absolute sense in everyday existence).

Following the logic of our analogy, it is apparent that whereas time is produced by the ignoring or concealing of man's original nature and the shift in his awareness from the ever-present seat of experience to a narrative with a before and an after, eternity is revealed to (rather than produced by) man when he is able to identify with his desireless state of being. In fact, eternity is not only revealed to man through this state of being as something external to him; rather it is revealed as his true nature, or as the 'eternal in (him)self': a mode of being which 'dwells with it(self), fascinated by its nature and able to do so by a natural power that never tires' (5.7–12). This act of subjectivity turning back to itself is what Plotinus means by eternity 'bring(ing) itself into unity with relation to itself': for man may first see the unchanging screen as something separate to himself (an attitude reflected in chapters 1–4 of III.7), but he will soon realise that it is in fact inseparable from his own nature (an attitude reflected in chapters 5, 11 and 12) and thus the paradoxical concealment of Being to itself (or to the higher part of the human soul) is eventually unveiled so that there is nothing left except for pure presence. Furthermore, man will realise that the desireless state of being through which he was able to access eternity is not merely a state of being but is rather true Being, or Being in itself. For as soon as man stops identifying with an incomplete and desiring consciousness (the lower part of the soul), his nature as eternity is revealed to him as 'true Being (which) is never not being or being otherwise, and (which) is always identical, and (which) is Being without difference' (6.12–14). We have therefore clarified

Plotinus' claim that time is generated by the form of life of the soul and have also attempted to show that a person can never actually become estranged from eternity when he enters time, just as the man in the cinema is always detached from the circumstances of the film however much he becomes involved in its plot and characters. The only thing that can ever happen is for eternity to be concealed from man through his desire for exciting prospects in the future and for physical experience. This means that eternity is never absent from man's nature and is beyond generation or destruction, whereas time is the reversible product of man's estrangement from his own nature through desire. The former is the mode of dwelling with Being (5.7–18) whereas the latter, as the image of eternity (see 1.18–20, 11.46–47 and *Ti.* 37D5), is the mode of desire for Being (see 4.28–31) by means of the 'before' and 'after' (Ibid.).

It would therefore appear that man's desiring consciousness is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of possibility for the experience of the images of a film or of the sensory existence associated with Soul. For while this desiring consciousness sets the timeline of the film, and time itself in motion, the basic fact of awareness, which in itself is free from any identification, is a further condition for man's experience of the film and physical experience. For without it, there would be nothing in which man could experience anything. We can therefore say that this eternal state (existing outside of the timeline of the film) remains intact as a condition of possibility both in the case of the man watching the film in a desireless and detached state and for the man who has forgotten his eternal nature and who has become identified with the characters and events within the film. For in both cases, man's conscious awareness remains aloof and untouched by the projections appearing in front of him, and is a necessary key to his experience. The only difference therefore between the enlightened and unenlightened man is that the former realises that his conscious awareness transcends time, whereas the latter does not. Ontologically however, the two men are identical in kind. For this reason we can say that the two men are always in eternity and that the latter is only apparently in time, since his conscious awareness is always there, and it is only his desire which blinds him to this fact. Thus, while time only comes into being with the 'unquiet power' of man (11.21), eternity is the ever-present reality which must be recognised through the extinction of the desire for a temporal life (12.4–12). Whether this occurs or not, however, eternity is the innermost condition of possibility for subjective experience since it signifies the conscious awareness which transcends all timelines. We have therefore discovered that on the one hand, man's desiring consciousness is required for his experience of time and its associated sensory objects but that this experience itself occurs in his own original eternal nature (eternity itself) which provides the unchanging context in which all

changing phenomena appear. In order to understand more fully man's journey into ignorance and his return to the recognition of his original nature, we must complete our matching up of elements of Plotinus' philosophical architecture with the elements in the cinema, so that we will be able to paint a picture of man's journey of liberation from start to finish. So far, we have described the subjective conditions of possibility for man's experience of the film: namely, man's desiring consciousness (producing a timeline) and man's original ever-present awareness (which is eternity). We must now turn to the objective conditions of possibility (or those realities which contribute to the production of experience independently of man's modes of consciousness): the third, fourth and fifth conditions of possibility, represented in our analogy by the film, the filmmaker and the screen.

The third condition of possibility, the film itself, can be described as the conceptual unity of the characters and events appearing in the cinema. In everyday life, it would be the conceptual unity of the sensible realities appearing in man's awareness. In Plotinus' philosophy, the conceptual unity of the physical, sensible realities is Soul (see for example 11.27–35; VI.6.7.4–7 and VI.7.42). Like Intellect, Soul can be described as a set, but this time of physical things since 'it was necessary that all the very same kinds of living things which were in the intelligible world should also exist in the world perceived by the senses' (IV.8.1.49–51). As a metaphysical set, Soul also receives its identity from the parts existing within it, which are set in their appropriate place since sensible realities must exist in Soul just as the intelligible realities must exist in Intellect. Furthermore, Soul imitates Intellect by existing not only as the unity of the sensible realities but also as their cause (see again 11.27–35 and II.9.8.8–16). This means that, according to our analogy, Soul is both the film and the filmmaker and is therefore both the third and fourth condition of possibility for experience, since like a film, it stands for the conceptual unity of a certain series of events conveyed through images and like the filmmaker, it is the cause of particular objects of man's experience which cannot themselves be explained by man's desire. Indeed, Plotinus suggests that unlike time which is the result of human desire (12.19–22), the creation of the physical world is the consequence of a parallel journey of Soul wishing to depart from the realm of Intellect, which therefore made 'all of it exist in time … encasing all its means of escape in time' (11.31–33). Thus, just as the particularities of a film are dictated by the filmmaker and are outside of the control of the viewer of the film, so too are the multitudinous sensible realities created by Soul without input from the human soul. We are therefore presented with an image of the human soul producing time and Soul generating the physical universe in conformity with time. Since time is produced by the human soul and corresponds to its desiring mode of con-

sciousness, we may call time a mode of the esoteric (the third after the first mode of the One and the second mode of eternity). Since Soul produces sensible objects independently of man, we can call Soul a level of the exoteric (the third after the first level of the One and the second level of Intellect). Furthermore, the physical universe can also be conceived as exoteric since it is created by (the exoteric principle of) Soul on the blueprint of (the exoteric principle of) Intellect. This is why the physical universe, unlike time, appears externally to man: for it arises from a source external to himself and therefore must appear as an object of experience rather than remain concealed as a subjective mode or condition of possibility for experience.

While we have thus far observed an opposition in III.7 between time as a subjective mode pertaining to human consciousness (or the third mode of the esoteric) and Soul as an exoteric hypostasis relating to how things are independently of man, Plotinus seems to threaten the legitimacy of this distinction in 11.29–30 when he claims that Soul made 'time as opposed to eternity' by intending to be an image of Intellect. For in this passage, Plotinus suggests that Soul co-creates time with the human soul with the implication that time, or at least an aspect of it, is on the side of objective features of reality existing independently of man's mode of consciousness, rather than existing as a mode. How then can we square the supposition that time is a mode (corresponding to its intimate connection with human intentionality) with Plotinus' claim that it is also produced externally to man by Soul? We must do this by observing the distinction between two types of time in Plotinus' thought: which we will call psychological time and mechanical time. In our analogy, this distinction may be illustrated by differentiating between man's absorption in the time of the film (psychological time) and the timeline of the film itself (mechanical time) with its 'before' and 'after'; and beginning, middle and end. The causes of psychological time have nothing to do with the filmmaker or the film itself, but can only be attributed to man's desire to lose himself in the plot of an exciting narrative. Indeed, man must wish to go to the cinema to watch a film in order to give the filmmaker the incentive to create the film which will be shown there. This original desire to watch a film corresponds to man's fall from Intellect, since it is his desire for the 'next' and the 'after' which sets into motion the productive power of Soul (the filmmaker) which then creates the physical universe (represented by the film) (11.27–33). The second cause of psychological time is man's inability to remember his true nature as he watches the film and becomes invested in its plot, characters and eventual conclusion. This corresponds to man's identification with his physical body in the temporal universe of Soul, to the exclusion of his acknowledgment and remembrance of his true nature as an eternal and intelligible being.

Psychological time therefore has both an original and a continuous cause corresponding first to man's initial desire for physical experience and second to his ongoing absorption with such experience which leads him to forget his original nature.

While psychological time is man's absorption in the 'before' and 'after' and corresponding forgetfulness of his true nature, mechanical time is simply the 'before' and 'after' itself, which bears a different relationship to man's desiring consciousness than psychological time. At the beginning of the creation of the universe, mechanical time is just as dependent upon man's desire as psychological time is. For without man's desire to move beyond his timeless existence in the intelligible realm, Soul would not create a sensory realm subject to the 'before' and 'after' of time in which man could experience physical existence and the extended narrative that this entails. Since mechanical time is simply this 'before' and 'after', and this 'before' and 'after' cannot be created without man's desire, we can conclude that mechanical time is caused by man's desire. However, according to Plotinus, this mechanical time, or sequence of the 'before' and 'after', is also created by the hypostasis of Soul which generates time along with the physical universe, and ensures that the physical universe exists within time (11.27–33). This means that the creation of mechanical time, once desired, is out of man's hands since it falls under the domain of Soul to bring it into being. This is why Plotinus claims both that man 'produced time as an image of eternity' (11.19–20) and that Soul 'made (time) instead of eternity' (Ibid.): for on the one hand man is responsible for the creation of mechanical time by desiring it, while on the other Soul is responsible for the creation of mechanical time by actually generating it along with the physical universe 'in imitation of that intelligible world' (Ibid.). Since the actual generation of mechanical time is outside of man's control, man cannot immediately erase the past and future by recognising his true intelligible nature. Rather, once he remembers himself, man is immediately liberated from psychological time since he is no longer so absorbed in sensory experience that he believes he is a physical being who was born and will eventually die. However, he will still perceive mechanical time, since he will still perceive a sensory world through a physical body created in accordance with his previous desire for a journey beyond timeless presence. Since the sensory world and physical body were subjected to mechanical time by Soul at their inception, man will still perceive mechanical time but will no longer feel himself to be part of it. And thus, the end of psychological time does not entail the immediate end of mechanical time. This is why Plotinus claims that the future or 'one thing after another' means nothing after man remembers eternity (see 12.12–13), rather than stating that the future immediately disappears: for man's 'return' to eternity entails only

the immediate escape from psychological time. For while there is a contradiction in remembering eternity and remaining in psychological time, there is no contradiction in man's recognition of his eternal state and his perception of mechanical time through the physical body. This is why Plotinus claims that the abolition of psychological time and return to eternity only begins the destruction of mechanical time for that person (see my comments on 12.4–22): for once psychological time has ended, man destroys the cause of his embodiment and seduction by the 'before' and 'after' but still has to endure the rest of the timeline produced by his previous desire for physical experience. Once he has undergone this, however, he will no longer need to come back to earth in another body, since he will rest content in his own nature as an intelligible being (and perhaps in the end as the One beyond Being).

Let us now clarify the difference between psychological time and mechanical time by returning to our analogy of the film and the filmmaker. In the beginning, man desires to depart from his present state and become lost in the timeline and narrative of a film. This original desire both sets up the possibility for man to become lost in an imitative world (psychological time) and incentivises the filmmaker (representing Soul) to produce a film (standing for the physical universe) with its own timeline (mechanical time). The two conditions of possibility for the timeline of the film are firstly the desiring consciousness of the man wishing to become involved in a narrative and secondly the creation of the film and its corresponding timeline by the filmmaker. Once the timeline is in place, man goes to watch the film and becomes heavily invested in the plot and identifies with the main character to such an extent that he forgets that he is watching a film and feels that he himself exists within its timeline and shares the destiny of the main character (psychological time). However, at some stage, the man's friend points out to him that he is only watching a film and reminds him that there is no need to be concerned, since nothing that happened in the film could affect his own life, which exists beyond the confines of its plot and narrative. At this stage, the man comes to his senses and neither identifies himself with the main character nor believes that he exists within the confines of the timeline of the film (representing the end of psychological time). The man is therefore, contextually speaking, in an enlightened state of detachment from the film since he no longer shares the fears or desires of the character(s) within it. However, while the negative psychological effects of watching the film due to total absorption in it have ended, the man still finds himself observing a film with a corresponding timeline (mechanical time) which does not immediately end once he comes to his senses but continues according to the plan of the filmmaker (Soul) who created the film in accordance with the original desire of the man to

become lost in a narrative. However, having come to his senses and having realised that he does not need the excitement of a film to experience well-being, man watches the rest of the film in acknowledgment of his nature beyond the film (representing man's eternal nature beyond time) until the timeline of the film comes to an end (representing physical death and the end of mechanical time). Since the man's recognition that he no longer needs to watch films to experience well-being remains once the film is over, he no longer searches for other films with other timelines (representing other incarnations and physical bodies) and therefore rests contented in his present state (eternity) beyond the projected images of the film (beyond Soul and the physical universe).

The fifth and final condition of possibility for man's experience of the film is a world in which this experience can take place, representing Intellect and the intelligible realities. In our analogy, this world is simply the world of real things (in this context) outside the projected images of the film. Thus, the world would include the people watching the film, the cinema, and everything outside the cinema. Just as the world in which the man lives exists before the film starts, while it is playing and after it is over, so Intellect exists at each stage of man's journey: beginning with his desire for physical experience and the generation of the physical universe; during his experience of the physical universe and mechanical time; and after the dissolution of these things at the point of physical death (since Intellect is eternal: see for example 5.18–19; IV.7.10.32–37 and VI.6.18.35–39). Furthermore, just as the film comprises a series of projected images of the real world, so the physical universe and matter represent a ghostly image or imitation of the intelligible world of perfect forms (see V.1.6.41–48 and III.6.7.7–17 respectively). Therefore, not only is the product of Soul expressed within the unchanging context of Intellect (see also IV.4.2.15–18) but it also derives its nature from Intellect (see for example 11.27–30; IV.4.13.17–22 and IV.8.1.46–50), similar to the way that the images of a film are derived from physical things existing in a world outside it. From an experiential standpoint, awakening to one's own eternal nature is synonymous with entering into the intelligible realm and vice versa. For as the man watching the film becomes aware that he is not in the film but merely observing it, so does he automatically come to his senses and recognise that he stands aloof from the narrative and destiny of the film as soon as he is made aware of the world outside the film. This serves as an illustration of the interchangeability of realisation of eternity and Intellect: for as soon as man recognises his own eternal nature, he immediately recognises all the intelligible forms which surround him, such as Beauty, Love and Truth, since it exists 'with the primaries and among them' (4.6–8). Finally, just as the man watching the film remembers

that he exists beyond the timeline of the film as a part of the (more) real world, so does the man who remembers that he exists beyond time recognise himself as an intelligible being and as a part of Intellect (see once more IV.7.10.30–40).

Of the conditions of possibility for experience of reality which we enumerated, two were exoteric and the others were esoteric. The exoteric conditions of possibility were Soul, represented by the film and filmmaker; and Intellect, represented by the world outside the film. These hypostases are exoteric by virtue of being external causes and unifying concepts of man's experience of reality, which is comprised of sensible realities on the level of Soul and intelligible realities on the level of Intellect. We also found that mechanical time was an exoteric product of Soul which generated the 'before' and 'after' in accordance with man's desire to journey beyond the timeless presence of Intellect, and which therefore, like the physical universe, could continue to exist even after man's realisation of his own true nature. On the other hand, we also found that there were two esoteric principles for man's subjective experience of reality. The first of these is eternity. As an esoteric principle, eternity differs from Intellect since as we have seen, it is not an objective reality by which a given set of realities is caused, but is instead a subjective mode in which these realities can be experienced. Eternity is therefore the internal and subjective cause of man's ability to experience the intelligible realities, whereas Intellect is the external and objective cause of the intelligible realities themselves, and therefore the external cause of man's ability to experience such realities. For just as man's conscious awareness provides one condition of possibility for him to experience the intelligible world around him, this intelligible world must at the same time exist for him to have this experience. As we saw in the example of the film, man's conscious awareness (eternity) gives him unconditional access to the intelligible realm (the world around him) but it is only because this realm is obscured to man through his desiring consciousness and subsequent departure into psychological time and the realm of Soul that he doesn't see that this is the case. Furthermore, we can now see why Plotinus says that eternity is a whole which 'does not arise from the gathering of its parts' (4.8–11; see also 3.19): for man's conscious awareness presents a unified intuition of the intelligible realities, similar to the way in which he perceives a face in one act of perception, rather than its separate features part by part (see IV.139). For this reason, as soon as man has entered into the intelligible realm, he perceives all the forms such as Beauty, Truth and Love all together (see I.1.8.1–8). On the other hand, in many passages, Plotinus claims that Intellect is made up of parts (see for example II.4.4.11–20; II.4.5.4–6; III.7.2.17–19; III.9.1.29–34; IV.3.4.9–12 and VI.6.15.13–15) and this is because Intellect is the exoteric and

objective reality within which the distinct intelligible realities belong rather than being the esoteric mode in which the intelligible realities are encountered in simultaneity, like eternity is. And thus, as a set of objects, the logical distinction between forms must be made in the case of Intellect, in a way which goes against the unified experience in eternal awareness. As we will see, eternity and Intellect always co-exist, so that eternity 'is comprised of a multiplicity' (5.22–23) even though it is not comprised of parts in the way that Intellect is.

So far, we have seen that eternity is an esoteric mode of experience, whereas Intellect is an exoteric cause of phenomena. The second difference between eternity and Intellect is that eternity conforms both to pure and impure objects alike, whereas Intellect is, properly speaking, the set only of pure objects. As we saw in the analogy of the film, man's conscious awareness was always present as he was watching the film just as it was present when he was reminded of the real world by his friend. Eternal awareness therefore does not discriminate between the pure objects of Intellect and the impure objects of Soul but is equally present to all objects. The only catch is that man will not realise that he is in eternity if he is in a state of psychological time. By contrast, although Intellect is also present at all times as well, just as the real world is always present even when the film is playing, there is a sense in which the physical universe is not in Intellect even though it is contained by it. Indeed, if someone asked the man, once he had awoken from psychological time, if the film he was watching was part of the real world, he may well say that it is not, and would be justified in doing so because the images of the film do not exist on the same ontological level of the people in the cinema. On the other hand, he could also say that the film is part of the real world, for the film (as long as it seen as a film and nothing more), is indeed part of the real world, as a projection of it existing within it. This is the way that Soul and the physical universe exist in relation to Intellect—as an image of Intellect which therefore both is and is not part of the intelligible world. Therefore, while Intellect, properly speaking, is the set of pure objects alone, eternity is not a set of a given set of realities which are distinguished from their illusory imitations, but is instead the mode of comportment to all realities which can then be concealed to man through his desire and ignorance. One could argue that eternity most naturally comports itself to the intelligible realities rather than the sensible ones, in the same way that man's natural state is to perceive the (more) real world around him rather than images on a screen. However, even this is a push, since there would be no contradiction contained in the notion of man spending his whole life in the illusory sensory world, just as there is no contradiction in a man spending his life watching films rather than interacting with other people. We may therefore

claim that while Intellect is the realm of the pure alone, eternity conforms both to the pure and impure, and therefore mirrors the One in which there are no differentiations (VI.2.9.13–14).

As we have already seen, Intellect can be described as a metaphysical set whose nature is apparent in all the intelligible realities, just as the nature of the set of even numbers is apparent in the numbers two, four and six and so on. This is why we can say that Intellect is an exoteric principle which mirrors the exoteric nature of the One, since it stands as an objective reality which can be affirmed through its parts. On the other hand, if in attempting to define eternity, we pointed to the form of Beauty, Truth or Love, we would be missing the mark, since eternity is not any object, even though its existence can be realised through the recognition of intelligible objects. Indeed, although man may automatically awaken to his own eternal nature when he makes contact with the intelligible realm and sees through the illusion of Soul and the physical universe, this does not mean that eternity is itself the objects in that realm, but only that intelligible objects serve as a fool-proof way for man to recognise the natural state of subjectivity when it is able to remain in a state of rest orientated towards itself (12.4–12). In order to know eternity, man must recognise himself as the timeless presence through which all objects, both intelligible and sensible, are perceived and distinguish this consciousness from the privileged objects (such as the forms and great kinds) that he is able to perceive once he has become enlightened to his true nature. Just like the esoteric aspect of the One, which can only be known through encounter and not by pointing to sensible or intelligible objects, so too can eternity only be known by undergoing a subjective process of coming to one's senses, which in itself is separate from all objects of perception and understanding. We are therefore able to sum up the difference between eternity and Intellect by claiming that eternity is the esoteric mode and subjective condition of possibility for experience which stands as a partless principle of negation, whereas Intellect is the exoteric, objective condition of possibility for experience which stands in relation to its parts as a principle of affirmation.

We are now able to see why both eternity and Intellect are aspects of Being. On the one hand, Intellect is the objective aspect of 'what is', since it comprises all the intelligible realities which can be perceived by man as existing outside himself. On the other hand, eternity is the subjective aspect of 'what is' since it is that through which all realities (including the intelligibles) are experienced by man. Without eternity, Intellect is merely a collection of objects without the spark of life which subjectivity brings. This is why Plotinus calls eternity 'life' (see 3.14–15; 6.8; 6.20; 11.1–4; 11.43–45 and 12.19–22) and the life associated with Being (3.36–38): for eternity is the subjective force which animates the

forms and great kinds, without which the intelligible realities would be merely theoretical concepts bearing no relation to consciousness or its journey to self-knowledge. On the other hand, without Intellect, eternity would exist as a life with nothing to enliven. For it would be an entirely empty form of subjectivity, since there would be nothing objective to which it could conform as a mode of experience. This modeless subjectivity does not exist on the level of Being, of which eternity is an aspect, because Being always stands in relation to beings, which is why Plotinus claims that eternity 'is a god which shows itself and manifests itself as what is … arising from a multiplicity' (5.19–23). And thus eternity is the second and not the first mode of the esoteric, since only in the first mode can man experience the One in a state of formless self-awareness and transcendence (see VI.9.11.38–45). We may therefore conclude that since eternity conforms to the intelligible realities, it is not the One but is instead 'directed towards the One and in it' (6.9–12) as a pure desireless mode of awareness which transcends psychological time but which stands below the One, since the One both transcends Intellect and rests only in itself (see for example III.8.10.1–12). We can now see that whereas the One represents both the first mode of the esoteric and the first level of the exoteric, Being represents the second mode of the esoteric and the second level of the exoteric, with eternity and Intellect fulfilling these respective roles. As we have seen, whereas eternity imitates the One by existing as an esoteric mode of subjectivity, Intellect imitates the One by existing as an exoteric principle of objective reality.

Now that we have distinguished eternity and Intellect, we will now endeavour to further clarify the relationship between eternity and time by showing why time can be thought of as the third mode of the esoteric which at the same time has an exoteric aspect. We will also see why Plotinus is critical of accounts of time which precede him: for these accounts describe time only as an exoteric and mechanical phenomenon, and therefore fail to capture the cause of such temporality which, according to Plotinus, exists as a restless disposition within the human soul (11.15).

3 The Third Mode of the Esoteric

In the last section, we discovered that time had two aspects: an esoteric aspect which we called psychological time, and an exoteric aspect which we called mechanical time. The esoteric aspect is the essence of time, since it is the original form of desiring consciousness which sets into motion the production of its exoteric counterpart with the help of Soul. This exoteric aspect then represents the 'restlessly active nature' of psychological time through the 'before'

and 'after' which accompanies discursive reasoning and the perception of sensible realities. The before and after of mechanical time existing in the realm of Soul can therefore be conceived as the image of the desiring consciousness of the human soul wishing to depart from its natural and formless state in Intellect since its sequential nature mirrors the movement of the human soul as it directs its attention away from eternity and Intellect. We also discovered that the essence of time, or psychological time, is not a hypostasis existing independently of subjectivity, but is rather a mode of subjectivity which makes the experience of the hypostasis of Soul possible. This essence of time is therefore a mode of the esoteric since it unlocks a certain range of experience (the hypostasis of Soul) and can be called the third mode since the level of reality it unlocks access to is more limited than that of the second mode, eternity (which gives access to both Soul and Intellect), and the first mode, the One, which allows man to encounter an ineffable state beyond both intelligible and sensible objects. However, since time has an exoteric aspect, it does not only stand as a key for unlocking human experience of Soul (embodied by its esoteric aspect) but is also a product of Soul, alongside human desiring consciousness, in the manifest form of the 'before' and 'after'. Since time has both an esoteric and exoteric aspect, Plotinus is sceptical of arguments which presuppose that time is only exoteric. Indeed, in chapters 8–10, Plotinus presents several objections to Stoic, Aristotelian and Epicurean definitions and explications of the nature of time, which, we will argue, all attempt to externalise time at the expense of its essence as a subjective mode. In this final section, we therefore aim to show that Plotinus' criticisms of his ancient counterparts in chapters 8–10 pave the way for chapters 11–13, in which Plotinus presents time in its totality as both an esoteric and exoteric phenomenon, as the life of Soul. We will do this by showing that each of the conclusions reached by the ancients come close to Plotinus' definition of time but miss the mark by failing to see that the nature of time is embedded into human subjectivity, rather than simply being observed or measured by it. In all, there are five conclusions which we will consider: the first is the belief that time is motion itself, which according to Aetius 1.22.7; *Dox. Gr.* 318 = *SVF* 2:514 was the view of the 'majority of Stoics', and which is examined by Plotinus in chapter 8.

The first ancient definition of time which Plotinus considers is a view attributed to the Stoics, namely that time is 'most usually supposed to be motion and a kind of change' (from Aristotle *Ph.* IV 10, 218b9–18). In chapter 8, Plotinus argues that time can neither be orderly movement alone (in response to Plutarch, who in *Quaest. Plat.* VIII 4, 1007c–d claims that time is 'motion in an orderly fashion that involves measure and limits and revolutions'), nor movement taken as a whole (including orderly and disorderly movement) by con-

sidering two possibilities. Firstly, if movement is in time, this would mean that it is contained in or measured by time, and it is impossible for something to be contained in or measured by itself. Secondly, if someone were to say that movement was not in time, he could theoretically posit the identity of movement and time, but he would be at a loss to describe what movement is contained within, which is clearly something different from this movement. This something, for Plotinus, must be time. For the purposes of this argument, it does not matter whether one considers orderly movement alone or all movement in general: for all motion, whether taken separately or together takes place, in Plotinus' view, within time. Plotinus further supports his view by claiming that whereas movements of all kinds may be interrupted or come to an end, time never stops, since time contains and measures not only movement but that which is motionless. While Plotinus discards this (possibly) Stoic conclusion about the identity of time and movement, we already know that in chapter 11, Plotinus identifies time with a kind of movement (namely the movement of the human soul) when he claims that 'time is the life of the soul in a movement that changes from one way of life to another' (11.43–45). We may therefore argue that the Stoic definition of time as sensible motion arises from an incorrect interpretation: for the Stoics identify time with sensible motion in Soul, rather than with intelligible motion in the human soul as it attempts to depart from eternity and Intellect. This misinterpretation represents a category error for two reasons. Firstly, time possesses a higher ontological status than sensible realities and sensible motion and therefore cannot be reduced to these phenomena. Secondly, time is an internal feature of man's soul in a desiring state and therefore should not be identified as something external to man like sensible motion in the physical universe (relative to the embodied human being). We can therefore see that the Stoic interpretation of their own definition of time betrays a fundamental misidentification of the esoteric (subjective nature of time) with the exoteric (conceived as external to man) but that their definition of time itself, when interpreted in the correct way, is compatible with Plotinus' conception. For Plotinus may well assent to the Stoic definition of time as 'motion and a kind of change', since he posits that time is the primordial motion associated with the specific change of orientation of the human soul as it redirects its attention from its own resting place (namely, eternity and Intellect) towards the 'next' and 'after'.

The second conclusion which Plotinus considers is the idea that time is the 'movement of the whole': a view which, according to Simplicius *In Ph.* 700.17–21, was ascribed to Plato by commentators such as Theophrastus, Eudemus and Alexander of Aphrodisias (cf.op.cit.705.5–7). Plotinus accepts the idea that the movement of the universe is cyclical (see v.7.1.23–25) and therefore interprets

'movement of the whole' firstly as one complete revolution of the universe and secondly as the speed at which the heavenly bodies complete this revolution. Plotinus first rejects the claim that time is one complete revolution of the universe on the basis that the universe could accomplish such a revolution in different timeframes according to its speed, so that it could theoretically have achieved the revolution it ends up completing in half the time or double the time than it actually takes. Since it is possible for the universe to take more or less time to complete a revolution, and time is identical to itself, time cannot be a revolution of the universe because then it could be half or double itself (or both) and therefore not identical to itself. Plotinus therefore rejects the first interpretation of time being movement of the whole on the basis that such a movement must take place within time rather than being identical to it. Plotinus then rejects the second interpretation according to which time is identified with the speed of the heavenly bodies on the basis that once again, time would not be identical to itself because certain heavenly bodies move faster than the rest (cf. Alex. Aphrod. *In Metaph* 39.22–40.09 = Arist. *De Pyth*. Fr. 203), so that if time were all of the heavenly bodies it would not be uniform. Furthermore, time could not be the speed of any of the heavenly bodies because time is that by which the speeds of the different heavenly bodies are measured and not any individual speed itself. For example, we only know that the speed of the outermost sphere is quicker than the other heavenly bodies because it traverses a greater distance than the others in the same timeframe (here Plotinus confuses matters by saying 'a greater distance in less time') where time is the constant by which speed can be measured relative to distance.

Once again, it is the interpretation from which the definition arises which Plotinus objects to rather than the definition itself. For as long as 'whole' is interpreted as the physical universe, Plotinus denies that time could possibly be identified as its movement since 'the heavenly sphere … exists and moves within time' (12.15–17) and is not time itself. However, Plotinus may well assent to this present definition of time as 'the movement of the whole' as long as the 'whole' is associated with Soul rather than the physical universe itself. For Plotinus states in 11.27–33 that Soul 'temporalised itself' by moving 'with a motion not belonging to that intelligible world' (namely intelligible motion: see for example, v.8.3–4 and vi.7.13 where Plotinus associates motion with the life and thought of Intellect) and that time is the 'life of the soul (in) … movement' (11.43–45) in contrast to the intelligible motion associated with eternity and Intellect. We therefore see once again that the possibly Platonic definition of time as movement of the whole, if directed to the cause of the physical cosmos rather than the physical cosmos itself, is compatible with Plotinus' understanding. The difference in this case (just as in the case of the Stoics) is that Plotinus

does not associate time with motion of any sensible reality, or with observable motion in the sensory world, but rather with the primordial motion of the human soul and the hypostasis of Soul as they journey away from Intellect and eternity. This motion, and therefore time in itself, has a greater ontological status than either observable motion or the physical universe itself and therefore exists on a par with Soul in an intermediary position between Intellect and the physical universe since it is neither, properly speaking, an intelligible nor a sensible reality. Therefore, Plotinus neither identifies time with motion in general; nor with the motion of the physical universe; nor with the physical universe itself (a conclusion which, according to Plotinus, requires no separate arguments to disprove because the physical universe can only be identified as time on account of its motion) since he believes not only that all the arguments to support these claims are internally flawed, but also that they ascribe to time too low an ontological status by identifying it with sensible (rather than a unique kind of intelligible) motion.

The third definition of time which Plotinus considers is that of Zeno the Stoic who claimed that time is the 'interval of motion' (see *SVF* 1:93; 2:510 and 2:515), as well as its modified form which became Platonic doctrine, that time is 'the interval of the motion of the universe'. Once again, we can see that these definitions appear to be compatible with Plotinus' conception of time when applied to the human soul (the same can also be said of Chrysippus' definition of time as "the interval concomitant with the motion of the universe" in *SVF* 2:509, which we further examine in the commentary). For in chapter 12, Plotinus claims that time is abolished when the human soul redirects its attention to eternity (12.15–22) and stops the activity which he describes in chapter 11 as a 'restless nature, which … chose to seek more than the present' (11.15–16). This activity has a beginning and an end for each human being who has first descended into the realm of Soul through desire, and who is then able to redirect his attention to eternity and Intellect. Since this desiring activity is the essence of (psychological) time itself, and this activity is limited by the arising and disappearance of the desiring state of the human soul, it follows that time itself is limited by these factors. For time is limited on the one hand by having a beginning at the inception of human desire and the corresponding motion of the soul away from eternity, and an end at the point at which the desire of the soul ends and redirects its attention to eternity. Since time represents the motion of the human soul taken as a whole, rather than being restricted to any one part of its motion, one could very well argue that time, according to Plotinus, is the interval of the motion of the soul away from eternity; an interval which is surrounded on all sides by eternity, Intellect and Being. This does not mean that time is exo-

teric, or independent of human consciousness in any way, but only that man's desiring mode of consciousness is a temporary state, so that we can observe its beginning and end and see it as a hiatus or interval interrupting man's recognition of and allegiance to his own eternal nature. We therefore see that the definition presented by Zeno the Stoic of time as an interval of motion, when applied to the human soul, is consistent with Plotinus' understanding of time both as an esoteric mode and as an embodiment of a limited range of motion representing man's temporary estrangement from the intelligible realm.

However, just like the previous two arguments, Zeno the Stoic defined time in relation to sensible, rather than a unique kind of intelligible, motion. Plotinus does not think that time could be the interval of (sensible) movement in general because there are many kinds of movement, each with their own duration. An infinite number of movements would therefore correspond to an infinite number of 'times', which would then once again mean that time wasn't identical to itself, entailing a contradiction. Neither does Plotinus think it feasible to identify time with the interval of the motion of the universe (according to the possibly Platonic modification of Zeno's claim). For if the interval is the duration of the movement itself then time is identical to movement in general once again: a claim which Plotinus believes himself to have already refuted. If the interval is the length covered by the universe, then this is space and not time. If the interval of motion is the quantity of motion of the universe as it moves, with the implication that time increases as the quantity of motion of the universe increases, then this once again a reduction of time to space for Plotinus, since it is only possible to make sense of the quantity of movement in spatial terms (for example an object has achieved a greater quantity of movement than another object if it has gone twice the distance in a given time). Furthermore, if the interval of the motion of the universe is some kind of extension, then either this extension is distance or quantity, which Plotinus has already attempted to show cannot be synonymous with time; or time is not spatial but temporal extension, in which case we are no closer to finding out what time actually is as we are using time to define itself. Finally, Plotinus believes that time should not only be connected to motion, since it is not only things in motion but also things at rest which exist within it. One could argue that in this case Plotinus doesn't take into account that since there is no contradiction in objects being motionless within the universe itself in perpetual motion, there is also no contradiction in time existing as the motion of the universe and containing objects at rest. Having said this, it still stands that there is no contradiction in positing a point at which the universe as a whole stops expanding (in our worldview) or pauses in its revolution (in the ancient worldview) within

time. Since this does not entail a contradiction, time cannot be identical to the movement of the universe, and therefore it is possible to support Plotinus in his claim that time cannot be the movement of the universe. Either way, it is clear that Plotinus believes that the claim of the identity of time with the motion of the universe does nothing to illuminate the essential nature of time.

We now turn to the fourth and fifth definitions of time which Plotinus considers: namely, the definition of time given by Aristotle as 'the number of motion in respect of the before and after' (*Ph.* IV 11. 219b1–2 and *Cael.* I. 9. 275a14–15) and the modified form of this definition given by Simplicius *In Ph.* 736.23–35: namely the conception of time as the measure of motion as a whole. This latter definition is modified according to the critique of Strato in fr 75, who states that time cannot be the number of motion, 'since a number is a discontinuous quantity, while motion and time are continuous, and the continuous is not numerable.' Plotinus reiterates this line of argument in 9.1–2 and therefore rejects the idea that time could be a purely mathematical number (see also 9.14–17). Furthermore, as Plotinus claims in 9.35–50, if time is a number, then it has been quantitatively determined, but it is not clear what external measure could determine such quantification. If that which is measuring time is a temporal unit, then time is measuring itself, which does not help us in our investigation since a measure is meant to be an external standard by which something else is quantified. Furthermore, a temporal unit is a length of time, and not time in itself, since any length is a concrete quantification, whereas time theoretically embodies all possible temporal quantifications and therefore cannot be reduced to any single one. Indeed, Plotinus warns us not to confuse the temporal embodiment of time with time itself, for since time is infinite (as Aristotle claims in *Ph.* VIII 1, 251b19–26) and each number is finite and determinate (see VI. 6.2.1–10 and 17.3), time cannot be number. Thus, only the temporal can be quantified, and time is that by which we quantify rather than that which is itself quantifiable (*pace* Aristotle in *Ph.* IV 11, 219b7–8 and 220b8). As for the fifth definition of time as the measure of motion as a whole, Plotinus objects to this conception of time on the grounds that however 'measure' is interpreted, no cogent argument can lead to its identification with time. For if 'measure' is understood as movement that is measured, this itself cannot be time since as Plotinus has already explained, motion can be interrupted but time cannot. Furthermore, motion, like motionlessness, occurs within time and therefore cannot be time itself, since that which is contained by something is necessarily non-identical with that in which it is contained. Secondly, if 'measure' is understood as that which measures rather than the movement measured, then time could never itself be measured, since it is itself the measure. But time is measured in every instance of temporal quantification (such as 'three

hours') and therefore time cannot simply be a measure. Plotinus therefore also rejects the definition of time as a measure of sensible motion, whether 'measure' is understood to be the motion that is measured or that which measures motion.

We have now seen why Plotinus rejects the Aristotelian and Aristotelian commentators' definitions of time as number of motion and measure of motion. However, once again, motion in both cases is understood as sensible motion. We will now, once again, investigate whether these definitions are compatible with Plotinus' understanding of time when 'motion' is viewed in relation to the human soul. We will therefore consider whether Plotinus understands time either as the number of motion of the human soul, or as the measure of motion of the human soul. Let us begin with the conception of time as the number of motion of the human soul. As we see in chapter 12, Plotinus sets out the requirements for any individual soul to achieve liberation from time and the realm of Soul, claiming that we must make the restlessly active power of our souls towards the 'next' and 'after' (as described in chapter 11.17–18) turn back again towards eternity. He then claims in 12.15–20 that having done this, the heavenly sphere will disappear (which we interpret to mean man's identification with the physical body and the realm of Soul: see comments on 12.4–22). The time it takes for each individual soul to return to its identification with eternity signifies the strength of the original desiring activity of this human soul: if the desire was weak then its identification with Soul and entrapment in time will be shorter lived than it will for he whose desire was strong. This is why Plotinus claims that we can 'measure the duration of its stop (namely the stopping of the identification with the physical universe—my brackets) … by the activity of soul': for the activity of soul has a certain strength which determines the duration of man's enslavement in the realm of Soul. This means that the motion of the soul (which Plotinus identifies as time in 11.43–45) is greater and lesser according to each individual. That being said, it would be possible to argue that time, for each individual, represents a certain number of motion, as Aristotle put it. This number cannot be stated, as the motion of the human soul is intelligible and not sensible, and therefore cannot be quantified in the way that the duration of movement of a physical body could be. Seen in this light, the number of motion of the soul would therefore have to be a purely abstract number which could not be known discursively. However, one could come to some understanding of the number if one knew how many years or lifetimes it took for a man, having descended into the physical universe, to rid himself of identification with the physical universe and the desiring mode of consciousness which produces time. We would know for example that the number of motion

of the soul for a man who took forty years to remember his true nature and return to eternity would be lower than the number of motion of the soul of a man who took eighty years to return to eternity and retain his identification with the intelligible realm. For we see from Plotinus' description of the activity of soul in 12.15–20 that his conception of time does not only contain the concept of the motion of the soul itself, but also the idea of a primordial quantity of each soul representing an interval between his descent and subsequent escape from psychological time. We can therefore see that Aristotle's definition, when applied to the human soul, is compatible with Plotinus' conception of time.

Finally, the idea that time is the measure of motion could be compatible with Plotinus' conception of time when applied to the human soul. For when we take the interpretation of 'measure' as that which has been measured rather than that doing the measuring, we see that time is the measure of the motion of the soul, for it represents the totality of its motion from its inception in Intellect when it desires for more than its present state, to its return to Intellect when it extinguishes this desire and returns to its natural state. Therefore, just as one could say that the 'measure of increase in expenses is large' (see Kalligas 2014, 618 on 13.13–18) where the word 'measure' refers to the totality of that which is measured, namely the increase in expenses; so we may also say that the 'measure of the motion of the soul is time', where 'measure' refers once again to that which has been measured: in this case, the completion of the motion of the soul away from Intellect, which may then be defined as time. For since Plotinus claims that time is the 'life of soul in a movement of passage from one way of life to another', and this movement is, as a whole, limited to the period in which man desires Intellect and eternity (between his original state of desirelessness in Intellect and the moment at which he extinguishes this desire in his embodied state), we may claim that time represents the finite phenomenon of man's movement away from eternity, and is thus the measure of this unique form of motion. Furthermore, we may also say that time is the 'measure' of man's embodied state. For the duration of man's existence within the physical universe affords us an indication or 'measure' of the activity or motion of his soul away from Intellect and eternity, which we have defined as both the essence of time and psychological time. Time may therefore be said to be the measure of each man's visit to the physical realm, insofar as it represents the totality of their experience of this form of life. Similarly, time is also that which measures the duration of man's embodiment. For, if we know the exact strength of the activity of a particular soul, we will also be able to predict how long it will be embodied. Indeed, as Plotinus claims, if physical existence and the physical universe itself 'becomes still, we will measure the extent of its rest according to

the activity of the soul, so long as soul is outside eternity' (12.15–19). Therefore, as well as being that which is measured by the duration of each soul's embodiment, time could also be that which measures this duration if man had the means to know and translate into temporal terms the strength of this activity as it moved towards the physical universe.

We have now surveyed the main definitions of time which Plotinus investigates and attempts to refute in chapters 8 and 9 of III.7. The same logic applies to his more generalised definition of time as 'an accompaniment of movement' in chapter 10. For while Plotinus is content to call time an accompaniment of the original movement of soul as it moves towards the physical universe (see 11.15–20), he does not believe it makes sense to call time an accompaniment of sensible movement when this movement must itself be in time (see my comments on 10.1–8 on p. 133). We have therefore seen that Plotinus believes that the definitions of time, whether as motion itself; the motion of the universe; the interval of motion; the number of motion in accordance with the 'before' and 'after'; or as the measure of motion, are all arrived at through shaky reasoning which he attempts to expose. However, we have also seen that, according to Plotinus' definitions of time in chapters 11 and 12 as 'the life of the soul in a movement that changes from one way of life to another' (11.43–45) and as the life which has continuous activity (12.1–4) which 'chose to seek more than the present … always moving to the next and to the 'after' (11.15–18), the concept of motion is integral to Plotinus' conception of time. We found that the definitions which Plotinus argues against, when understood in the context of the intelligible motion of the soul rather than the sensible motion of the physical universe, presented different ways of understanding Plotinus' own view of time. For Plotinus defines time as an activity and motion of the soul, and also describes how this motion begins and ends, so that we are justified in positing time as a finite phenomenon, which can be expressed as an interval, number or measure determining and knowable by the duration of physical existence of man as he lives through the consequences of his desire to seek an exciting narrative outside eternity and Intellect. We may therefore claim that the common presupposition underlying all the other definitions which Plotinus examines is that time is understood to stand in direct relationship with sensible motion, either by being identical with it, or by representing its quantity in the form of number, measure or interval. By contrast, Plotinus wishes to show us that time stands in direct relationship not with sensible motion but rather with the primordial motion of the human soul and the hypostasis of Soul as they journey away from Intellect. Therefore, it is only because time is synonymous with the motion of the soul that it stands in relation to sensible motion, which exists as a result of this original motion. For this reason, identifying time too closely with

sensible motion is to make a category error, since time's ontological status transcends that of the physical universe and sensible motion, and stands in relation to them by existing as the archetypal form of motion upon which sensible motion and the existence of the physical universe is made possible (see 11.15–30). One must therefore, according to Plotinus, conceive of time as an esoteric phenomenon (pertaining to the mode of the human soul) existing beyond the hypostasis of Soul, rather than as an exoteric phenomenon existing within Soul.

Plotinus' view that time has an indirect relationship with sensible motion is cemented in 12.40–43 when he claims that time measures motion incidentally and not directly. For time is first made manifest and measured by regular motion (specifically the motion of the heavens), which we acknowledge by giving such motion temporal units (for example, the regular motion of the earth around the sun translates to one year) which can only then be used to measure the duration of other forms of movement. This means that time can be said to measure movement incidentally, since its measurement provides the condition of possibility for all other forms of temporal measurement, without itself being a physical reference standard by which other forms of motion are measured (like the heavenly bodies). The fact that time measures motion incidentally rather than directly in the way that Plotinus sets out lends further support to the idea that time exists on a different ontological level to both the physical universe and sensible motion: for it is because time is neither divisible or graspable in any way (see 12.28–33) that it cannot be the direct measure or reference standard according to which any particular form of motion can be compared. As well as holding greater ontological status than things in the physical universe such as sensible objects, time is also indivisible and ungraspable because it exists as an internal mode of subjectivity in which all objects appear rather than an object itself. Thus, whereas one might say that Soul is manifest at all times by existing as the sum total of all sensible realities, time is not manifest, since it does not depend upon the sensible realities for its existence, but is solely the internal form of motion which enables these realities to come into being. One might therefore argue that time has an indirect relationship with the physical universe and sensible motion in two senses: first by being ontologically unlike these phenomena; and secondly by being the esoteric condition of possibility for their existence, which is why its innermost nature can only be glimpsed through the observation of the heavenly bodies.

It would therefore seem that Plotinus approaches the nature of time from three directions. Firstly, he defines time in relation to the desiring state of the human soul, which enables us to see that by extinguishing such desire, we may enter into a state of timelessness and eternity. This essential nature of time we labelled the esoteric essence of time and psychological time. Secondly, he

defines time in relation to the hypostasis of Soul which enslaves all physical objects in temporal succession (see for example 11.35–36) as a direct result of the desire of the human soul to experience an exciting narrative. This definition of time we labelled the exoteric aspect of time, or mechanical time, which is also synonymous with temporality. Thirdly, Plotinus defines time as that which can be measured and made manifest by the regular motion of the heavenly bodies. As well as giving his own arguments, Plotinus also attempted to refute earlier definitions of time by exposing the (possible) flaws in each argument. However, we have argued that Plotinus did not only disagree with the reasoning behind such arguments but also with the presupposition behind them, that time was an exoteric rather than an esoteric phenomenon, pertaining to something outside of man like heavenly bodies, rather than to the state of his own internal life and the activity of his own soul. By investigating Plotinus' definition of time as that which is measured by regular motion, and by examining his arguments against other ancient philosophers, we have attempted to further illuminate Plotinus' conception of time as an esoteric mode. For time cannot be identified with anything in the physical universe but only glimpsed through signs, just as the desiring consciousness of a man watching a film cannot be found on the screen but only inferred through the exciting narrative. Once time's esoteric and finite nature is revealed, we are then able to map a route to eternity by extinguishing the desire for physical existence, which will in turn allow us to approach the One through an act of absolute negation.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΩΝΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΧΡΟΝΟΥ

1. Τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἕτερον λέγοντες ἑκάτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν περὶ τὴν ἀίδιον εἶναι φύσιν, τὸν δὲ χρόνον περὶ τὸ γινόμενον καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν, αὐτόθεν μὲν καὶ ὥσπερ ταῖς τῆς ἐννοίας ἀθροωτέραις ἐπιβολαῖς ἐναργές τι παρ' αὐτοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἔχειν πάθος νομίζομεν λέγοντές τε ἀεὶ καὶ παρ ἅπαντα ὀνομάζοντες. πειρώμενοι μὴν εἰς ἐπίστασιν αὐτῶν ἰέναι καὶ οἷον ἐγγὺς προσελθεῖν πάλιν αὖ ταῖς γνώμαις ἀποροῦντες τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀποφάσεις περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλος ἄλλας, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τὰς αὐτὰς λαβόντες ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναπαυσάμενοι καὶ αὐταρκες νομίσαντες, εἰ ἔχοιμεν ἐρωτηθέντες τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκείνοις λέγειν, ἀγαπήσαντες ἀπαλλαττόμεθα τοῦ ζητεῖν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν. εὑρηκέναι μὲν οὖν τινας τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ μακαρίων φιλοσόφων τὸ ἀληθὲς δεῖ νομίζειν· τίνες δ' οἱ τυχόντες μάλιστα, καὶ πῶς ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν σύνεσις περὶ τούτων γένοιτο, ἐπισκέψασθαι προσήκει. καὶ πρότερον περὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος ζητεῖν, τί ποτε νομίζουσιν εἶναι αὐτὸν οἱ ἕτερον τοῦ χρόνου τιθέντες εἶναι· γνωσθέντος γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα ἑστῶτος καὶ τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος αὐτοῦ, ὃν δὴ χρόνον λέγουσιν εἶναι, τάχ' ἂν σαφὲς γένοιτο. εἰ δέ τις πρὸ τοῦ τὸν αἰῶνα θεάσασθαι τὸν χρόνον ὅς ἐστι φαντασθείη, γένοιτ' ἂν καὶ τούτῳ ἐντεῦθεν ἐκεῖ κατὰ

Enn. = w(= AE) x(= BRJ) y(= USC) Q (qui desinit **9.** 72); accedit L **2.** 1-**6.** 50 et **11.** 11–58

1.19–20 cf. Plat. *Tim.* 37d7

1.4 ταῖς: τὰς Q ἐπιβουλαῖς Q 6 ὀνομάζομεν Q 10 ἄλλος x 19 τὸ²: τοῦ (ὸ A^s)E 22 τούτω RJy: τοῦτο wQ: τούτων B

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[338] ἀνάμνησιν ἐλθόντι ᾧ ἄρα ὡμοίωτο ὁ χρόνος θεάσασθαι,
εἴπερ ὁμοιότητα οὗτος πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἔχοι.
2. Τίνα οὖν ποτε χρὴ φάναι τὸν αἰῶνα εἶναι; ἆρά γε τὴν
νοητὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὸν χρόνον τὸν
σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον εἶναι; καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ
ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔσχον τινές, φασι, περὶ τοῦ χρόνου.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ σεμνότατόν τι τὸν αἰῶνα εἶναι φανταζόμεθα
καὶ νοοῦμεν, σεμνότατον δὲ τὸ τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως, καὶ
οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅ τι σεμνότερον ὁποτερονοῦν—τοῦ δ'
ἐπέκεινα οὐδὲ τοῦτο κατηγορητέον—εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄν τις οὕτω
συνάγοι. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ὅ τε κόσμος ὁ νοητὸς ὅ τε αἰὼν περι-
εκτικὰ ἄμφω καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' ὅταν τὰ ἕτερα ἐν θατέρῳ
λέγωμεν–ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι–κεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅταν τὸ αἰώνιον κατηγορῶ-
μεν αὐτῶν–ἡ μὲν γάρ, φησι, τοῦ παραδείγματος φύσις
ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος,—ἄλλο τὸν αἰῶνα πάλιν αὖ
λέγομεν, εἶναι μέντοι περὶ ἐκείνην ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ ἢ παρεῖναι
ἐκείνῃ φαμέν. τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν ἑκάτερον εἶναι ταὐτότητα οὐ
δηλοῖ· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου
τὸ σεμνὸν γίνοιτο. ἥ τε περιοχὴ τῷ μὲν ὡς μερῶν ἔσται,
τῷ δὲ αἰῶνι ὁμοῦ τὸ ὅλον οὐχ ὡς μέρος, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάντα τὰ
τοιαῦτα οἷα αἰώνια κατ' αὐτόν.
Ἀλλ' ἆρα κατὰ τὴν στάσιν φατέον τὴν ἐκεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα
εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα τὸν χρόνον κατὰ τὴν κίνησίν φασιν;
ἀλλ' εἰκότως ἄν τις τὸν αἰῶνα ζητήσειε πότερα ταὐτὸν

Accedit L inde ab 2. 1

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2. 4 τινές i.e. Pyhtagorei (Simpl. *In Phys.* iv. 10, p. 700.19–20), cf. Aristot. *Phys. Δ* 10.218^{b}1 12–13= Plat. *Tim.* 37d3

2.2 εἴ τις: εἶπον A(ʺ A^{IS})E 5 εἶναι om. L 6 δὲ τὸ: καὶ A(δὲ τὸ A^{IS})E 8 οὕτω: τοῦτο L 10 τὰ ἕτερα (cf. 12 αὐτῶν): τὸ ἕτερον Müller 11 ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι del. Kirchhoff 12 ἡ: εἰ w 12 γάρ: γὰρ δὴ L 13 πάλιν: ἅπαν Q 18 τὸ ὅλον: τῷ ὅλῳ L 20 στάσιν: σύστασιν E: στάσιν A in rasura 22 αἰῶνα A^{pc} (αἰω in rasura, α^{2} ex ον corr. A^{2}) Creuzer: χρόνον A^{ac} ExyQL πότερα xyQ: πότερον wL ταὐτὸν om. L

τῇ στάσει λέγοντες ἢ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τῇ στάσει τῇ περὶ [339]
τὴν οὐσίαν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῇ στάσει ταὐτόν, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ
ἐροῦμεν αἰώνιον τὴν στάσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν αἰῶνα αἰώνιον·
τὸ γὰρ αἰώνιον τὸ μετέχον αἰῶνος. ἔπειτα ἡ κίνησις
πῶς αἰώνιον; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ στάσιμον εἴη. εἶτα πῶς
ἔχει ἡ τῆς στάσεως ἔννοια ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ἀεί; λέγω δὲ οὐ τὸ
ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ οἷον νοοῦμεν, ὅταν τὸ ἀίδιον λέγωμεν. εἰ
δὲ τῇ τῆς οὐσίας στάσει, ἔξω πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἄλλα γένη τοῦ
αἰῶνος ποιήσομεν. εἶτα τὸν αἰῶνα οὐ μόνον ἐν στάσει δεῖ
νοεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἑνί· εἶτα καὶ ἀδιάστατον, ἵνα μὴ ταὐτὸν
ᾖ χρόνῳ· ἡ δὲ στάσις οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ἓν οὔτε τὴν τοῦ
ἀδιαστάτου ἔχει ἔννοιαν ἐν αὐτῇ, ᾗ στάσις. εἶτα τοῦ μὲν
αἰῶνος κατηγοροῦμεν τὸ μένειν ἐν ἑνί · μετέχοι ἂν
οὖν στάσεως, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοστάσις εἴη.
3. Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη τοῦτο, καθ' ὃ τὸν κόσμον πάντα τὸν
ἐκεῖ αἰώνιον λέγομεν καὶ ἀίδιον εἶναι, καὶ τί ἡ ἀιδιότης,
εἴτε ταὐτὸν καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ τῷ αἰῶνι, εἴτε κατ' αὐτὴν ὁ αἰών;
ἆρά γε καθ' ἕν τι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ ἐκ πολλῶν συνηθροισμένην
τινὰ νόησιν, ἣ καὶ φύσιν εἴτ' ἐπακολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἐκεῖ
εἴτε συνοῦσαν εἴτ' ἐνορωμένην, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐκείνην
μίαν μὲν οὖσαν, πολλὰ δὲ δυναμένην καὶ πολλὰ οὖσαν; καὶ
ὅ γε τὴν πολλὴν δύναμιν εἰσαθρήσας κατὰ μὲν τοδὶ τὸ οἷον
ὑποκείμενον λέγει οὐσίαν, εἶτα κίνησιν τοῦτο, καθ' ὃ
ζωὴν ὁρᾷ, εἶτα στάσιν τὸ πάντη ὡσαύτως, θάτερον δὲ
καὶ ταὐτόν, ᾗ ταῦτα ὁμοῦ ἕν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ συνθεὶς πάλιν
αὖ εἰς ἓν ὁμοῦ εἶναι ζωὴν μόνην, ἐν τούτοις τὴν ἑτερότητα

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2. 35= Plat. *Tim.* 37d6 **3.** 9–11 cf. Plat. *Soph.* 254d–255a

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2. 26 τὸ^{2} om. L 27 αἰώνιος L 28 τὸ^{2}: τῶ A^{ac} (ῶ in ὸ mut.) EQ 30 τῇ: τῆς L 31. ποιήσωμεν Q 33 τὴν^{I}: τῇ L 35 τὸ: τοῦ Q om. L **3.**1 τοῦτο: τοῦ Q 2. λέγωμεν Q 3 ὁ om. Q 4 ἆρά γε Kirchhoff: ἆρα γὰρ *Enn.* 5 φύσιν: φησὶν Q 6 πάντα δὲ ταῦτα: ταῦτα δὲ πάντα L: πάντα δὲ Q 8 οἷον: οἷον συναθροίσας Q 10 ζῶον L 11 δὴ: δεῖ Q

[340] συστείλας καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὸ ἄπαυστον καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν
καὶ οὐδέποτε ἄλλο καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο νόησιν ἢ
ζωήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀεὶ ἀδιαστάτως, ταῦτα πάντα
ἰδὼν αἰῶνα εἶδεν ἰδὼν ζωὴν μένουσαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ
παρὸν τὸ πᾶν ἔχουσαν, ἀλλ' οὐ νῦν μὲν τόδε, αὖθις δ'
ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ἅμα τὰ πάντα, καὶ οὐ νῦν μὲν ἕτερα, αὖθις δ'
ἕτερα, ἀλλὰ τέλος ἀμερές, οἷον ἐν σημείῳ ὁμοῦ πάντων
ὄντων καὶ οὔποτε εἰς ῥύσιν προιόντων, ἀλλὰ μένοντος ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ οὐ μὴ μεταβάλλοντος, ὄντος δ' ἐν τῷ
παρόντι ἀεί, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ παρῆλθεν οὐδ' αὖ γενήσεται,
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστι, τοῦτο καὶ ὄντος· ὥστε εἶναι τὸν
αἰῶνα οὐ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὑποκει-
μένου οἷον ἐκλάμπον κατὰ τὴν [τοῦ] ἣν ἐπαγγέλλεται περὶ
τοῦ μὴ μέλλοντος, ἀλλὰ ἤδη ὄντος, ταυτότητα, ὡς ἄρα οὕτως
καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὕστερον αὐτῷ γένοιτο, ὃ μὴ
νῦν ἐστι; μηδ' αὖ ὕστερον ἐσομένου, ὃ μὴ ἔστιν ἤδη.
οὔτε γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀφ' οὗ εἰς τὸ νῦν ἥξει· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἦν
οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο· οὔτε μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, ὃ μὴ νῦν
ἔχει. ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτε τὸ ἦν ἔξει περὶ αὐτό· τί γὰρ
ἔστιν, ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ παρελήλυθεν; οὔτε τὸ ἔσται· τί γὰρ
ἔσται αὐτῷ; λείπεται δὴ ἐν τῷ εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστιν
εἶναι. ὃ οὖν μήτε ἦν, μήτε ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἔστι μόνον, τοῦτο
ἑστὼς ἔχον τὸ εἶναι τῷ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὸ ἔσται μηδ'
αὖ μεταβεβληκέναι ἐστὶν ὁ αἰών. γίνεται τοίνυν ἡ περὶ τὸ
ὂν ἐν τῷ εἶναι ζωὴ ὁμοῦ πᾶσα καὶ πλήρης ἀδιάστατος παν-
ταχῇ τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ ζητοῦμεν, αἰών.

3. 34 cf. Plat. *Tim.* 37e6–38a1

3. 14 ἄλλο^{I}: ἄλλη A(ο A^{IS}): ἄλλοι E 16 τῷ om. W 18 τὰ om. Q οὐ: νοῦν L 21 ἐν αὐτῷ (in se) om. L μὴ om. L 21 μεταλαβόντος Q 23 ὄντως Q 24–25 τοῦ ὑποκειμένου: τὸν ὑποκείμενον Q 25 τὴν A^{pc} Kirchhoff τὴν τοῦ A^{ac} (τὴν eras. et τοῦ in τὴν mut. A$^{2–3}$)ExyQL 38 ὃ δὴ transp. wL

4. Οὐκ ἔξωθεν δὲ δεῖ συμβεβηκέναι νομίζειν τοῦτο [341]
ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης καὶ σὺν ἐκείνῃ.
Ἐνορᾶται γὰρ ἐνοῦσα παρ' αὐτῆς, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα
ὅσα λέγομεν ἐκεῖ εἶναι ἐνυπάρχοντα ὁρῶντες λέγομεν ἐκ
τῆς οὐσίας ἅπαντα καὶ σὺν τῇ οὐσίᾳ. τὰ γὰρ πρώτως
ὄντα συνόντα δεῖ τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἶναι·
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια
ἐν αὐτοῖς. καὶ τὰ μὲν ὥσπερ ἐν μέρει τοῦ παντὸς ὄντος,
τὰ δ' ἐν παντί, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πᾶν οὐκ ἐκ
τῶν μερῶν ἠθροισμένον, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέρη γεννῆσαν αὐτό, ἵνα
καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς ἀληθῶς πᾶν ᾖ. καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια δὲ οὐ συμφωνία
πρὸς ἄλλο ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου οὗπερ ἀλήθεια. δεῖ δὴ
τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ἀληθινόν, εἴπερ ἔσται πᾶν ὄντως, μὴ
μόνον εἶναι πᾶν ᾧ ἐστι τὰ πάντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔχειν
οὕτως ὡς μηδενὶ ἐλλείπειν. εἰ τοῦτο, οὐδ' ἔσται τι
αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ ἔσται, ἐλλεῖπον ἦν τούτῳ· οὐκ ἄρα ἦν πᾶν.
παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τί ἂν αὐτῷ γένοιτο; πάσχει γὰρ οὐδέν. εἰ
οὖν μηδὲν αὐτῷ γένοιτο, οὐδὲ μέλλει οὐδὲ ἔσται οὐδ'
ἐγένετο. τοῖς μὲν οὖν γενητοῖς, εἰ ἀφέλοις τὸ "ἔσται", ἅτε
ἐπικτωμένοις ἀεὶ εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει μὴ εἶναι· τοῖς δὲ μὴ
τοιούτοις, εἰ προσθείης τὸ "ἔσται", ὑπάρχει τὸ ἔρρειν ἐκ
τῆς τοῦ εἶναι ἕδρας· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἦν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι οὐ
σύμφυτον, εἰ γίγνοιτο ἐν τῷ μέλλειν καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ
ἔσεσθαι εἰς ὕστερον. κινδυνεύει γὰρ τοῖς μὲν γενητοῖς ἡ
οὐσία εἶναι τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶναι τῆς γενέσεως, μέχρι-

4. 21 cf. Plat. *Phileb*. 24d2

4.1 δεῖ: δὴ CQ τούτων A^{ac}(ω in o et acc. mut.)E 2. ἀλλ' ἐκείνη Enn.: ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῃ Perna 3 ἐνοῦσα (scil. ἡ τοῦ αἰῶνος φύσις) Enn.: ἐν οὐσίᾳ Kirchhoff: μένουσα Dodds παρ' αὐτῆς (per seipsam): παρ' αὐτῇ Kirchhoff 4 ἐκεῖ om. Q 9 ἀληθὲς Q 12 ἀλήθεια: ἡ ἀλήθεια Q 13 τὸ^2 om. BL ἔσται: καὶ L 14 ᾖ: εἶναι Q 14 τὰ om. L 15 ὡς: ὥστε w εἰ τοῦτο: τούτων L 16 αὐτῷ: αὐτῶν L τούτῳ: τοῦτο Q: τούτων L 18 μηδὲν: οὐδὲν L 20 ἀεὶ: τὸ ἀεὶ L 23–24 καὶ ἔσεσθαι om. Q

[342] περ ἂν εἰς ἔσχατον ἥκῃ τοῦ χρόνου, ἐν ᾧ μηκέτ' ἐστί· τοῦτο δὴ τὸ "ἔστιν" εἶναι, καί, εἴ τις τοῦτο παρέλοιτο, ἠλαττῶσθαι ὁ βίος· ὥστε καὶ τὸ εἶναι. καὶ τῷ παντὶ δεῖ, εἰς ὅπερ οὕτως ἔσται. διὸ καὶ σπεύδει πρὸς τὸ μέλλον εἶναι καὶ στῆναι οὐ θέλει ἕλκον τὸ εἶναι αὑτῷ ἐν τῷ τι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ποιεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι κύκλῳ ἐφέσει τινὶ οὐσίας· ὥστε εἶναι ἡμῖν εὐρημένον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῆς κινήσεως τῆς οὕτω σπευδούσης ἐπὶ τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι τῷ μέλλοντι. τοῖς δὲ πρώτοις καὶ μακαρίοις οὐδὲ ἔφεσίς ἐστι τοῦ μέλλοντος· ἤδη γάρ εἰσι τὸ ὅλον, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς οἷον ὀφείλεται ζῆν ἔχουσι πᾶν· ὥστε οὐδὲν ζητοῦσι, διότι τὸ μέλλον αὐτοῖς οὐδέν ἐστιν οὐδ' ἄρα ἐκεῖνο, ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέλλον. ἡ οὖν τοῦ ὄντος παντελὴς οὐσία καὶ ὅλη, οὐχ ἡ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ μηδ' ἂν ἔτι ἐλλείψειν καὶ [τὸ] μηδὲν ἂν μὴ ὂν αὐτῇ προσγενέσθαι—οὐ γὰρ μόνα τὰ ὄντα πάντα δεῖ παρεῖναι τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μηδὲν τοῦ ποτε μὴ ὄντος—αὕτη ἡ διάθεσις αὐτοῦ καὶ φύσις εἴη ἂν αἰών· αἰὼν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος.

5. Τοῦτο δέ, ὅταν τινὶ προσβαλὼν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχω λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁρᾶν αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον οἷον μηδὲν περὶ αὐτὸ ὅλως γεγονέναι—εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἀεὶ ὄν, ἢ οὐκ ἀεί τι ὅλον ὄν—ἆρ' οὖν ἤδη ἀίδιον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἐνυπάρχοι αὐτῷ τοιαύτη φύσις, ὡς πίστιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς οὕτω καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ἔτι, ὡς, εἰ πάλιν προσβάλοις, εὑρεῖν

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4. 42–43 cf. Aristot. *De Caelo A.* 9. 279ª27

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4. 26 ἥκῃ xy: ἥκοι wQL 27 τοῦτο^{1} -εἶναι idque ipsum quod dicitur est (= τὸ "ἔστιν") in eis existere Ficinus recte ἔστιν: ἔσται Kirchhoff 27 εἶναι scil. κινδυνεύει 28–29 καὶ^{2}—ἔσται et uniuerso quidem esse eiusmodi oportet quousque sic erit Ficinus recte 29 οὗτος L 31 τινὸς L 33 τὸ ExL: τῶ A^{ac}(ῶ in ὸ mut.)yQ 36–37 ὥστε-μέλλον om. L 38 οὐχ ἡ: οὐχὶ Q: οὐχὶ ἡ L 39 ἡ om. Q ἐν τῷ regit utrumque infinitiuum τὸ (regit μηδὲν μὴ ὄν) A^{ac} (ὸ in ῶ mut.)ExyL: τῶ Q: ἐν τῷ Creuzer 41 καὶ^{2} om. L 5. 1–12 τοῦτο—ὄν om. L 1 προσλαβὼν Q 2 αὐτοῦ: αὐτῆς A(οῦ A^{1s}): αὐτῆς E 3 γεγονέναι εἰ: γέγονεν ἄγει Q

τοιοῦτον; τί οὖν, εἰ μηδὲ ἀφίσταιτό τις αὐτοῦ τῆς θέας, [343]
ἀλλὰ συνὼν εἴη τῆς φύσεως ἀγασθεὶς καὶ δυνατὸς
τοῦτο πράττειν ἀτρύτῳ φύσει; ἢ δραμὼν καὶ αὐτὸς εἰς
αἰῶνα ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἀποκλίνων οὐδαμῇ, ἵν' ἦ ὅμοιος καὶ
αἰώνιος, τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ αἰωνίῳ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὸ αἰώνιον
θεώμενος. εἰ οὖν τὸ οὕτως ἔχον αἰώνιον καὶ ἀεὶ ὄν, τὸ
μὴ ἀποκλῖνον εἰς ἑτέραν φύσιν κατὰ μηδέν, ζωὴν ἔχον, ἣν
ἔχει πᾶσαν ἤδη, οὐ προσλαβὸν οὐδὲ προσλαμβάνον ἢ
προσληψόμενον, εἴη ἂν ἀίδιον μὲν τὸ οὕτως ἔχον, ἀιδιότης
δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὖσα
καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, αἰὼν δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης
καταστάσεως ἐμφαινομένης. ὅθεν σεμνὸν ὁ αἰών, καὶ
ταὐτὸν τῷ θεῷ ἡ ἔννοια λέγει· λέγει δὲ τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ. καὶ
καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ὁ αἰὼν θεὸς ἐμφαίνων καὶ προφαίνων ἑαυτὸν
οἷός ἐστι, τὸ εἶναι ὡς ἀτρεμὲς καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ οὕτως καὶ τὸ
βεβαίως ἐν ζωῇ. εἰ δ' ἐκ πολλῶν λέγομεν αὐτόν, οὐ δεῖ θαυμά-
ζειν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ δύναμιν ἄπειρον· ἐπεὶ
καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον τὸ μὴ ἂν ἐπιλείπειν, καὶ τοῦτο κυρίως, ὅτι
μηδὲν αὐτοῦ ἀναλίσκει. καὶ εἴ τις οὕτω τὸν αἰῶνα λέγοι
ζωὴν ἄπειρον ἤδη τῷ πᾶσαν εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἀναλίσκειν
αὐτῆς τῷ μὴ παρεληλυθέναι μηδ' αὖ μέλλειν—ἤδη γὰρ οὐκ
ἂν εἴη πᾶσα—ἐγγὺς ἂν εἴη τοῦ ὁρίζεσθαι. [τὸ γὰρ ἑξῆς
"τῷ πᾶσαν εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἀναλίσκειν" ἐξήγησις ἂν εἴη
τοῦ "ἄπειρον ἤδη εἶναι."]
6. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις οὕτω παγκάλη καὶ ἀίδιος

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5. 7 τοιοῦτον; interpungimus 9 ἢ sane 10 ἔσται ExyQ: ἔστη A(η in ras. A^3 = Ficinus): σταίη Kirchhoff καὶ^1 del. Kirchhoff, sed coniungit δραμὼν et ἀποκλίνων 11 αἰωνίῳ: αἰῶνι Q 12 post τὸ^2: add. δὲ L 16–17 τοῦ–αὐτῷ om. L 18–22 ὅθεν—ζωῇ om. L 19 ἡ- θεῷ: εἰ ἔνια λέγοι λέγει δὲ τούτω τῶ θεῶ A^{1mg}: om. w λέγει δὲ τούτῳ (descripto nempe III. 7.4.37–42 et 5.12–15) τῷ θεῷ (scil. ταὐτόν) intellegimus τούτω A^{1mg}xy: τοῦτο Q 20 ἑαυτὸν om. Q 24 τὸ^2: τῶ Q 25 οὗτος Q 27 τῷ: τὸ Q^s om. Q 28 τὸ: τῶ Q 28–30 τὸ–εἶναι ut glossam del. Heinemann p. 96 Dodds 30 ἀπείρου Q

[344] περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, οὐδὲν ἐκβαί-
νουσα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, μένουσα δὲ ἀεὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ
καὶ ζῶσα κατ' ἐκεῖνο, εἴρηταί τε, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, τοῦτο τῷ
Πλάτωνι καλῶς καὶ βαθείᾳ τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως,
τοῦτο δὴ τὸ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνί, ἵνα μὴ μόνον ᾖ
αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ἓν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἄγων, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ τὸ ἓν
τοῦ ὄντος ζωὴ ὡσαύτως, τοῦτο ὃ δὴ ζητοῦμεν· καὶ τὸ
οὕτω μένον αἰὼν εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ οὕτω μένον καὶ
αὐτὸ τὸ μένον ὅ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ζωῆς μενούσης παρ'
αὐτῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ οὔτε τὸ εἶναι
οὔτε τὸ ζῆν ψευδομένη ἔχοι ἂν τὸ αἰὼν εἶναι. τὸ
γὰρ ἀληθῶς εἶναί ἐστι τὸ οὐδέποτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδ' ἄλλως
εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ὡσαύτως εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδιαφόρως εἶναι.
οὐκ ἔχει οὖν ὁτιοῦν [τὸ] ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, οὐδ' ἄρα διαστήσεις,
οὐδ' ἐξελίξεις, οὐδὲ προάξεις, οὐδὲ παρατενεῖς, οὐδ'
ἄρα οὐδὲ πρότερον αὐτοῦ οὐδέ τι ὕστερον λαβεῖν ἔχεις. εἰ οὖν
μήτε πρότερον μήτε ὕστερον περὶ αὐτό, τὸ δ' "ἔστιν"
ἀληθέστατον τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτό, καὶ οὕτω δέ, ὅτι
ἐστὶν ὡς οὐσίᾳ ἢ τῷ ζῆν, πάλιν αὖ ἥκει ἡμῖν τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ
λέγομεν, ὁ αἰών. ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ λέγωμεν καὶ τὸ οὐ ποτὲ
μὲν ὄν, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ἡμῶν, ἕνεκα [τῆς σαφηνείας] δεῖ

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6. 6 = Plat. *Tim.* 37d6

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6. 3 αὐτῆς Q ἀεὶ περὶ εκεῖνο: περὶ εκεῖνο ἀεὶ L: εἰ περὶ ἐκεῖνο Q 4 κατ': καὶ κατ' Q τοῦτο om. L οὐκ ἄλλως: οὐ καλῶς Q 6 μένοντος: μὲν ὄντως Q 7 αὐτὸν (seipsum) wxUS: αὑτὸν Q: ἑαυτὸν C: αὐτὴν τὸ om. Q 8 ὃ δὴ: δὴ ὃ AL 9 εἶναι Dodds 9–10 καὶ²-μένον om. Q 13 μὴ om. Q 14 τοῦτο δὲ² JL: τοῦ δὲ EBRyQ: το δὲ A in rasura 15 τὸ del. Volkmann, uidelicet correctio ad 14 τοῦ falso hic inserta 16 προάξεις: προσέξεις A (*supra* σέ scr. α A^{1s})E: πράξεις Q τὸ: ὁ Q τὸ δ' ἔστιν illud "est" 19 ἀληθέστατον: ἀληθέστατα w: ἀληθέστατος Q τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ: τὸν περὶ αὐτὸν Q 20 ὡς: ὡς μήτε L οὐσία omnes editores ἢ τῷ ERJy: ἢ τὸ AB: τὸ Q: μὴ τῷ L^{ac}(μ eras., spir. add.) 21 οὐ ποτὲ: οὕτω Q 23 τῆς σαφηνείας (συναφείας Q) ut glossam ad ἡμῶν del. Dodds ἡμῶν ἕνεκα: ἡμῖν ἕκαστα A(ὧν ἕνεκα A^{1s}) E

νομίζειν λέγεσθαι· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀεὶ τάχ' ἂν οὐ κυρίως [345]
λέγοιτο, ἀλλὰ ληφθὲν εἰς δήλωσιν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου πλανῷ
ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔκτασιν τοῦ πλείονος καὶ ἔτι ὡς μὴ
ἐπιλείψοντός ποτε. τὸ δὲ ἴσως βέλτιον ἦν μόνον τὸ "ὂν"
λέγειν. ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν ἀρκοῦν ὄνομα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ
καὶ τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίαν ἐνόμιζον, ἐδεήθησαν πρὸς τὸ
μαθεῖν καὶ προσθήκης τοῦ ἀεί. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μέν ἐστιν ὄν,
ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλο μὲν φιλόσοφος, ἄλλο δὲ
ὁ ἀληθινός· ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ὑποδυόμενον ἦν φιλοσοφίαν, ἡ
προσθήκη τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐγένετο. οὕτω καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀεὶ
καὶ τῷ "ὂν" τὸ ἀεί, ὥστε λέγεσθαι "ἀεὶ ὄν"· διὸ ληπτέον
τὸ ἀεὶ οἷον "ἀληθῶς ὂν" λέγεσθαι καὶ συναιρετέον τὸ ἀεὶ
εἰς ἀδιάστατον δύναμιν τὴν οὐδὲν δεομένην οὐδενὸς μεθ'
ὃ ἤδη ἔχει· ἔχει δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

Πᾶν οὖν καὶ ὂν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν οὐκ ἐνδεὲς καὶ οὐ ταύτῃ
μὲν πλῆρες, ἄλλῃ δὲ ἐλλεῖπον ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις. τὸ γὰρ ἐν
χρόνῳ, κἂν τέλειον ᾖ, ὡς δοκεῖ, οἷον σῶμά τι ἱκανὸν
ψυχῇ τέλειον, δεόμενον καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα, ἐλλεῖπον τῷ
χρόνῳ, οὗ δεῖται, ἅτε σὺν ἐκείνῳ, εἰ παρείη αὐτῷ καὶ
συνθέοι, ὂν ἀτελές· ταύτῃ ὂν ὁμωνύμως ἂν τέλειον λέγοιτο.
ὅτῳ δὲ ὑπάρχει μηδὲ τοῦ ἔπειτα δεῖσθαι μήτε εἰς χρόνον
ἄλλον μεμετρημένον μήτε τὸν ἄπειρον καὶ ἀπείρως ἐσό-

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6. 28 cf. *Stoic. Vet. Fr.* ii, n. 599 31 cf. Aristot. *Metaph. Γ* 2.1004^{b}18

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6. 25 ἔκτασιν Bury: ἔκβασιν Enn. 26 ὂν wyL^{ac} (ω in ο mut.): ὄν xQ 27–38 ἀλλὰ—φύσις om. L 27 ὄνομα om. Q 33–34 καὶ—ἀεὶ^{1} om. A(add. A^{Img})E 33 τῶ ὂν τὸ A^{Img}xy: τὸ ὂν τῶ Q ἀεὶ ὄν A^{Img}xy: ἀεὶ ὄν Q 34 ὂν: ὄν Q 38 γὰρ om. L 39 σῶμά τι RJy: σώματι A^{ac}(duo acc. mut.)EBQL 40 ψυχῇ xyL: ψυχὴ A^{ac}(acc.mut.)EQ 41 οὗ: οὐ Q ἅτε: ὥστε w 41 ἐκείνῳ scil. τῷ χρόνῳ αὐτῷ scil. τῷ ἐν χρόνῳ (et χρόνος subiectum ad παρείη et συνθέοι) potius quam αὐτῷ scil. τῷ ἐν χρόνῳ 42 ὂν ἀτελὲς ταύτῃ iter. Q post ἀτελὲς interpungimus cum archetypo ἂν τέλειον λέγοιτο: ὂν λέγοιτο καὶ τέλειον L 43 ὅτῳ δὲ ὑπάρχει: οὐ τῶδε ὑπάρχειν Q 43–45 μήτε—ἐσόμενον quod neque alio tempore mensuratur nec tempore infinito infiniteque futuro 44 μεμετρημένον neutrum at accusatiuus ad δεῖσθαι

[346] μενον, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο ἔχει, τοῦτό ἐστιν οὗ ἡ
ἔννοια ἐπορέγεται, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τοσοῦδε, ἀλλὰ
πρὸ τοῦ τοσοῦδε. ἔπρεπε γὰρ αὐτῷ μηδὲ τοσῷδε ὄντι
πάντη μηδενὸς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοσοῦδε, ἵνα μὴ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ
μερισθεῖσα τὸ καθαρῶς ἀμερὲς αὐτοῦ ἀνέλῃ, ἀλλ’ ᾖ καὶ τῇ
ζωῇ ἀμερὲς καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ. τὸ δ’ “ἀγαθὸς ἦν” ἀναφέρει
εἰς ἔννοιαν τοῦ παντὸς σημαίνων τῷ ἐπέκεινα παντὶ τὸ
μὴ ἀπὸ χρόνου τινός· ὥστε μηδὲ τὸν κόσμον ἀρχήν τινα
χρονικὴν εἰληφέναι τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῷ τὸ πρότερον
παρεχούσης. Ἀλλ’ ὅμως δηλώσεως χάριν τοῦτο εἰπὼν
μέμφεται ὕστερον καὶ τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι ὡς οὐδ’ αὐτοῦ
ὀρθῶς πάντη λεγομένου ἐπὶ τῶν τὸν λεγόμενον καὶ νοούμενον αἰῶνα εἰληχότων.
7. Ταῦτα οὖν λέγομεν ἆρά γε μαρτυροῦντες ἑτέροις
καὶ ὡς περὶ ἀλλοτρίων τοὺς λόγους ποιούμεθα; καὶ πῶς;
τίς γὰρ ἂν σύνεσις γένοιτο μὴ ἐφαπτομένοις; πῶς δ’ ἂν
ἐφαψαίμεθα τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις; δεῖ ἄρα καὶ ἡμῖν μετεῖναι
τοῦ αἰῶνος. ἀλλὰ ἐν χρόνῳ οὖσι πῶς; ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐν χρόνῳ
καὶ πῶς ἐν αἰῶνι ἔστιν εἶναι, γνωσθείη ἂν εὑρεθέντος
πρότερον τοῦ χρόνου. καὶ τοίνυν καταβατέον ἡμῖν ἐξ
αἰῶνος ἐπὶ τὴν ζήτησιν τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸν χρόνον· ἐκεῖ
μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡ πορεία πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν ἤδη οὐ
πάντη καταβάντες, ἀλλ οὕτως, ὥσπερ κατέβη χρόνος. εἰ

Desinit L **6.** 50

6. 50= Plat. *Tim.* 29e1 55–57 cf. ibid. 37e4–5

6.45 ἔχει (ex 43 ὅτω subiectum ὅ τι supplendum)wU^{ac}(prob.) L ἔχῃ xU^{ec}(η in alia litt.) SC^{ec} (η in alia litt.)Q 46–47 ἀλλὰ—τοσοῦδε om. Q 48 μηδενὸς: μηδ’ ἓν L 49 ᾖ: ᾗ A^{ac}(acc. mut.)E: ᾖ US 50 post οὐσίᾳ desinit L ἀναφέρει subiectum Plato 51 τοῦ παντὸς uniuersi sensibilis Bréhier recte 51-52 σημαίνων—τινός assignans cuique superiori esse extra tempus ullum cogitans de demiurgo bono 51 παντὶ: παντός Kirchhoff: πάντη Dodds 54 παρεχούσης w (intellegas cum id quod prius est semper praebat): πᾶν ἐχούσης xyQ 56 λεγομένου: λεγομένους Q **7.** 10 πάντη: πάνυ w

μὲν περὶ χρόνου εἰρημένον μηδὲν ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ [347]
μακαρίοις ἀνδράσιν, ἐχρῆν τῷ αἰῶνι ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνείραντας
τὸ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, πειρωμένους
τῇ ἐννοίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἣν κεκτήμεθα ἐφαρμόζειν τὴν λεγομένην
ὑφ' ἡμῶν δόξαν· νῦν δ' ἀναγκαῖον πρότερον λαβεῖν τὰ
μάλιστα ἀξίως λόγου εἰρημένα σκοποῦντας, εἴ τινι αὐτῶν
συμφώνως ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν ἔξει λόγος. τριχῇ δ' ἴσως διαιρε-
τέον τοὺς λεγομένους περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγους τὴν πρώτην. ἢ
γὰρ κίνησις ἡ λεγομένη, ἢ τὸ κινούμενον λέγοι ἄν, ἢ
κινήσεώς τι τὸν χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ στάσιν ἢ τὸ ἑστηκὸς ἢ
στάσεώς τι λέγειν παντάπασι πόρρω τῆς ἐννοίας ἂν εἴη
τοῦ χρόνου οὐδαμῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. τῶν δὲ κίνησιν
λεγόντων οἱ μὲν πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἂν λέγοιεν, οἱ δὲ τὴν τοῦ
παντός· οἱ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον λέγοντες τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἂν
σφαῖραν λέγοιεν· οἱ δὲ κινήσεώς τι ἢ διάστημα κινήσεως,
οἱ δὲ μέτρον, οἱ δ' ὅλως παρακολουθοῦν αὐτῇ· καὶ ἢ πάσης
ἢ τῆς τεταγμένης.
8. Κίνησιν μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε οὔτε τὰς συμπάσας λαμβά-
νοντι κινήσεις καὶ οἷον μίαν ἐκ πασῶν ποιοῦντι, οὔτε
τὴν τεταγμένην· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἑκατέρα ἡ λεγο-
μένη—εἰ δέ τις μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀπείη τοῦ
χρόνος εἶναι—ὡς ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἡ κίνησις, ἄλλου
τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῆς οὔσης. καὶ ἄλλων λεγομένων καὶ

7.20 cf. Aristot. *Phys*. *Δ* 11.219^{a}10 23 πᾶσαν κίνησιν: Stoici, cf. *Stoic. Vet. Fr*. ii, n. 514 23–24 τὴν τοῦ παντός cf. Aristot. *Phys*. *Δ* 10.218^{a}34 25 σφαῖραν Pythagorei (Simpl. *In Phys*. iv. 10, p. 700. 19–20), cf. Aristot. *Phys*. *Δ* 10.218^{b}1 διάστημα κινήσεως: Zeno Stoicus, cf. *Stoic. Vet. Fr*. i, n. 93 et ii. n. 510 26 μετρον cf. Aristot. *Phys*. *Δ* 12.220^{b}32 παρακολουθοῦν Epicurus *Fr*. 294 Usener (= Stob. *Anth*. i.8, t.i.103.6), et Chrysippus, cf. *Stoic*. *Vet. Fr*. ii, n. 509 8.1 cf. III.7.7.23–24

7.12 συνείροντας Q 19 λέγοι (scil. ὁ λόγος): λεγοιεν Kirchhoff 22 τοῦ^{2}: τὸ Q κίνησιν: κινήσεων(ιν A^{Iscp})EQ 23 πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἂν: κίνησιν ἂν πᾶσαν w 26 παρηκολούθουν Q 8.5 ἄλλου^{2} wxC: ἀλλ' οὐ USQ

[348] λεχθέντων ἂν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ὅτι κίνησις μὲν ἂν καὶ παύσαιτο καὶ διαλίποι, χρόνος δὲ οὔ. εἰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς κίνησιν μὴ διαλείπειν τις λέγοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὕτη, εἴπερ τὴν περιφορὰν λέγοι, ἐν χρόνῳ τινί· καὶ αὕτη περιφέροιτο ἂν εἰς τὸ αὐτό, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἥμισυ ἤνυσται, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἂν εἴη ἥμισυς, ὁ δὲ διπλάσιος, κινήσεως τοῦ παντὸς οὔσης ἑκατέρας, τῆς τε εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ ἥμισυ ἠκούσης. καὶ τὸ ὀξυτάτην δὲ καὶ ταχίστην λέγειν τὴν τῆς ἐξωτάτης σφαίρας κίνησιν μαρτυρεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς ἕτερον ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ χρόνος. ταχίστη γὰρ πασῶν δηλονότι τῷ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ μέγιστον διάστημα ἀνύειν· τὰ δ' ἄλλα βραδύτερα τῷ ἐν πλείονι ἂν καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ.

Εἰ τοίνυν μηδὲ ἡ κίνησις τῆς σφαίρας ὁ χρόνος, σχολῇ γ' ἂν ἡ σφαῖρα αὐτή, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὑπενοήθη χρόνος εἶναι.

Ἆρ' οὖν κινήσεώς τι; εἰ μὲν διάστημα, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πάσης κινήσεως τὸ αὐτό, οὐδὲ τῆς ὁμοειδοῦς· θᾶττον γὰρ καὶ βραδύτερον ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἐν τόπῳ. καὶ εἶεν ἂν ἄμφω μετρούμεναι αἱ διαστάσεις ἑνὶ ἑτέρῳ, ὃ δὴ ὀρθότερον ἄν τις εἴποι χρόνον. ποτέρας δὴ αὐτῶν τὸ διάστημα χρόνος, μᾶλλον δὲ τίνος αὐτῶν ἀπείρων οὐσῶν; εἰ δὲ τῆς τεταγμένης, οὐ πάσης μὲν οὐδὲ τῆς τοιαύτης· πολλαὶ γὰρ αὗται· ὥστε καὶ πολλοὶ χρόνοι ἅμα ἔσονται. εἰ δὲ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς διάστημα, εἰ μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ κινήσει διάστημα, τί ἂν ἄλλο ἢ ἡ κίνησις ἂν εἴη; τοσήδε μέντοι· τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε τοῦτο ἤτοι τῷ τόπῳ, ὅτι τοσόσδε ὃν διεξῆλθε,

8.21 cf. III. 7.7.25 23 cf. III. 7.7.25 25 cf. Aristot. *Phys. B* I.192^{b}14

8.7 ἀρκεῖ xUS: ἀρκῇ wQ: ἀρκοῖ C 8 διαλίποι RJy: διαλείποι wBQ 10 τινί scil. εἴη ἄν ἐξωτάτης: ἔξω ταύτης w 15 ὡς: ὥστε Q 17 μέγιστον: ἔλαττον Q 18 ἂν scil. ἀνύειν 27 αὐτὸν Q 31 αὐτοῦ A(ᾗ A^{Is})E

μετρηθήσεται, καὶ τὸ διάστημα τοῦτο ἔσται· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ [349]
χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τόπος· ἢ αὐτὴ ἡ κίνησις τῇ συνεχείᾳ αὐτῆς
καὶ τῷ μὴ εὐθὺς πεπαῦσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπιλαμβάνειν ἀεί, τὸ
διάστημα ἕξει. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τὸ πολὺ τῆς κινήσεως ἂν εἴη·
καὶ εἰ μὲν εἰς αὐτήν τις βλέπων ἀποφανεῖται πολλήν,
ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις πολὺ τὸ θερμὸν λέγοι, οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα
χρόνος φανεῖται οὐδὲ προσπίπτει, ἀλλὰ κίνησις πάλιν καὶ
πάλιν, ὡσπερεὶ ὕδωρ ῥέον πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, καὶ τὸ ἐπ'
αὐτῷ διάστημα θεωρούμενον. καὶ τὸ μὲν πάλιν καὶ πάλιν
ἔσται ἀριθμός, ὥσπερ δυὰς ἢ τριάς, τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦ
ὄγκου. οὕτως οὖν καὶ πλῆθος κινήσεως ὡς δεκάς, ἢ ὡς
τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον τῷ οἷον ὄγκῳ τῆς κινήσεως διάστημα, ὃ
οὐκ ἔχει ἔννοιαν χρόνου, ἀλλ' ἔσται τὸ τοσόνδε τοῦτο
γενόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ, ἢ ὁ χρόνος οὐκ ἔσται πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ'
ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῇ κινήσει, συμβαίνει τε πάλιν αὖ κίνησιν
τὸν χρόνον λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔξω αὐτῆς τὸ διάστημα, ἀλλὰ
κίνησις οὐκ ἀθρόα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀθρόα εἰς τὸ ἀθρόον ἐν χρό-
νῳ. τὸ μὴ ἀθρόον τίνι διοίσει τοῦ ἀθρόως; ἢ τῷ ἐν
χρόνῳ, ὥστε ἡ διεστῶσα κίνησις καὶ τὸ διάστημα αὐτῆς
οὐκ αὐτὸ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ἐν χρόνῳ. εἰ δὲ τὸ διάστημα τῆς
κινήσεως λέγοι τις χρόνον, οὐ τὸ αὐτῆς τῆς κινήσεως,
ἀλλὰ παρ' ὃ αὐτὴ ἡ κίνησις τὴν παράτασιν ἔχοι οἷον
συμπαραθέουσα ἐκείνῳ, τί δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν οὐκ εἴρηται.
δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἐν ᾧ γέγονεν ἡ
κίνησις. τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐζήτει ὁ λόγος, τί ὤν
ἐστι χρόνος· ἐπεὶ ὅμοιόν τε γίνεται καὶ ταὐτὸν οἷον εἴ

8. 36 τῶ wQ: τὸ xy 37 τὸ om. Q 40 φανείη Q 41 ὡσπερεὶ AB: ὡς περὶ ERJ: ὥσπερ yQ 42 αὐτῶ BRQ: αὐτὸ Jy: αὐτοῦ w 44 ὡς¹: οὐ Q 45 οἷον om. Q 46 τὸ om. w 49 αὐτοῦ A(ῆς A^{Is})E 50 κίνησις subiectum οὐκ ἀθρόα praedicatum 50–51 τὸ δὲ—χρόνῳ quod motio quae conferta non est commutatur in confertum, hoc in tempore accidit 50 εἰς A^{ac}(ς eras.) ExyQ: εἰ A^{pc} si Ficinus 55 παράστασιν A^{ac}(σ^{1} eras.)EQ 56 συμπαραθέουσα: σὺν παρὰ θεοῦ Q 58 τοῦτο: τοῦ Q 59 ἐστι: ἐστιν ὁ A(ὁ exp.) E τε γίνεται: γε γένηται ταὐτὸν: αὐτὸ w

[350] τις ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι χρόνος, λέγοι κινήσεως διάστημα ἐν χρόνῳ. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα, ὃ δὴ χρόνον καλεῖς τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ οἰκείου διαστήματος ἔξω τιθέμενος; καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ὁ τιθέμενος τῇ κινήσει τὸ διάστημα τὴν τῆς ἠρεμίας διάστασιν ποῖ θήσεται, ἄπορος ἔσται. ὅσον γὰρ κινεῖταί τι, τοσοῦτον ἂν σταίη καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ εἴποις ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἑκατέρου τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὡς ἄλλον δηλονότι ἀμφοῖν ὄντα. τί οὖν ἐστι καὶ τίνα φύσιν ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα; ἐπείπερ τοπικὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γε ἔξωθέν ἐστιν.

9. Ἀριθμὸς δὲ κινήσεως ἢ μέτρον—βέλτιον γὰρ οὕτω συνεχοῦς οὔσης—πῶς, σκεπτέον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ πάσης ὁμοίως ἀπορητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ διαστήματος τῆς κινήσεως, εἴ τις τῆς πάσης εἶναι ἐλέγετο. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ἀριθμήσειε τὴν ἄτακτον καὶ ἀνώμαλον; ἢ τίς ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ἢ κατὰ τί τὸ μέτρον; εἰ δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑκατέραν καὶ ὅλως πᾶσαν, ταχεῖαν, βραδεῖαν, ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ μέτρον τοιοῦτον, οἷον εἰ δεκὰς εἴη μετροῦσα καὶ ἵππους καὶ βοῦς, ἢ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέτρον καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν εἴη. εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτον μέτρον, τίνων μέν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος εἴρηται, ὅτι κινήσεων, αὐτὸς δὲ ὅ ἐστιν οὔπω εἴρηται. εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ δεκάδος ληφθείσης καὶ ἄνευ ἵππων ἔστι νοεῖν τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ τὸ μέτρον μέτρον ἐστὶ φύσιν ἔχον τινά, κἂν μήπω μετρῇ, οὕτω δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ τὸν χρόνον μέτρον ὄντα· εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ οἷον ἀριθμός, τί ἂν τοῦδε τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν δεκάδα ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν διαφέροι μοναδικοῦ; εἰ δὲ συν-

9. 1 cf. III.7.7.26; cf. Aristot. *Phys. Δ* 11.219^{b}2; *De Caelo A* 9.279^{a}14

8. 61 καλεῖς: καλεῖ ὁ A(ς A^{Is} ὁ exp.)E **9.** 1 ἢ μέτρον: ἡμέτερον Q 2 συνεχοῦς οὔσης J^{Img} (et testatur Simplicius, *In Physica* iv.14, p. 769. 7): συνεχούσης *Enn.* 4 εἴ τις (num quis scil. numerus) ἥ τις y 6 ἢ μέτρον: ἡμέτερον Q κατὰ τί: τί κατὰ τί y 8 οἷον: οἷον ὂν Q 10 δὴ τοιοῦτον: δὲ τοιοῦτο Q 17 ὁτουοῦν: ὁτιοῦν A(ου A^{Is}) EB^{ac}(ι in ου mut.)

ἐχὲς μέτρον ἐστί, ποσόν τι ὂν μέτρον ἔσται, οἷον τὸ πηχυαῖ- [351]
ον μέγεθος. μέγεθος τοίνυν ἔσται, οἷον γραμμὴ συνθέουσα
δηλονότι κινήσει. ἀλλ' αὕτη συνθέουσα πῶς μετρήσει τὸ
ᾧ συνθεῖ. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁποτερονοῦν θάτερον; καὶ
βέλτιον τίθεσθαι καὶ πιθανώτερον οὐκ ἐπὶ πάσης, ἀλλ ᾗ
συνθεῖ. τοῦτο δὲ συνεχὲς δεῖ εἶναι, ἢ ἐφέξει ἡ συνθέουσα.
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔξωθεν δεῖ τὸ μετροῦν λαμβάνειν οὐδὲ χωρίς,
ἀλλὰ ὁμοῦ κίνησιν μεμετρημένην. καὶ τί τὸ μετροῦν ἔσται;
ἢ μεμετρημένη μὲν ἡ κίνησις ἔσται, μεμετρηκὸς δ' ἔσται
μέγεθος. καὶ ποῖον αὐτῶν ὁ χρόνος ἔσται; ἡ κίνησις ἡ
μεμετρημένη, ἢ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ μετρῆσαν; ἢ γὰρ ἡ
κίνησις ἔσται ἡ μεμετρημένη ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους ὁ χρόνος,
ἢ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ μετρῆσαν, ἢ τὸ τῷ μεγέθει χρησάμενον,
ὥσπερ τῷ πήχει πρὸς τὸ μετρῆσαι ὅση ἡ κίνησις. ἀλλ'
ἐπὶ μὲν πάντων τούτων ὑποθέσθαι, ὅπερ εἴπομεν πιθανώ-
τερον εἶναι, τὴν ὁμαλὴν κίνησιν· ἄνευ γὰρ ὁμαλότητος καὶ
προσέτι μιᾶς καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου ἀπορώτερον τὸ τοῦ λόγου
τῷ θεμένῳ ὁπωσοῦν μέτρον γίνεται. εἰ δὲ δὴ μεμετρημένη
κίνησις ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ποσοῦ μεμετρημένη, ὥσπερ
τὴν κίνησιν, εἰ ἔδει μεμετρῆσθαι, οὐχὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἔδει
μεμετρῆσθαι, ἀλλ ἑτέρῳ, οὕτως ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ μέτρον
ἕξει ἄλλο ἡ κίνησις παρ' αὐτήν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐδεήθημεν
τοῦ συνεχοῦς μέτρου εἰς μέτρησιν αὐτῆς, τὸν αὐτὸν
τρόπον δεῖ καὶ τῷ μεγέθει αὐτῷ μέτρου, ἵν' [ᾗ] ἡ κίνησις,
τοσοῦδε γεγενημένου τοῦ καθ' ὃ μετρεῖται ὅση, μετρηθῇ.
καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ μεγέθους ἔσται τῇ κινήσει παρομαρ-
τοῦντος ἐκεῖνος ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ

9. 33 cf. Aristot. *Phys. E* 4.228^{b}16

9. 23 ἢ ἐφέξει (si minus subsistet): ἦ ἐφέξει w 24 μέτρον Q 27 αὐτῷ Q 28 τὸ^{1} A^{1s} om. w 28–30 ἢ γὰρ—μετρῆσαν om. y 28 ἢ γὰρ ἡ: ἡ γὰρ Q 35 μέτρω Q 37–38 οὐχὶ—μεμετρῆσθαι om. Q 41 ἡ Kirchhoff: ἦ ἡ wxy: ἦ Q 42 ante et post ὅση comma poni potest 43 ἔσται ⟨τοῦ⟩ Kirchhoff

[352] συνθέον τῇ κινήσει. οὗτος δὲ τίς ἂν εἴη ἢ ὁ μοναδικός;
ὃς ὅπως μετρήσει ἀπορεῖν ἀνάγκη. ἐπεί, κἄν τις
ἐξεύρῃ ὅπως, οὐ χρόνον εὑρήσει μετροῦντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν
τοσόνδε χρόνον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸν χρόνῳ. ἕτερον γὰρ
εἰπεῖν χρόνον, ἕτερον δὲ τοσόνδε χρόνον· πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ
τοσόνδε δεῖ ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνο, ὃ τοσόνδε ἐστίν.
ἀλλ' ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ μετρήσας τὴν κίνησιν ἔξωθεν τῆς
κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος, οἷον ἡ δεκὰς ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων οὐ μετὰ
τῶν ἵππων λαμβανόμενος. τίς οὖν οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, οὐκ εἴ-
ρηται, ὃς πρὸ τοῦ μετρεῖν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἡ
δεκάς. ἢ οὗτος, ὃς κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τῆς
κινήσεως παραθέων ἐμέτρησεν. ἀλλ' οὗτος ὁ κατὰ τὸ
πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον οὔπω δῆλος ὅστις ἐστίν. ἀλλ' οὖν
κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον μετρῶν εἴτε σημείῳ εἴθ'
ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ πάντως κατὰ χρόνον μετρήσει. ἔσται οὖν ὁ
χρόνος οὗτος ὁ μετρῶν τὴν κίνησιν τῷ προτέρῳ καὶ ὑστέρῳ
ἐχόμενος τοῦ χρόνου καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος, ἵνα μετρῇ. ἢ γὰρ
τὸ τοπικὸν πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, οἷον ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ
σταδίου, λαμβάνει, ἢ ἀνάγκη τὸ χρονικὸν λαμβάνειν.
ἔστι γὰρ ὅλως τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὸ μὲν χρόνος ὁ
εἰς τὸ νῦν λήγων, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον ὃς ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἄρχεται.
ἄλλο τοίνυν ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον
μετροῦντος τὴν κίνησιν οὐ μόνον ἡντινοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν

9. 55 cf. Aristot. *Phys.* *Δ* 11.219^{b}2 64–65 cf. ibid. *Δ* 13. 222^{b}1–2

9. 45 σύνθετον A(έον A^{Is})E οὕτω Q 46 ὃς: ὡς Q ἀπορεῖν ἀνάγκη: ἀνάγκη ἀπορεῖ Q 48 χρόνῳ: οὖν χρόνον Q 50 ὅ τί ποτ': ὅτι τί ποτ' US: ὁ ποτ' Q εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνο transp. w 53 λαμβανόμενος (congruit cum ἀριθμός): λαμβανομένη E: λαμβάνεται A(όμενος A^{Is}) 54 ὅπερ: ὅσπερ Q ὁ χρόνος (*tempus quod statuunt*) del. Kirchhoff 63 λαμβάνει (τὸ τοπικὸν subiectum, πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον obiectum Cilento recte): λαμβάνεται Kirchhoff τὸ: τὸν Q 65 ὕστερον del. Kirchhoff 66. ἄλλο A^{pc} aliud Ficinus: αλλὰ A^{ac} (ὰ in ο et acc. mut. A^{2})ExyQ τοίνυν: τοῦ νῦν Q

τεταγμένην, ὁ χρόνος. ἔπειτα διὰ τί ἀριθμοῦ μὲν προσγε- [353]
γενημένου εἴτε κατὰ τὸ μεμετρημένον εἴτε κατὰ τὸ
μετροῦν· ἔστι γὰρ αὖ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μετροῦντα καὶ μεμετρη-
μένον εἶναι—ἀλλ' οὖν διὰ τί ἀριθμοῦ μὲν γενομένου χρό-
νος ἔσται, κινήσεως δὲ οὔσης καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πάντως
ὑπάρχοντος περὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τοῦ ὑστέρου οὐκ ἔσται χρόνος;
ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ μέγεθος μὴ εἶναι ὅσον ἐστίν, εἰ
μή τις τὸ ὅσον ἐστὶ τοῦτο λάβοι. ἀπείρου δὲ τοῦ χρόνου
ὄντος καὶ λεγομένου πῶς ἂν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸς εἴη; εἰ
μή τις ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι αὐτοῦ μετροῖ, ἐν ᾧ συμβαίνει
εἶναι καὶ πρὶν μετρηθῆναι. διὰ τί δὲ οὐκ ἔσται πρὶν καὶ
ψυχὴν τὴν μετροῦσαν εἶναι; εἰ μή τις τὴν γένεσιν αὐτοῦ
παρὰ ψυχῆς λέγοι γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ διά γε τὸ μετρεῖν
οὐδαμῶς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· ὑπάρχει γὰρ ὅσον ἐστί, κἂν μή
τις μετρῇ. τὸ δὲ τῷ μεγέθει χρησάμενον πρὸς τὸ μετρῆσαι
τὴν ψυχὴν ἄν τις λέγοι· τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἔννοιαν
χρόνου;
10. Τὸ δὲ παρακολούθημα λέγειν τῆς κινήσεως, τί ποτε
τοῦτό ἐστιν οὐκ ἔστι διδάσκοντος οὐδὲ εἴρηκέ τι, πρὶν εἰπεῖν
τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ παρακολουθοῦν· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἂν ἴσως εἴη ὁ
χρόνος. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τὸ παρακολούθημα τοῦτο εἴτε
ὕστερον εἴτε ἅμα εἴτε πρότερον, εἴπερ τι ἔστι τοιοῦτον
παρακολούθημα· ὅπως γὰρ ἂν λέγηται, ἐν χρόνῳ λέγεται.
εἰ τοῦτο, ἔσται ὁ χρόνος παρακολούθημα κινήσεως ἐν
χρόνῳ.

Desinit Q **9.**72

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9. 78–84 cf. Aristot. *Phys. Δ* 14.223ª21–29 **10.** 1 cf. III.7.7.26

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9. 70 ἔστι γὰρ αὖ (id est sicut III.7.9.24–25) coniecimus: ἔστι γὰρ ἂν *Enn.* εἴη γὰρ ἂν 72 post οὔσης desinit Q παντὸς A^{ac}(ο in ω et acc. mut.)E 82 μετρῆσαι Kirchhoff: μετρῆσαν Enn. **10.** 1 λέγεται A(ειν A^{1s})E 2 διδάσκοντες regit τί ποτε τοῦτό ἐστιν 2 οὐδὲ εἴρηκέ τι Page: εἰρηκέναι *Enn.*

[354] Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐ τί μή ἐστι ζητοῦμεν ἀλλὰ τί ἐστιν.
εἴρηταί τε πολλὰ πολλοῖς τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν καθ' ἑκάστην
θέσιν, ἃ εἴ τις διεξίοι, ἱστορίαν μᾶλλον ἂν ποιοῖτο, ὅσον
τε ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς εἴρηταί τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ πρὸς
τὸν λέγοντα μέτρον κινήσεως τοῦ παντὸς ἐκ τῶν ἤδη
εἰρημένων ἀντιλέγειν τά τε ἄλλα ὅσα νῦν περὶ μέτρου
κινήσεως εἴρηται—χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας πάντα τὰ
ἄλλα, ἃ καὶ πρὸς αὐτούς, ἁρμόσει—εἴη ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἰ-
πεῖν, τί ποτε δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν χρόνον εἶναι.
11. Δεῖ δὴ ἀναγαγεῖν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πάλιν εἰς ἐκείνην
τὴν διάθεσιν ἣν ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐλέγομεν εἶναι, τὴν
ἀτρεμῆ ἐκείνην καὶ ὁμοῦ πᾶσαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἤδη ζωὴν καὶ
ἀκλινῆ πάντη καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἑστῶσαν. χρόνος δὲ
οὔπω ἦν, ἢ ἐκείνοις γε οὐκ ἦν, γεννήσομεν δὲ χρόνον
λόγῳ καὶ φύσει τοῦ ὑστέρου. τούτων δὴ οὖν ἡσυχίαν
ἀγόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον ἐξέπεσε χρό-
νος, τὰς μὲν Μούσας οὔπω τότε οὔσας οὐκ ἄν τις ἴσως κα-
λοῖ εἰπεῖν τοῦτο· ἀλλ ἴσως, εἴπερ ἦσαν καὶ αἱ Μοῦσαι τότε,
αὐτὸν δ' ἄν τις τάχα τὸν γενόμενον χρόνον, ὅπως ἐστὶν
ἐκφανεὶς καὶ γενόμενος. λέγοι δ' ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὧδέ πως·
ὡς πρότερον, πρὶν τὸ πρότερον δὴ τοῦτο γεννῆσαι καὶ
τοῦ ὑστέρου δεηθῆναι, σὺν αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἀνεπαύετο
χρόνος οὐκ ὤν, ἀλλ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡσυχίαν ἦγε.

Accedit L **11**.11–58

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11 3–4 cf. Parm. *Fr.* B 8.4–6 7= Hom. *Il* 113 et Plat. *Resp.* 545d8–e1

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10. 11 ἃ εἴ: ἀεὶ w 14 τά τε ἄλλα scil. ἀντιλέγειν ἔστι **11**. 5 γεννήσομεν $A^{pc}B^{ec}$RJy: γενήσομεν B^{ac}(*supra* ν^{1} add. ν B^{s}): γεννησόμενον E: γενησόμενον A^{ac}(*supra* ν^{1} add. ν A^{is} et ον exp. prob. A^{1}) 10 ἄν τις scil. καλοῖ χρόνον: κόσμον Dodds 11 λέγοι (subiectum ὁ χρόνος): λέγει L(οι L^{s}) hinc incipiens περὶ αὐτοῦ (ἑαυτοῦ L) *de seipso*, nec tamen prosopopoeia temporis sequitur, ipse uero Plotinus de tempore loquitur 13–14 αὐτῷ et ἐκείνῳ nempe αἰῶνι

φύσεως δὲ πολυπράγμονος καὶ ἄρχειν αὐτῆς βουλομένης καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ πλέον τοῦ παρόντος ζητεῖν ἑλομένης ἐκινήθη μὲν αὐτή, ἐκινήθη δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ οὐ ταὐτόν, ἀλλ ἕτερον εἶθ' ἕτερον κινούμενοι, μῆκός τι τῆς πορείας ποιησάμενοι αἰῶνος εἰκόνα τὸν χρόνον εἰργάσμεθα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς ἦν τις δύναμις οὐχ ἥσυχος, τὸ δ' ἐκεῖ ὁρώμενον ἀεὶ μεταφέρειν εἰς ἄλλο βουλομένης, τὸ μὲν ἀθρόον αὐτῇ πᾶν παρεῖναι οὐκ ἤθελεν· ὥσπερ δ' ἐκ σπέρματος ἡσύχου ἐξελίττων αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος διέξοδον εἰς πολύ, ὡς οἴεται, ποιεῖ, ἀφανίζων τὸ πολὺ τῷ μερισμῷ, καὶ ἀνθ' ἑνὸς ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ἓν δαπανῶν εἰς μῆκος ἀσθενέστερον πρόεισιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ αὐτὴ κόσμον ποιοῦσα αἰσθητὸν μιμήσει ἐκείνου κινούμενον κίνησιν οὐ τὴν ἐκεῖ, ὁμοίαν δὲ τῇ ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐθέλουσαν εἰκόνα ἐκείνης εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτὴν ἐχρόνωσεν ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτον ποιήσασα· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῷ γενομένῳ ἔδωκε δουλεύειν χρόνῳ, ἐν χρόνῳ αὐτὸν πάντα ποιήσασα εἶναι, τὰς τούτου διεξόδους ἁπάσας ἐν αὐτῷ περιλαβοῦσα· ἐν ἐκείνῃ γὰρ κινούμενος —οὐ γάρ τις αὐτοῦ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς τόπος ἢ ψυχή— καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνης αὖ ἐκινεῖτο χρόνῳ. τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν αὐτῆς παρεχομένη ἄλλην μετ' ἄλλην, εἶθ' ἑτέραν πάλιν ἐφεξῆς, ἐγέννα τε μετὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὸ ἐφεξῆς καὶ συμπροῄει μετὰ διανοίας ἑτέρας μετ' ἐκείνην τὸ μὴ πρό- [355]

11. 20 cf. Plat. *Tim.* 37d5

11. 18 τὸ: εἰς τὸ L 19 κινούμενοι nos homines uel animae, recte iam MacKenna 20 εἰργάσμεθα (idem subiectum atque III.7.11.5 γεννήσομεν): εἰργασάμεθα A(′σ A^{1s})E 22 βουλομένη Kirchhoff 23 δ': ουδ' L 24 οἴεται: εἴρηται L 25–26 έν αὐτῷ (bis) in seipso 27 πρόεισιν x: πρόσεισιν A^{ac}(σ^{1} eras.)EyL 31–35 ἐν χρόνῳ om. L 32 τούτου scil. τοῦ κόσμου 34 αὐτοῦ: αὐτῷ Kirchhoff: αὖ Cilento, sed si coniciendum, potius τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς glossa ad αὐτοῦ ἢ, ψυχή prob. A^{3}: ἡ ψυχή A^{ac}Exy 36 αὐτῆς: αὐτοῦ A^{ac}(ῆς A^{1s} et spir. mut.)E: αὐτῆς A^{pc} πάλιν om. L

[356] τερον ὄν, ὅτι οὐδ' ἡ διάνοια ἐνεργηθεῖσα ἦν οὐδ' ἡ νοῦν
ζωὴ ὁμοία τῇ πρὸ αὐτῆς. ἅμα οὖν ζωὴ ἄλλη καὶ τὸ "ἄλλη"
χρόνον εἶχεν ἄλλον. διάστασις οὖν ζωῆς χρόνον εἶχε καὶ
τὸ πρόσω ἀεὶ τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον ἔχει ἀεὶ καὶ ἡ παρελθοῦσα
ζωὴ χρόνον ἔχει παρεληλυθότα. εἰ οὖν χρόνον τις λέγοι
ψυχῆς ἐν κινήσει μεταβατικῇ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον βίον ζωὴν
εἶναι, ἆρ' ἂν δοκοῖ τι λέγειν; εἰ γὰρ αἰών ἐστι ζωὴ ἐν
στάσει καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἄπειρος ἤδη, εἰκόνα
δὲ δεῖ τοῦ αἰῶνος τὸν χρόνον εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν
ἔχει πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἀντὶ μὲν ζωῆς τῆς ἐκεῖ ἄλλην δεῖ ζωὴν
τὴν τῆσδε τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ ὁμώνυμον
λέγειν εἶναι καὶ ἀντὶ κινήσεως νοερᾶς ψυχῆς τινος μέρους
κίνησιν, ἀντὶ δὲ ταὐτότητος καὶ τοῦ ὡσαύτως καὶ μένοντος
τὸ μὴ μένον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ἐνεργοῦν, ἀντὶ
δὲ ἀδιαστάτου καὶ ἑνὸς εἴδωλον τοῦ ἑνὸς τὸ ἐν συνεχείᾳ
ἕν, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀπείρου ἤδη καὶ ὅλου τὸ εἰς ἄπειρον πρὸς τὸ
ἐφεξῆς ἀεί, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀθρόου ὅλου τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐσόμενον
καὶ ἀεὶ ἐσόμενον ὅλον. οὕτω γὰρ μιμήσεται τὸ ἤδη ὅλον
καὶ ἀθρόον καὶ ἄπειρον ἤδη, εἰ ἐθελήσει ἀεὶ προσκτώμενον
εἶναι ἐν τῷ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι οὕτω τὸ ἐκείνου
μιμήσεται. δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἔξωθεν τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβάνειν τὸν
χρόνον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν αἰῶνα ἐκεῖ ἔξω τοῦ ὄντος, οὐδ' αὖ
παρακολούθημα οὐδ' ὕστερον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐνορώ-
μενον καὶ ἐνόντα καὶ συνόντα, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖ ὁ αἰών.
12. Νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς ἡ φύσις αὕτη χρόνος,
τὸ τοιούτου μῆκος βίου ἐν μεταβολαῖς προιὸν ὁμαλαῖς τε

11. 46–47 cf. Plat. *Tim.* 37d5–7

11. 39 οὐδ' ἡ[1]: οὐ δὴ A: οὐ δεῖ E 40 τὸ: τῷ Creuzer: om. L 44. βίον ζωὴν x Simplicius, *In Phys. de temp.*, p. 790. 36: βίον χρόνον wCL: χρόνον ζωὴν US 45 εἰ: εἰ μὲν x ζωὴ A^{ac}(ἡν $A^{\gamma\rho s}$)ExyL: ζωῆς Simplicius, ibid. p. 791.1 51 αὐτότητος w 53 εἴδωλον τοῦ ἑνὸς om. L 57 ἤδη: εἴδη L 58 post τῷ εἶναι desinit L **12.** 1 χρόνος del. Kirchhoff 2–4 τό- ἔχον explicat 1 φύσις 2 μήκους A^{ac}(ˆ et ος A^{1s})E

καὶ ὁμοίαις ἀψοφητὶ προιούσαις, συνεχὲς τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας [357]
ἔχον. εἰ δὴ πάλιν τῷ λόγῳ ἀναστρέψαι ποιήσαιμεν τὴν
δύναμιν ταύτην καὶ παύσαιμεν τοῦδε τοῦ βίου, ὃν νῦν ἔχει
ἄπαυστον ὄντα καὶ οὔποτε λήξοντα, ὅτι ψυχῆς τινος ἀεὶ
οὔσης ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, οὐ πρὸς αὐτὴν οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ἐν
ποιήσει καὶ γενέσει—εἰ οὖν ὑποθοίμεθα μηκέτι ἐνερ-
γοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ παυσαμένην ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ
ἐπιστραφὲν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ
καὶ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ μένον, τί ἂν ἔτι μετὰ αἰῶνα
εἴη; τί δ' ἂν ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο πάντων ἐν ἑνὶ μεινάντων; τί
δ' ἂν ἔτι πρότερον; τί δ' ἂν ὕστερον ἢ μέλλον; ποῦ δ' ἂν
ἔτι ψυχὴ ἐπιβάλλοι εἰς ἄλλο ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι; μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ
τούτῳ· ἀφεστήκοι γὰρ ἂν πρότερον, ἵνα ἐπιβάλῃ. ἐπεὶ
οὐδ' ἂν ἡ σφαῖρα αὐτὴ εἴη, ἢ οὐ πρώτως ὑπάρχει·
[χρόνος] ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη καὶ ἔστι καὶ κινεῖται, κἂν
στῇ, ἐκείνης ἐνεργούσης, ὅση ἡ στάσις αὐτῆς, μετρήσομεν,
ἕως ἐκείνη τοῦ αἰῶνός ἐστιν ἔξω. εἰ οὖν ἀποστάσης
ἐκείνης καὶ ἐνωθείσης ἀνῄρηται χρόνος, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ
ταύτης ἀρχὴ πρὸς ταῦτα κινήσεως καὶ οὗτος ὁ βίος τὸν
χρόνον γεννᾷ. διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἅμα τῷδε τῷ παντὶ γεγο-
νέναι, ὅτι ψυχὴ αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ἐγέννησεν.
ἐν γὰρ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ τόδε γεγένηται τὸ πᾶν·
καὶ ἡ μὲν χρόνος, ὁ δὲ ἐν χρόνῳ. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι χρόνους
λέγεσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄστρων φοράς, ἀναμνησθήτω,
ὅτι ταῦτά φησι γεγονέναι πρὸς δήλωσιν καὶ διορισ-
μὸν χρόνου καὶ τὸ ἵνα ἢ μέτρον ἐναργές. ἐπεὶ

12. 22 cf. Plat. *Tim.* 38b6 25–26 cf. ibid. 39d1 27–28 = ibid. 38c6 et 39b2

12. 11 μένοι RJ: μένει B(οι B^s) 13 μέλλον Page: μᾶλλον *Enn.* 17 χρόνος (prob. ut subiectum ad 16 εἴη falso insertum, cf. III. 7. 8. 21) deleuimous 18 ἐκείνης scil. ψυχῆς 19 ἐκείνη scil. ψυχή 19 post αἰῶνος add. ἡ στάσις (glossa ad ἐκείνη) w ἀπόστασις A^{ac}(in ι scr. η et acc. mut. A^{2-3})E 25 ὁ δὲ scil. ὁ κόσμος cf. III.2.1.9 28 καὶ τὸ ἵνα ἢ μέτρον ἐναργές wC: τὸ ἵνα ἢ μέτρον ἐναργές US: καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον ἐναργές $A^{\gamma\rho mg}E^{\gamma\rho mg}$x

[358] γὰρ οὐκ ἦν τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁρίσαι οὐδὲ μετρεῖν
παρ' αὐτοῖς ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος ἀοράτου ὄντος καὶ οὐ
ληπτοῦ καὶ μάλιστα ἀριθμεῖν οὐκ εἰδόσιν, ἡμέραν καὶ
νύκτα ποιεῖ, δι ὧν ἦν δύο τῇ ἑτερότητι λαβεῖν, ἀφ' οὗ
ἔννοιά, φησιν, ἀριθμοῦ. εἶθ' ὅσον τὸ ἀπ' ἀνατολῆς εἰς
τὸ πάλιν λαμβάνουσιν ἦν ὅσον χρόνου διάστημα, ὁμαλοῦ
ὄντος τοῦ τῆς κινήσεως εἴδους ὅτῳ ἐπερειδόμεθα, ἔχειν
καὶ οἷον μέτρῳ χρώμεθα τῷ τοιούτῳ· μέτρῳ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου·
οὐ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος αὐτὸς μέτρον. πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ μετροῖ καὶ
τί ἂν λέγοι μετρῶν τοσοῦτον εἶναι, ὅσον ἐγὼ τοσόνδε; τίς
οὖν ὁ "ἐγώ"; ἢ καθ' ὃν ἡ μέτρησις. οὐκοῦν ὥν, ἵνα μετρῇ,
καὶ μὴ μέτρον; ἡ οὖν κίνησις ἡ τοῦ παντὸς μετρουμένη
κατὰ χρόνον ἔσται, καὶ ὁ χρόνος οὐ μέτρον ἔσται κινήσεως
κατὰ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὢν ἄλλο τι πρό-
τερον παρέξει δήλωσιν τοῦ ὁπόση ἡ κίνησις. καὶ ἡ κίνησις
δὲ ληφθεῖσα ἡ μία ἐν τοσῷδε χρόνῳ πολλάκις ἀριθμουμένη
εἰς ἔννοιαν ἄξει τοῦ ὁπόσος παρελήλυθεν· ὥστε τὴν
κίνησιν καὶ τὴν περιφορὰν εἴ τις λέγοι τρόπον τινὰ
μετρεῖν τὸν χρόνον, ὅσον οἷόν τε, ὡς δηλοῦσαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῆς
τοσῷδε τὸ τοσόνδε τοῦ χρόνου, οὐκ ὂν λαβεῖν οὐδὲ συνεῖναι
ἄλλως, οὐκ ἄτοπος τῆς δηλώσεως. τὸ οὖν μετρούμενον
ὑπὸ τῆς περιφορᾶς—τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ δηλούμενον—ὁ
χρόνος ἔσται, οὐ γεννηθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς περιφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ
δηλωθείς· καὶ οὕτω τὸ μέτρον τῆς κινήσεως, τὸ μετρηθὲν
ὑπὸ κινήσεως ὡρισμένης καὶ μετρούμενον ὑπὸ ταύτης, ἄλλο
ὂν αὐτῆς· ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ μετροῦν ἄλλο ἦν, καὶ ᾗ μετρούμενον

12. 30–33 cf. Plat. *Tim.* 39b6–c1; *Epin.* 978d 2–4 34 et 44 Aristot. *Phys.* Δ 12.220ª13–14

12. 32 ποεῖ scil. ὁ θεός, Plat. *Tim.* 38c4 ἦν δύο transp. y 34 λαμβάνουσιν participium ἦν id est ἦν δυνατόν 35 ἐπερειδόμεθα ARJ(ω J^{1s})C: ἐπερειδώμεθα EBUS 39 ὁ: ὃ A^{ac}(acc. eras.)E 40 μέτρον; interpung. Cilento: μέτρον ⟨ᾗ⟩ Dodds 45 ἀνάξει A^{ac}(ἀν exp.)E 54 εἰ: ᾗ Kirchhoff εἰ-ἦν si reuera tempus ut mensurans aliud, erat cf. 42 ὢν ἄλλο τι ᾗ Kirchoff: εἰ *Enn.*

ἕτερον, μετρούμενον δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἐλέγετο, ὡς εἰ τὸ μετρούμενον ὑπὸ πήχεως λέγοι τις τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο μὴ λέγων, μέγεθος ὁριζόμενος, καὶ οἷον εἴ τις τὴν κίνησιν αὐτὴν οὐ δυνάμενος τῷ ἀόριστον εἶναι δηλῶσαι λέγοι τὸ μετρούμενον ὑπὸ τόπου· λαβὼν γὰρ τόπον τις, ὃν ἐπεξῆλθεν ἡ κίνησις, τοσαύτην ἂν εἶπεν εἶναι, ὅσος ὁ τόπος. 55 [359] 60

13. Χρόνον οὖν ἡ περιφορὰ δηλοῖ, ἐν ᾧ αὐτή. δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν χρόνον μηκέτι τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον αὐτὸν εἶναι ὅς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἄλλα κινεῖται καὶ ἕστηκεν ὁμαλῶς καὶ τεταγμένως, καὶ παρὰ μέν τινος τεταγμένου ἐμφαίνεσθαι καὶ προφαίνεσθαι εἰς ἔννοιαν, οὐ μέντοι γίνεσθαι, εἴτε ἑστῶτος εἴτε κινουμένου, μᾶλλον μέντοι κινουμένου· μᾶλλον γὰρ κινεῖ εἰς γνώρισιν καὶ μετάβασιν ἐπὶ τὸν χρόνον ἡ κίνησις ἢπερ ἡ στάσις καὶ γνωριμώτερον τὸ ὁπόσον κεκίνηταί τι ἢ ὅσον ἕστηκε. διὸ καὶ κινήσεως ἠνέχθησαν εἰς τὸ εἰπεῖν μέτρον ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν κινήσει μετρούμενον, εἶτα προσθεῖναι τί ὂν κινήσει μετρεῖται καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γινόμενον περί τι αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν καὶ ταῦτα ἐνηλλαγμένως. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἐνηλλαγμένως, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ συνίεμεν, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς λεγόντων μέτρον κατὰ τὸ μετρούμενον οὐκ ἐτυγχάνομεν τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὴ συνιέναι ἡμᾶς, ὅτι τί ὂν εἴτε μετροῦν εἴτε μετρούμενον οὐκ ἐδήλουν διὰ τῶν συγγραμμάτων ὡς εἰδόσι καὶ ἠκροαμένοις αὐτῶν γράφοντες. ὁ μέντοι Πλάτων οὔτε μετροῦν εἴρηκεν οὔτε μετρούμενον ὑπό τινος 5 10 15

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13. 6 cf. Aristot. *Phys.* *Δ* 12.221^{b}22–27 9–10 cf. ibid. 220^{b} 14–16 14 cf. ibid. 220^{b}19 19–22 cf. Plat. *Tim.* 39b–c

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12. 55 δὲ: ὡς δὲ A^{ac}(ὡς exp.)E κατὰ Kirchhoff: καὶ *Enn.* 59 τῷ xC: τὸ A^{ac}(o in ω mut.)EUS **13.** 10–12 ἀντὶ τοῦ regit et εἰπεῖν et προσθεῖναι et εἰπεῖν 12 γενόμενον w γινόμενον περί τι αὐτοῦ (scil. χρόνου) oppositum ad τί ὄν 15 ἐντυγχάνομεν w 17 ἐδήλουν coniecimus ἐκδηλοῦν A^{ac}(in ν scr. σι A^{2})Exy ἐκδηλοῦσι A^{pc}

[360] τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ εἰς δήλωσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν περιφορὰν ἐλάχιστόν τι εἰλῆφθαι πρὸς ἐλάχιστον αὐτοῦ μέρος, ὡς ἐντεῦθεν γινώσκειν δύνασθαι, οἷον καὶ ὅσον ὁ χρόνος. τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ δηλῶσαι θέλων ἅμα οὐρανῷ φησι γεγονέναι κατὰ παράδειγμα αἰῶνος καὶ εἰκόνα κινητήν, ὅτι μὴ μένει μηδ' ὁ χρόνος τῆς ζωῆς οὐ μενούσης, ᾗ συνθεῖ καὶ συντρέχει· ἅμα οὐρανῷ δέ, ὅτι ζωὴ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ καὶ μία ζωὴ οὐρανὸν καὶ χρόνον ἐργάζεται. ἐπιστραφείσης οὖν ζωῆς ταύτης εἰς ἕν, εἰ δύναιτο, ὁμοῦ καὶ χρόνος πέπαυται ἐν τῇ ζωῇ ὢν ταύτῃ καὶ οὐρανὸς τὴν ζωὴν ταύτην οὐκ ἔχων. εἰ δέ τις τῆσδε μὲν τῆς κινήσεως τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον λαμβάνων χρόνον λέγοι—εἶναι γάρ τι τοῦτο—τῆς δ' ἀληθεστέρας κινήσεως τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἐχούσης μὴ λέγοι τι εἶναι, ἀτοπώτατος ἂν εἴη, κινήσει μὲν ἀψύχῳ διδοὺς ἔχειν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον καὶ χρόνον παρ' αὐτήν, κινήσει δέ, καθ' ἣν καὶ αὕτη ὑφέστηκε κατὰ μίμησιν, μὴ διδοὺς τοῦτο, παρ' ἧς καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον πρώτως ὑπέστη αὐτουργοῦ οὔσης κινήσεως καὶ ὥσπερ τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς ἑκάστας γεννώσης, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ ἅμα τῇ γεννήσει καὶ τὴν μετάβασιν αὐτῶν. διὰ τί οὖν ταύτην μὲν τὴν κίνησιν τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀνάγομεν εἰς περιοχὴν ἐκείνης καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ φαμέν, οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν διεξόδῳ οὖσαν ἀιδίῳ; ἢ ὅτι τὸ πρὸ ταύτης ἐστὶν αἰὼν οὐ συμπαραθέων οὐδὲ συμπαρατείνων αὐτῇ. πρώτη οὖν αὕτη εἰς χρόνον καὶ χρόνον ἐγέννησε καὶ σὺν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτῆς

13. 24 cf. Plat. *Tim.* 38b6–c2 et 37d5

13. 21 εἰλῆφθαι (medium) xy: εἰληφέναι A(ˆet θαι A^{Is})E 23 αὐτοῦ A^{s} uel A^{is} om. w 24 κατὰ Kirchhoff, cf. Plat. *Tim.* 38b8: καὶ *Enn.* 31 τῆσδε μὲν A^{Img}xy: τῆς ζωῆς καὶ w 36 αὐτήν: αὐτῆς A(ʽν A^{Is})E 44 ταύτης: αὐτῆς A(τ^{1} et ´ A^{Is})E 45 αὐτῇ: αὐτῆς A^{ac}(ς exp.)E αὕτη: αὐτὴ A(˝ A^{is})E

ἔχει. Πῶς οὖν πανταχοῦ; ὅτι κἀκείνη οὐδενὸς ἀφέστηκε [361]
τοῦ κόσμου μέρους, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐδενὸς ἡμῶν
μέρους. εἰ δέ τις ἐν οὐχ ὑποστάσει ἢ ἐν οὐχ ὑπάρξει τὸν
χρόνον λέγοι, δῆλον ὅτι ψεύδεσθαι † καὶ τὸ θεὸν αὐτόν, ὅταν
λέγῃ "ἦν" καὶ "ἔσται"· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἦν, ὡς τὸ ἐν
ᾧ λέγει αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους ἄλλος
τρόπος λόγων. ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ πρὸς ἅπασι τοῖς
εἰρημένοις, ὡς, ὅταν τις τὸν κινούμενον ἄνθρωπον λαμ-
βάνῃ ὅσον προελήλυθε, καὶ τὴν κίνησιν λαμβάνει ὅση, καὶ
ὅταν τὴν κίνησιν οἷον τὴν διὰ σκελῶν, ὁράτω καὶ τὸ πρὸ
τῆς κινήσεως ταύτης ἐν αὐτῷ κίνημα ὅτι τοσοῦτον ἦν, εἴ
γε ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον συνεῖχε τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ σώματος. τὸ μὲν
δὴ σῶμα τὸ κινούμενον τὸν τοσόνδε χρόνον ἀνάξει ἐπὶ τὴν
κίνησιν τὴν τοσήνδε—αὕτη γὰρ αἰτία—καὶ τὸν χρόνον
ταύτης, ταύτην δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν, ἥτις τὰ
ἴσα διειστήκει. τὴν οὖν κίνησιν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τί; εἰς ὃ
γὰρ ἐθελήσει, ἀδιάστατον ἤδη. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ πρώτως
καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἄλλα· αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐν τῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἔξει
[τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ πρώτως]. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντὸς
ὡσαύτως. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν χρόνος; ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ τῇ
τοιαύτῃ πάσῃ καὶ ὁμοειδῶς ἐν πάσῃ καὶ αἱ πᾶσαι μία. διὸ
οὐ διασπασθήσεται ὁ χρόνος· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ὁ αἰὼν ὁ κατ'
ἄλλο ἐν τοῖς ὁμοειδέσι πᾶσιν.

13. 49 cf. Aristot. *Phys. Δ* 12.221^{b}31 sqq.

13. 48 μέρος A^{ac}(ς in υς mut.)E ἡμῶν Kirchhoff ἡμῖν wBJy: om. R: del. Dodds 50 ψεύδεσθαι: ψεύσεται Kirchhoff τὸ wRJU^{ac}(ν ins.)C: τὸν BS 55 προελήλυθε Kirchhoff προσελήλυθε *Enn.* 56 ὅταν scil. λαμβάνῃ ὁράτω Dodds: ὁρᾷ τῶ wxU(τὸ U^{mg})S(ὸ S^{s})C 64 ἐν τῳ Dodds: ἐν ὧ *Enn.* 65 τοῦτο—πρώτως del. Kirchhoff 67 πάσῃ^{2} wxUS: πᾶσι C Simplicius *In Phys. de temp.* p. 791.23

Translation

Chapter 1

(**1**–**3**) When we say that eternity and time are different from one another and that one belongs to the everlasting nature, whereas the other—time—belongs to that which is in becoming and our universe,

(**3**–**8**) Immediately and as if by a sudden apprehension of our concept of them, we think that we have a clear impression about them in our souls, since we are always mentioning them and naming them on every occasion. However, when we try to examine them more deeply and in a sense bring ourselves closer to them, our thought runs again into confusion.

(**8**–**16**) Each of us considers one or the other of the different assertions of the ancients about time and eternity and perhaps interprets them in a different way; we halt our investigation there, and when we are asked, we think that it suffices to name the opinions of the great philosophers. We are then happy to depart from our investigation into these concepts. Certainly, we must hold that some of these ancient and blessed philosophers have discovered the truth, but it is fitting for us to examine which of them best attained it, and how we ourselves can come to have such an understanding.

(**16**–**20**) We must begin with eternity by asking ourselves what it is for those who say that it is something different from time. For once we know what stands as the archetype, it might be possible also to clearly reveal its image—that image which they say is time.

(**20**–**24**) Nevertheless, if one came to form an image of the nature of time before having contemplated eternity, it would still be possible for him, through recollection, to ascend from here to the intelligible realm, and so to contemplate that which time resembles, if it is true that time really does resemble eternity.

Chapter 2

(**1**–**4**) What therefore should we say that eternity is? Must we say that it is intelligible reality itself, just as we could say that time is the whole of the heavens and the universe at large? For as they say, this was the opinion of certain philosophers about time.

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(5–9) For since we imagine and conceive eternity as something supremely majestic, and since in another sense we also conceive intelligible nature as supremely majestic, and as we do not say that one of the two is more majestic than the other—as for that which is beyond, even this predicate cannot be attributed to it—it is thus tempting to identify them with one another.

(9–20) And all the more so since the intelligible world and eternity both have a containing character and contain the same things. However, when we say that things of one kind—the intelligibles—are held in the other—in eternity—and we attribute to them the predicate 'eternal' because, as Plato maintains, the nature of the archetype is eternal, we are again saying that eternity is something other than this nature, while claiming that it is concerned with it, is in it, or belongs to it. The fact that they are both majestic does not prove that they are identical because it may well be that one of the two receives its majestic character from the other. As for their containing character, they are not of the same order: one contains that which it contains because it stands in relation to its parts, whereas the other, eternity, contains the totality of the intelligible realities simultaneously, not as parts, but because all the realities, insofar as they are eternal, are so by virtue of eternity itself.

(20–36) Must we therefore say that eternity is related to intelligible rest, just as we say that time is related to sensible movement? But now someone could ask, understandably, if those who say this want to say that eternity is identical to rest, or not to rest without qualification but to the rest which belongs to Being. For if it is identical to rest, then first of all, we must not say that rest is eternal, just as we do not say that eternity itself is eternal, for that which is eternal is that which participates in eternity. Secondly, how could movement be eternal when at the same time it would also be at rest? And how can the notion of rest contain the 'always'—not the 'always' which is in time, but that which we think of when we speak of that which is everlasting? If, on the other hand, eternity were identical to the rest which belongs to Being, then once more we would place the other kinds of intelligible being outside eternity. Then it is not necessary to think of eternity as existing only in rest because it is also in unity; it is also necessary to think of it without extension in order for it not to be identical to time: but rest insofar as it is rest does not entail either the notion of unity or of the absence of extension. Finally, since we predicate of eternity its dwelling in unity, it could participate in rest while not being rest itself.

Chapter 3

(**1–3**) What therefore could this nature be which makes us say of the intelligible realm that it is wholly eternal and everlasting? And what is everlastingness? Are everlastingness and eternity one and the same thing or does eternity conform to everlastingness?

(**4–7**) Should we say that it is an idea which corresponds to a certain unity, but a unity which results from a gathering of multiplicity? Or rather, is it instead a nature which follows on from things in the intelligible realm, or which is present to them, or manifest in them? Are all these things that nature which, although one, possesses many powers and exists as many things?

(**7–11**) And if we examine this abundant power, we call it 'being' with reference to the character which it has as a substrate, 'motion' to the extent to which we consider its life, then 'rest' because it dwells in every way in the same state, and 'different and same' to the extent that the things of the intelligible realm are together and one.

(**11–27**) So too, if we again gather these things into unity so as to be only life, and if we compress the otherness, and consider the inexhaustible nature of their action, and the fact that it never becomes other than itself and is not the thought or life which goes from one state to another, but rather that which dwells in the same state and continually does not have extension, that thing that we see in seeing all these things is eternity, a life which dwells in the same because the whole is always present to it. This life is not one thing now and then something different afterwards, but it is all things at the same time and not composed of different things now and then others afterwards. Rather, it is perfectly complete and without parts: as in a point, all things are in it together without ever separating or flowing out. Dwelling instead in itself and identical to itself, eternity does not change; it is always in the present because there is nothing of it which has come or will go but it is just what is. So that it is not the substrate which is eternity but that which shines out, so to speak, from the substrate itself in accordance with the identity which proclaims about not what is going to be but what is already present and which is as it is and not otherwise.

(**27–36**) And in fact, what could happen to it later which it is not now? It will not be anything later which it is not already because there is nothing which it could leave in order to arrive at the now, because this could not be different from the now. And it is not going to be in the future what it does not possess now. Neces-

sarily, 'was' will not belong to it because what is there which belonged to it that has passed? Neither 'will be', because what will happen to it? It remains for it that it is precisely that which is. That which neither was nor will be but which only is, and which possesses being by dwelling in rest, because it does not change to the 'will be' nor has changed—this very thing is eternity.

(**36–38**) Therefore, the life which belongs to being and which is in being, the life that is wholly together, full and totally lacking extension, is what we are searching for, namely, eternity.

Chapter 4

(**1–5**) One must not think that that which exists for the intelligible nature has come to it accidentally from the outside: it is this nature, it comes from it and is with it. For eternity manifests itself in this reality by virtue of the reality itself, since for all the other things too which we claim are there, because we see that they have their existence there, we say that in each case they come from the intelligible nature and exist with it.

(**5–11**) For it is necessary that the primary realities exist with the primaries and among them. Indeed, beauty too is among them and comes from them, and truth is among them as well. And some things are as if in a part of total being, whereas the others are in the totality in the same way that this which is really a whole does not arise from the gathering of its parts, but has produced its parts itself, so that in this way it would be truly whole.

(**11–12**) And there, truth does not correspond with anything else but it belongs to each thing of which it is the truth.

(**12–20**) It is necessary, in fact, that this thing which is a true whole, if it is to be truly whole, must not only be whole in the sense that it is all things but it must also have the character of a whole by not lacking anything. If this is the case, then nothing will be for it. This is because, if something will be, it means that the whole lacks this thing and that it was not after all whole in the first place. And what could happen to it which would be alien to its nature? For it does not suffer in any way. If therefore nothing could happen to it, it will not be destined to come into being, nor did it come into being. Concerning things which have been created, if you take away the 'will be', then they immediately cease to exist because they are continually acquiring their being.

(20–28) But for things which are not of this kind, if you add the 'will be', then they leave the seat of being. Therefore, it is clear that being was not something natural for them if they came to be by delaying being, by having been, and by going to be in the future. For things which have been produced, it could well be that their reality consists in existing from the very moment of their birth until they have reached their last moment, at which point they no longer exist. Their 'being' is just that, and if we were to take this away from them, their life would be shortened and as a result their being would also be diminished.

(28–33) And the universe must also have a future by moving towards that which 'will be' in this way. This is why it actually speeds towards the future without wanting to stay still and draws being to itself by producing a succession of different states and by moving in a circle through a kind of desire for Being. And for that reason, we have also found the cause of the movement which tends to everlasting being by projecting itself into the future.

(33–42) But the primary and blessed beings do not desire for the future because they are already the whole, and they have all the life which so to speak is due to them. For this reason they do not seek anything because they have nothing which will be, nor, after all, that in which the future can be found. The complete and whole reality of Being is not solely that which consists in the sum of its parts but also that which consists in the fact that it will never lack anything and that there is no non-being which will associate with it, because it is not enough for the whole to have all beings present to it, but it is also necessary that it does not have anything which could ever not be; this disposition and nature would be eternity.

(43) Thus, 'eternity' (*aiōn*) comes from 'that which always is' (*aei on*).

Chapter 5

(1–7) When I apply thought to something and can say of that thing, or rather see, that it is of such a kind that it is impossible that anything about it could have come into being (for then it would be something that does not always exist, or that does not always exist as a whole), is that thing eternal, if it does not have the kind of nature which affirms that it exists and will never exist in a different way, so that if you were to look at it again, you would find it as it was?

(**7–12**) What, then, if one does not stop contemplating it, but dwells with it, fascinated by its nature and able to do so by a natural power that never tires? Would one not rush towards eternity, without veering from it in any way, and thus become similar to it and eternal, contemplating the eternal and eternity by that which is eternal in oneself?

(**12–18**) If that which has these attributes is eternal and always exists and does not veer away towards a different nature in any way, and has the life which already it possesses as a whole, not requiring any addition, past, present, or future, that which has these attributes would be everlasting, and everlastingness would be this kind of condition of the substrate, as that which comes from the substrate itself and that which is in it, and eternity would be the substrate, with that kind of condition manifesting itself in it.

(**18–22**) For which reason, eternity is something majestic, and thought proclaims it identical to the god, and proclaims it identical with this god. And it would be right to say that eternity is a god which shows itself and manifests itself as what is, that is, Being, immoveable and identical to itself, and like this and solidly established in life.

(**22–30**) However, there is no need to be surprised if we say that it is comprised of a multiplicity because each of the intelligible beings is many things due to the limitless power of these beings. To be limitless is to never lack anything, and this being is limitless in a strict sense, since it expends nothing of itself. And if we were to say, in the light of this, that eternity is immediately limitless life, because it is whole and does not expend anything of itself, neither existing in the past nor in the future—without which it would not exist as an immediate whole—we would indeed be close to a definition of eternity. [The latter part of this definition, 'because it is whole and does not expend anything of itself', would be an explanation of the expression 'immediately endless'].

Chapter 6

(**1–9**) Since the nature which is of this kind, absolutely beautiful and everlasting in this way, is around the One and comes from it and is orientated towards it, without ever going away from it, but always dwells around it and in it, and lives in accordance with it; and since Plato said in a beautiful way and with deep intelligence (in my opinion), and not at random, 'eternity dwells in the One', not only in the sense that it leads itself back to unity in relation

to itself, but also by being the life of Being around the One, this nature is therefore what we are seeking and dwelling in this way is being eternity.

(**9–21**) For that which is this and which dwells in this way as what it is, an activity of life dwelling in and directed towards the One and in it, with no falsehood in its being or its life—this would have the being of eternity. For true Being is never not being or being otherwise, and this Being is always identical, and this is Being without differences. True Being therefore never has 'this then that' nor will you be able to separate it out or unroll it, or prolong it or stretch it, and therefore you cannot grasp anything of which comes beforehand or afterwards. If therefore, there is no before or after concerning it, if its 'is' is the truest thing concerning it, and itself, and this in the sense that it is by its being or its life, there again appears to us that which we are speaking about, namely, eternity.

(**21–26**) But whenever we speak of the 'always' and say that at one moment it exists and at another it does not, it is necessary to believe that we express ourselves in this way in order to make things clearer for ourselves. For the 'always' was perhaps not being used in the strict sense, but taken as explaining the imperishable, might deceive the soul into thinking of something which extends more and more and which will never fail.

(**26–36**) It would perhaps have been better simply to say 'that which is'. But even though the expression 'that which is' is suitable for describing being, since people thought that being was becoming they needed the qualification of 'always' in order to understand the meaning of 'that which is'. For it is not that 'existing' is one thing and 'existing always' is another, just as it is not that a 'philosopher' is one thing and a 'true philosopher' is another, but it was because a pretence of philosophy existed that the addition of the adjective 'true' to 'philosopher' took place. Similarly, we added 'always' to being, that is, '*aei*' to '*on*' so that we say 'always being' (*aei on*) meaning that which truly is, designating an unextended power which in no way needs anything more than what it already possesses, as it possesses the whole.

(**37–42**) The nature of this kind is therefore all, it is that which is, and not lacking in wholeness, and not complete in one respect and lacking in another. For that which is in time, even if it seems perfect in the way that a body which is appropriate for a soul is perfect, also needs that which is to come and lacking in time, which it needs because it is with it; if time is present to it and runs alongside it, it is incomplete. Having this kind of existence, it would be called perfect homonymously.

(**43–50**) But that which does not need that which is to come, which is measured neither by another time or an indefinite time which will be endless, but which possesses that which it must be, this is what our mind reaches for, that whose being does not arise from a certain amount of time but exists before any amount of time. For since it is not of any quantity, it was fitting that it should not have any contact with quantity to avoid its life being divided into parts and the destruction of its pure partlessness, in order for it to be partless both in life and in being.

(**50–57**) And with the proclamation, 'he was good', Plato takes us back to the notion of the all, signifying by the 'all beyond' that the intelligible realm did not come into being from any particular time, so that even the universe did not have any temporal beginning, since the cause of its being supplies what is before it. Nevertheless, having said this for the sake of explanation, he then finds fault with this word as well afterwards, as not being used entirely in the correct way for things which have a share in that which we call and think of as eternity.

Chapter 7

(**1–5**) Do we then say these things as though we were testifying for others and speaking about what is foreign to us? How would this be possible? And how could we attain understanding of something with which we have no contact? For how could we have contact with something which is foreign to us? It is necessary that we ourselves also have a share in eternity.

(**5–10**) But how can we, when we are in time? What it is to be in time and what it is to be in eternity may be understood when we have first found out what time is. So we must descend from eternity for the purpose of the investigation into time, and to time. For there the way was upwards, but now let us speak as descending, not totally but in the way that time descended.

(**10–17**) Now if the ancient and blessed men had said nothing about time, it would have been necessary to start with eternity and join the subsequent account together with it, saying what seems true to us and attempting to match the notion of time we have gained with the opinion about it which we express. But as things are, it is necessary first to take into account the most worthy statements and examine whether the theses which we hold will agree with any of them.

(**17–27**) Perhaps we should, in the first instance, divide the statements made about time into three groups. For either time is what is called movement, or it could be said to be that which is moved, or something which is associated with movement. For to say that it is rest, or at rest, or something associated with rest, would be far from our notion of time, which is never the same in any way. Among those who say that time is movement, some would seem to mean that it is movement in general, others that it is the movement of the whole. Those who say that time is what is moved seem to mean that it is the sphere of the whole; among those who say that time is something which is associated with movement or that it is the interval of movement, some say that it is the measure of movement, others that it is in a general way that which follows movement, and either all movement or regulated movement.

Chapter 8

(**1–8**) It is impossible for time to be movement, whether one takes all the movements and makes them as it were into one or whether one takes it as ordered movement, for what we call movement of each kind exists in time; if some movement were not in time, it would be even less feasible for it to be time because that in which movement exists and movement itself are different things. And although objections can be advanced or have been advanced, it suffices to say that movement can stop or be interrupted whereas time cannot.

(**8–14**) If one were to argue that the movement of the universe is not interrupted, nevertheless this as well, if indeed he were talking about the movement of the heavens, exists in a period of time. This circuit would not complete itself in the time which it would need to achieve half its journey: one would be half and the other double the time; each movement would be movement of the whole, with the first going to and from the same place and the latter reaching only half the distance.

(**14–19**) And to say that the movement of the outermost sphere is the keenest and quickest is to bear witness to our view that movement is different to time. For it is quite clearly the quickest of all because it traverses the greatest distance in less time; the other movements are slower since they take a longer time to cover only a part of the distance traversed by the outermost sphere.

(20–22) If therefore, time is not the movement of the sphere, it could hardly be the sphere itself, which was supposed to be time on the basis that it is in motion.

(23–30) Is it therefore something which belongs to movement? If it is the interval of movement, firstly, this interval is not identical for all movement, not even for movement of the same kind: for movement is quicker and slower, even in space. And both these intervals would be measured by one other thing, which would indeed more correctly be called time. Then of which of the two movements is the interval time? Or rather, of which of the infinite number of movements which exist? If it is the interval of ordered movement, it is not the interval of all ordered movement, or of ordered movement of a particular kind, for there are many of these, so there would also be many times at once.

(30–32) But if it is the interval of the movement of the universe, and if we take it to be the interval which is in the movement itself, what would this be other than the movement?

(32–37) The movement certainly has a fixed quantity, but this quantity will be measured by space because the space which the movement has travelled across has a fixed quantity and this will be the interval. But this is not time but space. Or alternatively, the movement itself, by the continuity of its movement and because it does not stop immediately but always persists, will contain the interval.

(37–53) But this would be the multiplicity of movement, and if, looking at it, one shows that it is a multiplicity, just as one might say that there is a lot of heat, time will not manifest at that point, nor enter into view, but only movement again and again just like water flowing again and again and the interval we perceive in it. And the again and again will be a number, just like two or three but interval pertains to size. In this way, therefore, the multitude of movement is like the number ten or the interval which appears in that which is, so to speak, the mass of movement, and this does not contain the concept of time but will be the extent of that which came to be in time, or else time will not be everywhere but in movement as its substrate, and we are back to saying that time is movement. For the interval itself is not outside movement but is movement which is not immediate. But the comparison between movement which is immediate and movement which is not immediate itself occurs in time. How will that which is not immediate differ from that which is

immediate? By existing in time, insofar as the movement which extends over an interval and the interval of it are not time itself but are in time.

(**53–62**) But if someone were to say that the interval of movement is time, not the interval of movement itself, but that from which the movement itself possesses extension, in the sense that it runs along together with it, what this is has not been stated. For it is clear that time is that in which the movement came into being. But this has been the object of our enquiry from the outset, to discover what time really is, which is more or less the same as responding to the question, 'what is time?' with the statement that it is the interval of movement in time. What therefore is that interval which you call time and place outside the interval which belongs to movement?

(**63–69**) Moreover, he who places the interval in the movement itself will find himself confused as to where to place the interval of rest. For another thing could rest for as long as something was moved, and you would say the time of each was the same, being quite clearly different from both. What therefore is this interval and what is its nature? Indeed, it cannot be spatial, for this is also outside movement.

Chapter 9

(**1–2**) We must consider in what sense time is number of movement or its measure—better to call it a measure since movement is continuous.

(**2–15**) Firstly, we must also raise the question as to whether time is the measure of all movement equally, just as we raised the question of the interval of movement, if time was said to be the measure of all movement. For how could one count disordered and uneven movement? And what would its number or measure be and according to what would it be measured? But if there is the same measure for each kind of movement and for all movement as a whole, quick and slow, then the number and measure will be like the number ten measuring both horses and cows, or like the same measure for both liquids and solids. Indeed, if time is such a measure, it has been said what kind of things time is a measure of—that of movements—but what it is itself has not yet been said. But if one can take the number ten and think of this number independently of horses, and the measure is a measure possessing a definite nature, even if it is not yet measuring, in the same way, time must also have a definite nature by virtue of being a measure.

(**15–17**) If it is by itself a thing of such a kind, like a number, what difference can there be between this and the number ten or any other number consisting of abstract units?

(**17–31**) If on the other hand time is a continuous measure, it will be a measure by virtue of being something of a certain quantity, like the length of a cubit. The size will therefore be like a line which clearly runs alongside movement. But how will this line running alongside movement measure that which it runs alongside? Why should one measure the other rather than the other way round? It would be better and more persuasive to say that time is not the measure of all movement but only of that which it runs alongside. But this movement must be continuous, otherwise the line which it runs alongside will stop. But one should take that which measures neither as something outside nor as something separate but should treat the measured movement as one and the same. And what will that which measures be? Movement will be measured and that which measures will be size. And which of them will be time? The movement which is measured or the size doing the measuring? Time will either be the movement measured by magnitude or the magnitude which measures, or even that which uses this magnitude, as one uses the cubit to measure the quantity of the movement.

(**31–35**) But in all these cases, we must suppose the very thing which we said is more plausible, namely, uniform movement, for without uniformity and, over and above that, without movement being unitary and pertaining to the whole, the account of time as a measure, in one way or another, becomes even more obscure.

(**35–50**) But if time is a measured movement measured by a certain quantity, just as the movement, if there was need for it to be measured, could not be measured by itself but would need to be measured by something else, so it is necessary, if the movement is going to have another measure besides itself (and it is for this reason that we needed a continuous measure in order to measure this movement) in the same way it is necessary for magnitude itself to have a measure in order for the movement to be measured by fixing at a certain quantity of that by which it is measured as a certain quantity. And the time which we seek will be the number of the magnitude which accompanies movement but not simply the magnitude which runs alongside the movement. But what could this be if not number consisting of abstract units? Necessarily one is at a loss as to how this number will measure. Then, if someone were to discover how this could occur, one will discover not time measuring, but a particular

quantity of time. But this is not the same as time. For it is one thing to speak of time, another to speak of the quantity of time, since before speaking about the quantity of time, it is necessary to say what that thing is which is of such a quantity.

(**51**–**55**) But the number which measures the movement from outside the movement is time, like the number ten applied to horses but understood independently of horses. Therefore, what this number is, which, like the number ten, is what it is before measuring anything, has not been said.

(**55**–**68**) Perhaps it is the number which runs beside and measures the movement according to before and after. But it is not yet clear what this number, which measures according to before and after, is. However, if it measures according to before and after with a point or by any other means, in any case it would be measuring according to time. This time therefore, which measures movement according to before and after, depends on time and is in contact with it in order to measure. For one must either grasp before and after in a spatial sense, like the beginning of the race-course, or in a temporal sense. For in general, before and after are, on the one hand, that time which stops at the now, and on the other hand that which begins from the now. Time therefore is something different from the number which measures according to before and after not only any kind of movement but also ordered movement.

(**68**–**75**) Then why, when number is added, either measured or measuring (as the same number could be both that which measures and that which is measured) why will time come into being when this number has come into being, but when movement exists—which always has a before and after belonging to it—time will not exist? It would be like saying that magnitude was not a certain size on the basis that no one took it to be that size.

(**75**–**78**) Since time is and is said to be infinite—how could number have anything to do with it? Unless one took a part of it and measured it, a part in which time would exist even before having been measured.

(**78**–**84**) And why would time not exist before even the soul which measures it? Unless one were to say that its origin comes from the soul. But the fact that the soul measures time in no way necessitates this, for time exists with its quantity, even if no one measures it. But if one were to say that it is the soul which makes use of magnitude in order to measure time, what would this contribute to the concept of time?

Chapter 10

(**1–8**) Saying that time is an accompaniment of movement does not indicate what it is, nor are we saying anything meaningful before it is said what that accompanying thing is, for perhaps that would be time. And one must consider whether this accompaniment comes after, at the same time as, or before the movement—if such an accompaniment really exists—for whichever of these is said, it is said to be in time. If this is the case, time will be an accompaniment of movement in time.

(**9–17**) But since we are not looking for what time is not but for what it is, and since many things have been said by many of our predecessors on each theory—if one went through everything, he would instead be doing a historical investigation—and since something has been said about them by way of a summary and it is possible from what has already been said to contradict one who says that time is the measure of movement of the all by taking into account what we have already said about the measure of movement (for apart from that of uneven movement all the other objections used against these arguments will fit this one), the next thing is to say what it is necessary to believe that time is.

Chapter 11

(**1–4**) Indeed, it is necessary to take ourselves back into that disposition which we were saying existed in eternity, that still and unified whole: the already boundless life, altogether unswerving, which dwells in and is orientated towards the One.

(**4–6**) Time did not yet exist, not at any rate for the intelligible realities and we will generate time according to the principle and nature of the 'after'.

(**6–11**) Indeed, since these realities rest in themselves, one could probably not invoke the Muses to say how time 'first fell off' since they did not yet exist. But perhaps, even if the Muses really did exist at that time, one could ask time itself, having come into being, how it appeared and came into being. It might say something like this about itself:

(**12–14**) that before, indeed before it had generated this 'before' or wanted the 'after', it rested in Being with eternity, since it was not yet time but itself, too, remained quiet in that Being.

(**15–20**) But there was a restless nature, which wanted to govern itself, be by itself and chose to seek more than the present; it set itself in motion and time itself also moved and by always moving to the next and to the 'after' and what is not the same, but one thing or another, we created a lengthy journey and produced time as an image of eternity.

(**20–27**) For the soul had an unquiet power, which always willed to carry across what it saw there into something else and did not want the all to be continuously present to it. Just as from a quiet seed the principle unfolds itself and goes outwards into vastness, or so it thinks, and hides the vastness by division, and instead of remaining in unity itself, expends its unity outside itself and proceeds into a weaker extension,

(**27–33**) in this way too Soul makes the physical universe which imitates that eternal world, and moves with a motion not belonging to that eternal world but which resembles that motion and wishes to be an image of it. It first temporalised itself by making time as opposed to eternity, and then gave over to time as its slave that which had come into being, making all of it exist in time, and encasing all its means of escape in time.

(**33–45**) For since this world moves in Soul—there being no other place for the universe than Soul—it moves also in that very time of Soul. For it produces its activities one after the other, and then another which succeeds that which precedes it. It generates one after another with its activity and goes forward with another thought after that which it had beforehand, because discursive thought had not yet been activated, and the life of Soul now does not resemble that which previously existed. Its life is at the same time therefore 'other' and this 'other' involves another time. The expansion of life involves time and the ceaseless progression of life involves time which is continuous and life which has passed involved time which has passed. If someone were therefore to say that time is the life of the soul in a movement that changes from one way of life to another, would he be speaking sense?

(**45–59**) Indeed—for if eternity is life at rest, identical to itself and the same and already boundless, and time must be an image of eternity, just as this universe is an image of the intelligible realm, then we must say that instead of that life there, there is another life which has the same name as this power of the soul, and it is not intelligible movement but movement of a part of Soul; it is not identity and sameness and permanence but that which does not dwell in identity and which acts in one way and then another, not that which is extensionless

and unified but an image of the One existing in sequence, not already boundless and whole but existing in endless succession always, not as a complete whole but as something which will exist part by part and whose wholeness will always be yet to come. For in this way it will imitate the already whole and complete and already boundless, if it will always wish to acquire being in addition to its being, and indeed this is the way in which it will imitate that Being.

(**59–62**) But one must not take time to exist outside Soul, just as eternity there is not outside Being. It neither accompanies Soul nor comes after it, just as eternity neither accompanies nor comes after Being but is seen with Soul and exists in and with it, just like eternity there in the intelligible realm.

Chapter 12

(**1–4**) Hence too it is necessary to understand that this is the nature of time, the extent of life of this kind which progresses in uniform and homogeneous changes that are silently advancing and which has continuous activity.

(**4–22**) Now if in our thought we were to make this power turn back again and stop this life, which it now has, being endless and never going to cease because it is the activity of a soul which always exists, neither being orientated towards nor dwelling in itself, but involved in creation and generation, if we therefore assumed that this power was no longer active but ceased from this activity and that this part of the soul too turned back towards the intelligible realm and to eternity, abiding in a state of rest, what would then exist but eternity? And how would there be one thing after another when all things abided in unity? And how would 'before' still exist? And how too would 'after' or 'about to be'? And where would the soul attend to anything other than that in which it exists? Rather, it could not even attend to this, for it would first have to be separate from it in order to attend to it. Since even the sphere itself, which does not exist primarily, would not be, for this also exists and moves in time, and if it stops while the soul is active, we shall measure how long is its stop so long as the soul is outside eternity. If therefore when the soul desists and is unified, time is destroyed, it is clear that the beginning of this movement towards these things and this life generate time.

(**22–25**) For which reason it is said that time was generated at the same time as the universe because soul produced it along with this universe. For this uni-

verse too came into being in activity of this kind and on the one hand this activity is time and on the other hand the universe is in time.

(**25–36**) But if someone were to say that Plato also calls the revolutions of the stars 'times', he would have to remember that Plato says that the stars are generated in order to make time manifest and 'delimited' and 'in order for there to be a visible measure'. For since it was not possible either for the soul to trace out time as a boundary or for those who did not know how to count to measure each of its parts by themselves, since time is invisible and cannot be grasped, the demiurge made day and night by means of which it was possible to grasp the notion of two, through their difference, and this is where the concept of number came from, according to Plato. Then, by taking the length of the interval from one sunrise to the next, since the nature of the movement upon which we rely is uniform, we can have an interval of time as a given length and we use this sort of interval as a kind of measure, but as a measure of time,

(**37–40**) for time is not itself a measure. For how could it measure and what would it say while measuring? Would it say, 'This is the same quantity as some amount of myself'? Who then is this 'myself'? It is presumably that according to which the measurement is taking place. Then would it exist in order to measure while also not being a measure?

(**40–49**) Therefore, it will be the movement of the universe which will be measured by time, and time will not be the measure of movement by virtue of its nature but, by previously being something different, it will incidentally provide evidence of the length of movement. And one movement, taken in a certain length of time and counted many times, will produce a notion of how much time has passed so that, if one were to say that the movement and the heavenly circuit in a way measure time, as much as possible, in the sense that the circuit manifests, through its own extent, the extent of time, which one could neither grasp nor be acquainted with otherwise, his explanation would not be out of place.

(**49–55**) Therefore, that which is measured by the heavenly circuit—that is, that which is made manifest—will be time, and time is not produced by the heavenly circuit but only made manifest by it. And in this way the measure of the movement is that which is measured by a defined movement, and since it is measured by this movement it is something different from it, since even if it were measuring, it would be something else, and insofar as it is measured it is different to that which measures and is only measured incidentally.

(**55–61**) One could explain it like this: it would be like saying that that which is measured by a cubit is the magnitude, without saying what magnitude really is but only tracing out its size, and if one were not able to say what movement is in itself by virtue of its indeterminate nature and said that it is that which is measured by space; for having taken a certain space through which the movement had passed, one could say that this movement is the same length as the space.

Chapter 13

(**1–13**) The revolution of the heavens therefore makes time manifest, in which it exists. It is necessary that time itself no longer possesses that in which it exists, but must first be that which it is itself, that in which the other things move and stand still evenly and regularly; however, time must be indicated by something ordered, and manifested as a concept in the mind, but not brought into being by that which indicates it, whether that which indicates it is at rest or in motion—but it should rather be in motion, for it is that which is in motion rather than that which is at rest which leads to the knowledge of time and shifts our attention towards it, and it is easier to know how long something has been moving than how long it has been at rest. This is why people were brought to say that time is the measure of movement, as opposed to saying that time is measured by movement and then adding what it is that is measured by movement, not merely saying something about what happens to a part of it incidentally and getting things the wrong way round.

(**13–18**) But perhaps those authors did not get things the wrong way round, but we do not understand them because they clearly said 'measure' meaning that which is measured, and we did not hit upon what they were thinking. But the reason that we do not understand is that they did not make it clear, in their writings, what that is which either measures or is measured because they were writing for those who knew and had listened to them.

(**18–28**) However, Plato neither described the real identity of time as that which measures nor as that which is measured by something else, but said that in order to manifest time, the smallest part of the heavenly circuit is taken to correspond to the smallest part of time, and from this it is possible to know what sort of a thing and how great time is. However, when Plato wants to explain the nature of time, he says that time came into being together with the heavens according to the archetype of eternity and as its moving image, because time

does not stay put, just as the life with which it runs together and alongside does not stay put, but it arises together with the heavens, because it is this kind of life which produces the heavens as well and one life which makes the heavens and time.

(**28–30**) Therefore, if this life returned to unity, if it could, time too would stop with it because it exists in this life and the heavens would also stop if it did not have this life.

(**30–40**) But if someone were to take the before and after of this movement and call it time—on the basis that this is something real—but did not say that the truer movement of the soul, which possesses the before and after, was something real, he would be most out of place, since he would ascribe to movement without soul the 'before and after', and time which accompanies it, but would not ascribe this to the movement which causes and is imitated by this movement without soul, and from which the before and after first came into existence, since it is spontaneous movement, and just as it produces each of its own activities, so too it forms their succession, and at the same time as it produces these activities, it passes from one to the other of them.

(**41–47**) Why then do we refer back this movement of the universe to that which contains it and say that it is in time, but do not say that the movement of the soul which exists within it in an everlasting passage is in time? It is because that which exists before this movement of soul is eternity, which neither runs along with it nor stretches out with it. This movement of soul was therefore first to descend into time, and it produced time and possesses time with its activity.

(**47–49**) How, therefore, is time everywhere? It is because Soul is not absent from any part of the universe, just as the soul in us is not absent from any part of ourselves.

(**49–53**) But if someone were to say that time is in something which does not have reality or exist, it must be stated that clearly he speaks falsely whenever he says 'was' and 'will be,' because 'will be' and 'was' are used in the same sense as that in which he says time will be. But for people of this nature, another kind of argument is required.[1]

1 Here I follow the reading 'καταθετέον' suggested in the textual addenda to the OCT (the editio minor): see Vol. III of the OCT, p. 319.

(**53–62**) But in addition to that which has been said, it is necessary to consider the following, that when one grasps how far a moving man has gone forward, one also grasps the quantity of the movement, and when he considers for example, the movement of his legs, let him see also that the movement in this man, which came before the movement of his legs, had a certain quantity, if at least the movement of his body had a fixed duration. Indeed, the body which is moved for a certain amount of time will lead us to the quantity of the movement—for it is the cause—and to the time of this movement, and this movement will lead us to the movement of the soul, which is separated out equally.

(**62–66**) To what, therefore, will the movement of the soul lead us? For that to which one will want to go is already without extension. It is therefore this which is primary and in which the other things exist, but it is no longer in anything for it will not have anything in which to be. And the same holds for the Soul of the universe.

(**66–69**) Is time therefore also in us? It is in all souls of this kind and exists in a similar way in each of them and all are one. That is why time will not be torn apart any more than eternity, which, in a different way, is in all things of the same kind.

Commentary

Chapter 1

1 *Τόν αἰῶνα* (*line 1*)—*πᾶν* (*line 3*)

Plotinus uses the word λέγοντες to refer to a doctrine which both he and his students accept but which requires further explication to be fully brought to light (cf. II.1.1.1, II.4.1.2, III.6.1.1 and IV.6.1.1–2). As we will see, eternity can be said to correspond to Intellect by being the mode which unlocks man's experience of the intelligible realities, whereas time belongs to Soul by being the mode which unlocks access to the physical universe and sensible realities. Furthermore, eternity is defined precisely as 'what is' (3.23/34–36) and is therefore inseparable from Being (εἶναι, ὄν: 5.21, 6.6–8, 11.59–62), whereas time is its image (1.19–20, 11.20/29/46–47/54) because it arises from a desiring state of the soul which becomes extended: 'μῆκος ἀσθενέστερον' (11.26). Time therefore represents the status of the soul as it loses its seat in the eternal realm of being (11.13–14) and falls into a state of becoming (γίγνεσθαι, γένεσις). The being of eternity is fixed and never changes (3.9–10, 11.45–46), whereas time is closely related to becoming by going towards a 'will be' (11.55–56) of the future, and this involves its transformation into something which does not already exist (and that which does not already exist cannot be eternal: 3.29). The idea that eternity and time possess different ontological statuses is already put forward by Plato in *Ti.* 27d6–28a4 (cf. Nicom. *Ar.* I 1, 2.10–16; and Num. fr. 7). Furthermore, the correlation of 'eternity-time' with the 'being-becoming' distinction can already be found in Philo *Mut.* 2.67; and Plut. *De E ap. Delph.* 2.0, 393a–b.

2 *αὐτόθεν* (*line 3*)—*ἀποροῦντες* (*line 8*)

Instead of a 'cursory conceptual apprehension' (ἀθρόα ἐπιβολή) as McGuire and Strange put it (1988, 2.53; cf. II 8.1.40; and Strange 1994, 2.8n.1), we wish to penetrate the matter itself. Indeed, knowing a thing's name does not mean we have a firm grasp of that which we are naming (and this is echoed in 6.38–42; III.5.6.4–6; IV.7.4.15–18 and V.3.13.2–6. Cf. Pl. *Cra.* 421d–422a, 432d and 436a/b). We are therefore content with naming only if it accompanies close examination, which, while leading us to difficulties (as Plato warns us in *Tht.* 208e7–10) is a necessary condition for true knowledge. Plotinus cautions, however, that in the case of eternity and time, getting to the heart of the matter will not be so easy, given their elusive natures. As we will see, eternity and time are objects neither of perception nor of discursive or intelligible thought, but

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are instead internal modes in which such perceptions and thoughts may be encountered. Plotinus provides us with a clue that time and eternity cannot be known through intellectual examination alone by questioning whether, through mere concepts, we can have a clear experience of them *in our souls*. In fact, by thinking that eternity and time are mere *concepts* which can be known by the soul, we miss the fact that they are in fact states of the soul. We must therefore tie our notions of these phenomena to the experience of the soul, rather than thinking we have grasped the truth through theoretical investigation alone. Modern philosophers have tended to identify Augustine as the first philosopher to recognise the paradoxically familiar yet misleading and elusive nature of time (see for example, Heidegger 1982, 229 and Wittgenstein 1997, I 89). Indeed, in *Confessions* XI.14, Augustine picks up on the elusive nature of time when he asks, "quid ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat scio, si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio." However, as we can see, Plotinus frames this problem first, and Augustine's statement paraphrases Plotinus' own here. Aristotle also alludes to time's elusiveness in *Physics* IV.10 but not to the deceptive sense of familiarity which makes people think that they understand what they in fact do not.

3 *τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν* (*line 8*)—*προσήκει* (*line 16*)

Plotinus believes we should a.) interpret the ancients and compare our interpretations to those of other philosophers in the past, b.) identify those views which come closest to the truth: for example, those of Plato, who achieves the truth completely: V.1.8.11–14, and is 'godlike': III.5.1.6; IV.8.1.23; and of Parmenides who comes close to the truth: V.1.8.15–24. And finally, c.) we should proceed from this investigation to our own, unitary and coherent account, which may then improve upon previous accounts (cf. II.7.2.3–6; *VP*.14.14–15). This critical approach to ancient sources mirrors recommendations of Aristotle as set out in *Eth. Nic*. VII 1, 1145b2–7 (cf. Verbeke 1973, 188n.1). Apart from Plato and the pre-Socratics, the 'παλαιῶν' that Plotinus refers to play a particularly important role in his discussion of time, most notably, Aristotle, the Stoics (especially Zeno the Stoic and Chrysippus), the Epicureans, the Peripatetics (such as Theophrastus) and the Pythagoreans. While Plotinus thinks it absolutely necessary to engage with his philosophical predecessors in a critical manner, he also emphasises the role of reflection upon personal experience (cf. Armstrong 1966–1988, 296–297). For as we see in 10.9–17, Plotinus believes that without such reflection, philosophy is reduced to a merely historical investigation of competing views. For this reason, the study of the ancients is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for arriving at the truth.

4 *καὶ* (*line 16*)—*γένοιτο* (*line 20*)

Plotinus first follows in Plato's footsteps by claiming that eternity is the archetype and time its image. For in *Timeaus* 37d5–7, Plato defines time as "an eternal image, moving in accordance with number, of eternity abiding in unity" (translation by Zeyl). For Plotinus, the fact that eternity is archetype suggests not only that one must acknowledge its ontological superiority, but also that it makes good sense to prioritise it in his rational and experiential enquiry. For a proper account of time may be based on a clear account of eternity, given that time is but a ghostly image of eternity. Having become familiarised with eternity, therefore, we may see for ourselves that time is in fact the image of eternity (see for example 11.19–20 and 11.46–47 and 13.24–25 in agreement with *Ti.* 38B6–C2). For we will come to see in 11.26 that it is precisely because time seeks more than the present stillness of eternity, that it embodies it in an extended form, in accordance with the 'before' and 'after'.

5 *εἰ* (*line 20*)—*ἔχοι* (*line 24*)

Having said this, we could just as well begin by investigating that which we mistake for the archetype and find the signs in this image of the archetype (which is time) to lead us back to eternity (via ἀνάμνησις). This is a strategy we see when Plotinus decides first to enquire into the civic virtues (I.2.2.1–4) in order to find out the nature of that which they imitate in the intelligible realm (I.2.1.35–38). Plotinus reassures us that this strategy will be possible as long as time really is a likeness to eternity (which we will see is indeed the case since time is the image of eternity). Such recollection is only possible because the soul has a transcendent aspect (as Plotinus states in IV.8.4.21–31) which does not 'remember' in a temporal sense but rather recognises something outside of time (IV.3.25.27–35). For this reason, we must not suggest that there is no path to the recollection of eternity (and overemphasise Plotinus' disregard for the method of recollection, as Blumenthal arguably does in 1971a, 96–97) but should rather see that Plotinus prefers to begin with the archetype because it is the natural dwelling place of the human soul, which means that man may first be able to identify his own nature before his life in the realm of time is considered. The second method is less reliable since it involves first exploring the nature of time, which a person may mistakenly believe is the archetype upon which eternity is based (see Beierwaltes 1967, 149), or the natural abode of the human soul, before enquiring into eternity.

Chapter 2

1 *Τίνα* (*line 1*)—*χρόνου* (*line 4*)

Plotinus is interested in where eternity fits in relation to the great scheme of things, in the hierarchical order relating to the One, the Intellect and the Soul. He begins this enquiry by asking whether we should think of eternity as the intelligible nature itself. Plotinus will go on to say that this assumption is not viable. We have already learned that Plotinus thinks we take things all too much for granted when we read the ancients uncritically. He therefore asks us whether such a reading can be so simply assented to while comparing this view with that of certain philosophers (as attested by Aristotle, *Ph.* IV 10, 218b1), most likely Pythagoreans (see Burkert 1972, 75–77; and Schibli 1990, 138n.10) that time is simply the entire heavens and the cosmos (see 8.1–22 for Plotinus' rejection of this conclusion) or the totality of sensible realities (see Simplicius *In Ph.* 700.31–701.1 that "everything is within the heavens and everything is in time"). The assumption that eternity is equivalent to the Intellect, or to the totality of intelligible realities, is a tempting but ultimately false postulation.

2 *ἐπεὶ* (*line 5*)—*συνάγοι* (*line 9*)

Plotinus understands that we relate to the Intellect and eternity in similar ways from an introspective point of view. Plotinus presents two arguments to support the identification of eternity and Intellect. The first is that both are majestic (σεμνότατον). We all have an internal vision of the majesty of both eternity and the Intellect (see V.5.2.13, VI.7.22.21 and Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 9, 1074b18 for the majestic nature of the Intellect; and V.8.3.18–21 and VI.6.18.19–22 for Intellect as the source of majesty) which discursive reason is unable to grasp (see VI.7.39.29–34, which also offers Plotinus' interpretation of *Soph.* 248D6–249A2). The nature of this majesty echoes the majesty of the One (see V.5.3.6–15 and VI.6.3.5–9), which in turn transcends the majesty of Intellect by being completely ineffable (V.3.13.1–6). Similarly, we can also claim that the majesty of eternity is derived from the One since eternity is 'an activity of life dwelling in and directed towards the One' (6.9–11). However, the fact that both Intellect and eternity receive their majesty from the One and exceed the limits of discursive reason does not mean that they are one and the same thing, as Plotinus will explain.

3 *καὶ γὰρ* (*line 9*)—*αὐτῶν* (*line 10*)

The second argument is that eternity and Intellect contain the same things and therefore must be identical. For both eternity and Intellect contain the same

set of elements, namely the intelligible realities, in different ways. On the one hand, Intellect is simply the whole (see V.3.5.43–46, V.3.6.7–8 and VI.2.21.3–11) which is the sum of all the intelligible realities (see VI.2.18.12–17, VI.2.20.20–23 and VI.8.18.26–28) existing as distinct parts (see for example VI.4.14.3–5). This concept represents neither the nature nor a state of the human soul but rather the order of reality which lies below the One and above the hypostasis of Soul. Intellect not only unifies the intelligibles into this order (see for example III.5.9.3 and VI.7.14.8–18) but is also the cause of the intelligibles (see V.1.2.20.25–29), and contains them as a mathematical set contains its elements, or 'as a genus does its species and a whole its parts' (V.9.6.9–10). Insofar as man is able to perceive the intelligible world when he is ready (see for example, I.3.1.12–18), Intellect exists as an external condition of possibility for the human experience of the intelligible realities. It is a condition of possibility because, without Intellect, man would not be able to experience any intelligibles such as Love, Beauty or Truth, since Intellect causes these realities and represents their unified nature. It is an external (or exoteric) condition of possibility for human experience because it does not owe its existence either to the state of the human soul or to the readiness of the human soul to perceive this level of reality (which is reality itself, existing below the One and above the ghostly image of Soul: see V.1.6.42–49). On the other hand, eternity neither causes nor represents the unified nature of the intelligibles as Intellect does but instead exists as an internal condition of possibility for the human experience of the intelligibles. It is a condition of possibility because it is only by taking oneself 'back to that disposition which we were saying existed in eternity' (11.1–4) and by making the power whose 'activity is involved in creation and generation' turn back again, that he can restore his original vision and return to the intelligible realm (12.4–12). It is also an internal (or esoteric) condition of possibility for human experience because it embodies the natural state of the human soul before its desiring activity takes its attention away from the intelligible world. We may therefore claim that whereas Intellect comprises that objective reality which is accessed when man is ready (namely the intelligibles), eternity is the subjective means of access to this world. And thus, Plotinus claims that the intelligible realities lie first in eternity before Intellect: for it is only when man has realised eternity within himself that he will have access to the intelligibles. This in turn means that eternity stands in relation to the intelligible world as a whole, since man perceives the intelligible world all at once rather than part by part (similar to the way in which he perceives a face as a whole and not each individual feature in distinct acts of perception) whereas Intellect, as a unifying and causal concept, receives its identity from its distinct intelligible parts (sim-

ilar to the way in which a human face stands in relation to its distinct parts including the eyes, nose and mouth and so on). Eternity and Intellect are therefore different principles, even though they can both be said to contain the same elements and to represent two aspects of Being (as we will see in 5.18–22).

4 *Ἀλλ'* (*line 20*)—*εἴη* (*line 36*)

Plotinus enquires into whether eternity and Rest are the same thing or whether eternity participates in Rest in some sense (reminding us of Aristotle in *Ph.* IV 10, 219a8–10 when he asks whether time is motion itself or something which participates in it), whereas Plato investigates the relationship between Being and Rest in *Soph.* 250b/c. Since Plotinus explicitly identifies eternity with *that which is* in 3.34–36 (after *Ti.* 37E6–38A2), it is arguable that Plotinus is asking the very same question that Plato asks in the *Sophist*, namely whether Being (which is also *that which is*) and Rest are the same thing. Since Plotinus saw himself as a faithful disciple of Plato, it should come as no surprise to the student that Plotinus will reject the identity of *that which is* with Rest, just as Plato does. Plotinus inherits his specific concept of Rest from Plato (as McGuire and Strange 1988, 254 acknowledge by capitalising the 'r' in 'rest') who in the *Sophist* defines Rest as one of the five Great Kinds (*Soph.* 257b, 258e–259a). Here, he begins to undermine the identity of eternity and Rest by asking the question whether Rest contains the notion of the everlasting. Eternity is not the same as Rest since, as Plato says, *that which is* contains not only the concept of Rest but also that of Motion (*Soph.* 250b/c). Since Plotinus equates eternity with *that which is* and *that which is* includes not only the concept of Rest but also that of Motion, and Rest excludes the concept of Motion (see *Soph.* 254d, with 249e–250c), it is impossible to equate eternity with Rest. Furthermore, eternity contains the concepts of unity (6.6–8, 12.4–13/19–22, 13.28–30) and 'extensionlessness' (see also 3.15/37) which the concept of Rest does not. Finally, whereas the concept of Rest is an intelligible reality, we will see that eternity is the mode in which the intelligible realities, including the Great Kinds, may be accessed in human experience (see my comments on 5.7–12; 11.1–6 and 12.8–12), since eternity is the origin of experience, rather than something which can be pointed to in experience. However, Plotinus claims that eternity still participates in Rest because, as we will see in chapter 3, eternity is changeless (3.9–10). This means that we can use the concept of Rest as a conduit to grasping eternity, or *that which is*, since it is through recognising changelessness, rather than falling away into the past or the future, that a true understanding of eternity can be achieved.

Chapter 3

1 *Τί* (*line 1*)—*αἰών* (*line 3*)

Plotinus examines a distinction which was established by Plato: namely, the difference between the eternal (αἰώνιον) and the everlasting (ἀίδιον: see *Ti.* 29a3, 37d1, e5), both of which are ascribed to the intelligible model of the demiurge in the *Timaeus*. Beierwaltes 1967, 156–158 claims that only Patristic authors after Plotinus expressed any doubt about the synonymity of the two principles, and that there is no meaningful difference between the two for Plotinus himself. Modern authors tend to agree that the two principles are interchangeable because Plotinus describes Intellect as both eternal and everlasting (see 2.10–15, IV.7.8.38–43, V.1.6.38 and V.4.2.18) without formally demarcating the two notions. However, it would seem that Plotinus does in fact wish to distinguish between the two concepts (see I.5.7.24–30 and 5.15–18) and to begin an enquiry into whether both can be predicated of the Intellect. The main difference, it would seem, is that whereas eternity is *that which is* without qualification, everlastingness is that which is *always*. Since everlastingness is that which is in all moments, it is relative to those moments and therefore owes its being to time. Eternity exists as the unconditional now which envelops the concepts of past, present and future which appear within it and therefore transcends those concepts. Everlastingness on the other hand exists by embodying those concepts and extending infinitely in all directions through them (for example, Plotinus describes the heavens and the cosmos as everlasting: see II.1.1–3, III.2.3.30, III.3.6.24 and V.1.2.23). Everlastingness thus goes backwards infinitely into the past and forwards infinitely into the future and can therefore be compared to an x-axis which goes horizontally, relative to eternity which transcends this perspective, as the y-axis, extending upwards vertically. Since the Intellect exists outside time and houses the intelligible realities, including the forms, it can certainly be said to be eternal. However, it is also everlasting since it always exists. Indeed, while everything changes in the physical world, the Intellect remains the same, fixed and unchanging reality. Since there is no point in time at which one can say that the Intellect does not exist, there is a sense in which the Intellect is everlasting. However, this is true only in a limited sense, since the Intellect transcends time and so is not simply everlasting but also eternal. While we can see the difference between eternity and everlastingness, it is nonetheless true that eternity is in conformity with everlastingness, since everything which is eternal is also everlasting (including the intelligible realities and Intellect itself). However, eternity cannot be identical to everlastingness because it transcends time and thus, a comprehension of the everlasting does not imply a comprehension of the eternal.

Indeed, while a person may be correct in thinking that the intelligible realities always exist, he would be wrong to believe that these realities exist in time.

2 ἆρά (*line 4*)—πολλὰ οὖσαν (*line 7*)

The concept of everlastingness stands in relation to that of unity since it represents a single extended reality through time. However, even though everlastingness is not a partless unity in the way that eternity is, it is still a predicate of intelligible realities and the five Great Kinds (see VI 2.8.25–49). Everlastingness, or that which is always, is secondary and dependent upon that which is, which provides the conditions of possibility for that which is *always* (see 5.15–18). If there were no 'that which is', there would be no grounds upon which to make sense of the 'always'. As we have seen, 'that which is' is the Intellect, eternity and intelligible realities. Therefore, we can say that everlastingness is dependent on eternity and the intelligible realities since the concept would contain no meaning were it not for that which exists at all times as a result of its existing outside of time. Furthermore, everlastingness accompanies the intelligible realities since 'that which is' *transcends* time and so can be acknowledged to exist at any point *in* time, whether past, present or future. On the other hand, however, the concept of everlastingness or 'that which is always' only accompanies 'that which is' when it is seen from the point of view of time. When 'that which is' is acknowledged without reference to time, it exists absolutely and without qualification. The concept of everlastingness is therefore equally dependent upon time and eternity, since without time, everlastingness would simply be eternity; and without eternity and the intelligible realities, there could be nothing everlasting.

3 Καὶ (*line 7*)—ἐν (*line 11*)

Plotinus' attention now shifts to the 'manifold power' which can be interpreted by man as everlastingness when he is in time. This manifold power is Being, which Plotinus now discusses in relation to the four other of Plato's five Great Kinds (see Pl. *Soph.* 254d4–255a2) rest, motion, sameness and difference (see also VI.2.8.25–49). Since Being is *what is*, it has the power to take on many identities and to express itself in different ways. One example of its transformative power is its manifestation as substrate or subject. In this case, it takes on a foundational identity because it grounds the objects which it stands in relation to: its 'that which is' now stands in relation to all objects since the 'is' provides both the necessary and sufficient condition for the reality of any object and can therefore be perceived in different ways. For example, Heraclitus identifies 'that which is' with motion, since he observes that everything 'which is'

is in a constant state of flux (see fr. B12 DK), whereas Parmenides identifies 'that which is' with rest, since 'that which is' can never be 'that which is not' (Parm. fr. B8.5–10 DK) and is therefore never changing but only resting in its own nature. For Plotinus, both are only aspects of Being and he agrees with Plato when he says that Being is qualitatively different to the other four kinds in *Soph*. 257b, 258e–259a and that the other four kinds in fact participate in it. Plotinus claims that Being is 'different' because it contains different beings and 'same' because those beings conform to its own unified and homogeneous nature, as Being. Therefore, the four other kinds are intelligible manifestations of Being, or aspects of Being, which depend upon how the observer views Being at any given time. Indeed, the way in which Being retains its identity while being viewed in different ways can be compared to a Gestalt image in which a picture appears as two objects at once (although these objects are not perceived simultaneously): in the case of a duck-rabbit image, for example. While the Gestalt image remains stable, the ways of perceiving the image may change so radically as to present altogether different natures to the human observer. As Wittgenstein recounts: "I see two pictures, with the duck-rabbit surrounded by rabbits in one, by ducks in the other. I do not notice that they are the same … I *describe* the alteration (change of aspect) like a perception; quite as if the object had altered before my eyes … The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a *new* perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged." (Wittgenstein 1997, 193–196). In the case of Being, in a way similar to the duck-rabbit image, we perceive the four kinds *as if* Being had itself disappeared, as our attention shifts to one and then another aspect of it. The totality of Being must therefore conceal itself in order to allow us to see it in its different forms and aspects, which all participate in Being without themselves being identical to it. Furthermore, since Intellect is Being considered objectively (see my comments on 5.18–22), the alterations which appear in Being can also be said to appear in Intellect. And thus, the other four great kinds occur in Intellect as that facet of Being which can be observed. As Hadot puts it (1960, 111), "the genera of being … appear as the different aspects under which our partitioning intelligence grasps the unitary life of the Intellect." Intellect, as the sum of its intelligible parts, is therefore the aspect of Being which appears in these different forms.

4 *οὕτω* (*line 11*)—*καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως* (*line 27*)

On the other hand, eternity exists 'without extension or interval' because it is the partless aspect of Being which is able to witness itself as Intellect, rather than a totality which can be perceived directly through the intelligible realities like Intellect (see VI.7.14). Since eternity is not 'thinking' but 'life', as Plotinus

claims here and in I.1.13.5–7, I.4.3.33–37, III.2.1.31 and 11.48–50 (following Aristotle's characterisation of the activity of Intellect as 'life' in *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072b2.6–30, cf. *Cael.* I 9, 2.79a18–27 and the identification of eternity with life by Alexander of Aphrodisias in *Mund.* A 126), we cannot presume to know its true nature through either discursive or intelligible thought, but must instead seek to access it within ourselves through a deep commitment to the life which Plotinus describes (see my comments on 11.1–4 and 12.4–12). This requires devotional practice since the life of eternity which Plotinus describes is radically different to the temporal conception of life which involves passing from one stage to another in an endless linear progression of past, present and future. For Plotinus, the only truly desirable life is one which is centred on the abundant nature of the eternal present. For since experience itself cannot happen in the past or future, our only chance of flourishing is in the eternal present (see I.5.2): an eternal present reminding us of the completeness (τετελεσμένον) of Being in Parmenides (cf. Fr. B8.42) by itself existing as a 'partless completion' (τέλος ἀμερές). As Sorabji notes (1983, 11–12), the partlessness of eternity means that it can neither come into being (γίγνεσθαι cf: Arist. *Ph.* VI 6. 237b9–11; and Num. fr. 5.13–21) nor pass away. Moreover, since this presence is partless, it embodies a state of simplicity which Plotinus compares to a point (see also VI.5.11.14–21) which in turn mirrors the simplicity of the One (see for example VI.8.18.7–22). The description of a process of generation as a flow of a point of simplicity into different geometric magnitudes is also found in Arist. *De an.* I 4, 409a3–5; and Philop. *In De an.* 77.30–78.5; cf. Philo *Opif.* 49; Sext. Emp. *Math.* X 2.81; Iambl. *In Nicom. Ar.* 57.7–12.; Procl. *In Eucl.* 97.6–17; see also Burkert 1972, 66–69. Furthermore, Plotinus reiterates that eternity is not the same as the substrate of Intellect. For as we have already seen, Intellect is the objective aspect of Being which is made up of parts, whereas eternity is Being when perceived as a partless whole, as a formless mode of subjectivity. For this reason, Plotinus claims that eternity cannot be equated with τὸ ὑποκείμενον (3.24) and yet only two chapters later he seems to contradict this and claims that eternity is the substrate (5.15–18). We may say that eternity, by comporting itself to Intellect 'gives something of itself to the substrate' (III.6.8.18–20) and is therefore not equivalent to the Intellect, while at the same time being inseparable from it. Thus, eternity shines from τὸ ὑποκείμενον (the substrate of Intellect) because the light of human subjectivity, in its natural desireless condition, enlivens the intelligible world in the same way that the light of the sun allows plants and animals to flourish on earth, while at the same time being separate from these phenomena. For one could at the same time associate the light of the sun with the earthly beings and separate their natures: on the one hand, the phenomena are surrounded by and filled with light, and on the other, they are

distinct entities from the sun. In a similar way, we may say that the intelligible beings are both inextricably connected to and distinct from human subjectivity.

5 *Τί γὰρ ἄν* (*line 27*)—*αἰών* (*line 36*)

Plotinus here echoes Plato (in *Ti.* 37e5–38a5) and Parmenides (in DK fr. B8.19–20 DK), who both claim that eternity is outside of time and impervious to change. Indeed, eternity is Being perceived in itself. It does not have a future or a past because its identity is precisely that which is, and the future and past is what is not, since the future is what is not yet and the past is what is not any more (see V.1.4.21–25, VI.7.1.45–57 and similar passages noted by Beierwaltes, such as Num. fr. 5.6–7: "Being neither ever was, nor ever will come to be, but always is at a determined time, [which is] solely the present"). For that which is cannot be associated with or pass into what is not yet (future) or what is not any more (past) since if it could, it would cease to be what is and would become what is not, or a mixture of what is and what is not. Since it is impossible for 'that which is' to be that which is not, Plotinus concludes that eternity cannot be associated either with the past or the future, nor be described as having a beginning or an end. Indeed, Plotinus argues that eternity couldn't come from the past since it is Being and if Being had had a beginning, there would have been nothing before it from which it could have arisen. Similarly, if it was destined to be something else in the future, then it would have to be other than itself, namely non-Being, which entails a contradiction and is thus impossible. There is a possibility of understanding the claims that Plotinus makes here on both an intellectual and on an experiential level. Indeed, a student needs to know not only that 'that which is' can never have a future or a past; he must also honour this truth by focusing his attention on this presence in his daily life, so that he is never lost in the stream of time which he perceives. This ultimately means having an ever-present awareness of the presence of Being which serves as the backdrop of all experiences and perceptions. Therefore, eternity not only transcends time but is also immanent in every moment since it is the here and now. If the student fully imbibes Plotinus' words he will realise that the eternal is not solely a concept but a practical reality which can be lived by shifting awareness of the linear succession of temporal phases to that which envelops and surrounds these phases.

6 *γίνεται* (*line 36*)—*αἰών* (*line 38*)

Here, Plotinus reiterates that eternity is the life of Being. Many scholars view Plotinus' conception of eternity as unchanging and as 'life' (ζωή) to be internally contradictory, since it is difficult to conceive of life which is unmoving and

atemporal (see Kneale 1960/61, 99–100 and references in Strange 1994, 38n.45). As Hadot puts it, "to reconcile life and immobility represents one of the fundamental problems Plato posed for the whole of Western thought" (1980b, 53). However, this problem largely arises from viewing eternity as an object which can be understood rather than a subjective mode in which entities (including the intelligible realities) appear. Indeed, if eternity were an unchanging object which appeared within experience, it would be difficult to see how this could be an enlivening force or pertain to human experience in any way. However, once we see eternity as a subjective mode (arising from the state of the soul), we can reconcile these two descriptions. For human subjectivity may be conceived as the unchanging context in which Being, the forms and the great kinds appear to man. For on the one hand, human subjectivity is unchanging since it is provides the space in which all of man's experiences occur, and on the other, it is life, for without such subjectivity, Being and Intellect would be reduced to dead abstractions with no relation to the journey of the soul. Therefore, similar to Nietzsche who in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* asks, "Great star, what would your happiness be, if you had not those for whom you shine!" (1974, 39), we may in turn claim that for Plotinus, there would be no life in the great Intellect without those human souls which can access this realm through lived experience. Indeed, while many authors claim that eternal life is reserved to God alone (see for example, Philo *Deus* 32 "so that there is nothing future to God, who has the very boundaries of time subject to him; for his life [βιός] is not time [οὐ χρόνος], but the archetype of time and its exemplar, eternity"; and Plutarch in *De Is. et Os*. 1, 351e, who similarly claims that god has eternal life), Plotinus believes that human beings may themselves exist in this state, since they too are divine (see in particular IV.7.10.30–40). Therefore, for Plotinus, eternity is not only 'the mode of life of the intelligible world' (see Philo. *Mut*. 267); it is also the specifically subjective mode of life of the intelligible world: a mode which enlivens Intellect while remaining unmoved in its own nature.

Chapter 4

1 *Οὐκ* (*line 1*)—*οὐσίᾳ* (*line 5*)

Plotinus claims in 3.23–27 that eternity shines from the substrate without itself being the substrate. Yet at the same time he says that eternity and the Intellect are in some sense identical. The key is the fact that eternity is the aspect of Being which exists as a partless whole (see 2.17–19, 3.15–19, 4.37–43 and 6.47–50), whereas the Intellect is the aspect of Being which exists in relation to its

parts, albeit in a qualified sense (see II.4.4.11–20, II.4.5.4–6, 2.17–19, III.9.1.29–34, IV.3.4.9–12, VI.6.15.13–15). And thus, the One transfers its purely esoteric and purely partless nature to eternity on the one hand (see V.3.15.15–18) and its exoteric and relational nature to Intellect on the other. From a relational vantage point, which seeks to penetrate the metaphysical structure and hierarchy of reality, Intellect takes logical priority over eternity since Intellect can be known objectively in relation to other metaphysical objects such as Soul and the intelligible realities. Therefore, when Being is viewed from an objective perspective, eternity can be said to exist "in" (see also 2.6–9) and come "from" Intellect because, as the animating force connecting all intelligible objects of experience, it is an integral part of the nature of Intellect. However, when Being is considered from a subjective point of view, eternity has logical priority (see 2.10–12) because from the point of view of human experience, it is only when man realises the eternal within himself that he is granted access to the intelligible objects of experience which accompany this inner state of presence. Therefore, eternity exists "with" Intellect as its subjective counterpart; is identical to it from the perspective of Being; and can be said to come "from" it when Being is considered objectively rather than subjectively.

2 ***τὰ* (*line 5*)*—ᾗ* (*line 11*)**

Here, Plotinus distinguishes between "primary realities" and "primaries". The primary realities include eternity itself, as well as the form of beauty (see I.6.1.53–54 and 6.21–34) and truth (III.9.1.9–10, V.5.1.54–68), and these primary realities connect the intelligible realm into an ordered whole and prevent it from existing as a random arrangement of parts: cf. Pl. *Tht.* 204a7b9; and Arist. *Metaph.* Z 17, 1041b11–12. The primaries on the other hand, are those intelligible realities which possess the primary realities of truth, beauty and eternity as properties (see Kalligas 2014, 586 on 2.20–24 and Smith 1996, 202). Among these primary realities, eternity is arguably unique by existing 'as if' in a part of the existent whole. For just as rays of the sun enter the earth and illuminate the objects therein without strictly being 'parts' of the earth, so too may eternity enliven and be found within the intelligible realities without itself being a part of Intellect. And therefore we may distinguish between eternity as a mode of subjectivity, and primaries which exist 'within the whole' as objective features of Intellect. For eternity connects the primaries 'as if' it is part of the whole, since it exists as a subjective mode shining light upon, and allowing human beings to access, the intelligible realm. On the other hand, the other primary realities may be said to exist in and originate from Intellect as objective properties of the primaries. And thus, one could argue that there is a qualitative difference between the claims that 'all primaries are beautiful' and 'all primar-

ies are eternal'. The former claim points to beauty as an objective property of the primaries; whereas the latter points to eternity as the subjective mode in which the primaries may be experienced.

3 *καὶ* (*line 11*)—*ἀλήθεια* (*line 12*)

Furthermore, in the intelligible realm, the truth 'is what it says and says what it is' (see V.3.5.25–88 and V.5.2.18–20 and Emilsson 1996, 236–238) and therefore does not correspond to some pre-existing standard by which it may be validated as true. For since 'you cannot find anything truer than the truth' (see V.5.2.23–24 and VI.7.34.27–28) only the truth itself can confirm its own nature.

4 *δεῖ* (*line 12*)—*εἶναι* (*line 20*)

However, Plotinus asserts that the nature of the whole (in this case, eternity) is such that it does not lack anything (see for example V.1.4.12–21 and V.4.2.13–16). Indeed, a whole cannot be deficient, for even if its parts were deficient, the whole would remain in harmony with itself by transcending the discord of the parts (see III.2.16.28–36, V.3.13.16–21 and 6.37–38). The difference between a whole and a part therefore regards deficiency, which, as a matter of necessity, can never be predicated of the whole but only of the part. If the future existed for the whole, the whole would be continually deficient, in the sense that at any given point *p* (present), it would always lack something due to arrive at point *p*2 (existing in the future). Since the whole cannot be deficient in anything, and having a future necessitates some kind of lack because it only exists potentially (see II.5.3.4–8), the whole cannot have a future. Thus, in the case of eternity, which exists as a whole, its own end is contained in itself, so that nothing can be either added to or taken away from its nature (see Nikulin, 2002). Furthermore, if eternity (as an aspect of Being) were to lack something, or were due to experience something, it would have to lack or be due to experience something outside its sphere of influence. The only thing that lies outside the sphere of influence of Being is non-Being. If Being were able to endure something contrary to its nature (non-Being), it would no longer be Being because the conflation of Being and non-Being entails a contradiction. Therefore, Being cannot endure anything contrary to its nature. We are left with Being in itself, with no possible association with past or future.

5 *τοῖς* (*line 20*)—*εἶναι* (*line 28*)

Plotinus here illustrates a key difference between things in the intelligible realm and those in the temporal realm: while the intelligible realities do not have a future, the sensible realities, as parts, are constantly attempting to reach

full maturity through motion (cf. Arist. *Ph.* II 1, 192b21–23 and 193b16–18, and Kalfas 1999, 144–146). All things in the temporal realm meet the criterion of being a thing by virtue of having a possible future and a past. For example, when someone cuts down a tree, the tree no longer "will be", and therefore by destroying the tree, the person takes away its "will be". Sensible realities are therefore dependent upon the future to guarantee the continuation of their existence (cf. Plut. *Quaest. Plat.* VIII 4, 1007d (trans. Cherniss): "what is subject to generation cannot [be] apart from time, etc.") whereas the intelligible realities do not need to acquire anything in time because everything is already present to them (see also V.1.4.8–19). Indeed, each time point *p* in the future manifests itself as point *p*2 in the present (before it becomes point *p*3 in the past) the temporal thing has bought more time, and thus increased its share of being. On the other hand, if one were to add a 'will be' to beauty, truth or eternity, which exist in the intelligible realm, the ontological status of the object of investigation would immediately be lowered (see also V.9.5.32–36) since anything which has a future (or a past) is a part and not a whole by virtue of the deficiency that having a past or a future entails. Therefore one can assume that by ascribing future and past existence to the intelligible realities, one really discusses the images of the intelligible realities in the temporal world (like a beautiful object rather than Beauty itself, an instance of justice rather than Justice itself) rather than the intelligible realities themselves. Having distinguished between things in the temporal realm and the intelligible realm based on their association (or lack thereof) with the future, Plotinus claims that the very meaning of Being differs for the two groups. For the intelligible realities, Being is a fixed and unchanging state which has everything present to it simultaneously whereas for things in time, their being or "is" constantly changes relative to the past and the future (see also II.5.3.28–33, II.5.5.1–5, II.9.3.12–15, II.56–59 and VI.7.1.48–50). Thus, while the intelligible realities are whole and eternal, the sensible realities exist as parts in time. And therefore, whereas Beauty itself always exists, a beautiful (sensible) object has both a beginning and an end.

6 *καὶ* (*line 28*)—*μέλλοντι* (*line 33*)

As a sensible reality, the physical universe is also subject to temporality and thus has a future which it moves towards. Since desire belongs to that which is in need (III.5.9.49), the physical universe cannot be an intelligible reality, since intelligible realities are always already complete (see IV.4.8.48–51). Instead, the physical universe moves in a circle towards Intellect (see also II.2.1.1 and 39–51), resembling the circular movement of Soul as it too aspires to the fullness of Intellect (see IV.4.16.23–31). Unlike the intelligible realities which exist in a

state of perfect stillness, the universe travels towards Being, and for this reason never really attains it but instead gathers the ersatz being which stands relative to the past and the future. Like a dog chasing its tail, the universe goes round in circles in search for being and hankers after it, but never achieves it, having instead to settle for the image of eternity, which is everlastingness in time (see also III.2.1.20–26, 5.12–18 and V.8.12.17). Plotinus therefore claims that the cause of the perennial movement of the universe is this desire for being, which it fails to achieve precisely because it strives to reach it.

7 *τοῖς* (*line 33*)—*εἴη ἂν αἰών* (*line 42*)

By contrast, since the primaries are whole, they do not seek anything but are instead complete, existing as they do in the rarefied region of pure Being where past and future are excluded. The complete nature of the primaries reminds us of the 'complete living thing' of Plato's *Timaeus* (31b1; cf. *Resp.* V 477a3 and *Soph.* 248e8–249a1) as well as Parmenides' Being ("complete in every direction": Fr. B8.42–43 DK) which outlaws non-Being (c.f. Parm.fr. B7.I, 8.12–13, 46 DK). For each primary is qualitatively complete by being illumined by the qualities of the other primaries (as seen in V.3.15.26, V.8.4.9, V.8.9.16–17, and VI.2.8.7–11; see also Kalligas 2000, 28) as well as being complete by transcending time. Thus, the primaries are complete both by possessing the fullness of Being in eternity and by embodying all aspects of Being in the intelligible realm. They are also blessed as a result of being what they are and not needing to move towards or create anything else (see also III.2.1.38–45 and IV.7.9.13–16). By claiming that the future cannot develop in the primaries (and not simply that the primaries do not travel towards the future), Plotinus reminds us that the primaries cannot simply be thought of as parts without a past and a future but as wholes which do not admit of any association with past and future. Therefore, it is not the past and future which prohibit the primaries from participating in them, but the primaries which outlaw past and future by virtue of existing in the intelligible realm. This is why Plotinus asserts that "there is nothing which is going to be for them (the primary realities)" rather than saying that they will not exist in the future. For while the future does not exist for the primaries, there is no point in the future in which the primaries will not exist. Therefore, the primaries a.) transcend time and as a result of a.), b.) always exist from the point of view of someone in time and c.) cannot aspire to the future or be subject to change or novelty, since they exist in eternal stillness. On the other hand, the sensible realities have only partial existence since they rely upon the past and future (which from the point of view of Intellect are non-existent) for their continuation.

8 *αἰὼν γὰρ* (*line 42*)—*ὄντος* (*line 43*)

Plotinus' false claim about αἰών deriving from ἀεί and ὄν ('always existing') is also found in Arist. *Cael.* I 9, 279a27 where it is used to support the claim that the sensible world is everlasting (cf. *Ph.* IV 12, 221b3–7 and Festugière 1949, 175–182). Furthermore, Whitaker 1968, 138 suggests that this etymology (already pointing to the Platonic conception of eternity as everlasting Being) may well have motivated Plato to use the terms αἰών and αἰώνιον in the *Timaeus*. In Plotinus' case, we must remember to identify eternity in relation to the 'always' which transcends time rather than the 'always' of time and everlastingness (see again 2.28–29).

Chapter 5

1 *Τοῦτο δέ* (*line 1*)—*τοιοῦτον* (*line 7*)

Plotinus claims that that which always exists cannot have come into being and therefore cannot have a past. Here Plotinus echoes *Ti.* 41B2–B4, "since you have come into being, you are not immortal" (and Plotinus mentions this passage in 1.8.7.9–11). However, it seems that we have to interpret the 'always existing' here as that which is eternal rather than that which is everlasting. This is because Plotinus claims both that the universe and time are everlasting (see III.2.1.20–26 and I.5.7.25–27) and yet that they both came into being (although this act of coming into being takes place outside of time: see 6.50–54, 11.4–6 and 12.22–23 for example). Since Plotinus claims here that that which always exists cannot have come into being in any sense, we can infer that he is specifically referring to that which is eternal rather than that which is everlasting. Since eternity always exists in every sense (by not having a beginning either in time, in the human soul, or in the hypostasis of Soul), it cannot have had any kind of beginning. Plotinus also asks a rhetorical question about whether we can say that something is eternal if it changes. But we already know from 3.11–19 and 12.8–14 that Plotinus rules this out on the grounds that eternity is what is, and since what is cannot be associated with what was or what will be, eternity remains fixed and unchanging in a state of rest and unity. Furthermore, that which does not exist as a whole cannot be eternal since it would be deficient in a temporal sense, requiring the ongoing passage of time to guarantee its being (see my comments on 4.12–20).

2 *τί οὖν* (*line 7*)—*θεώμενος* (*line 12*)

Here Plotinus presents us with a challenge. The focus on eternity moves from theoretical and abstract investigation to practical and spiritual enquiry. This

spiritual enquiry is a form of meditation, where one remains aware of the eternity that surrounds them; where there is a shift in attention from the objects within one's field of awareness to the field of awareness itself (cf. my comments on 11.1–4 and 12.4–22). Thus, we can contemplate all things, such as thoughts, perceptions and sensations within the eternal now, rather than in temporal sequence (see also I.5.7.24–30). The focus on eternity may take its form in the light of other intelligible realities which are also eternal such as beauty (see III.5.1.38–42). However, a continual focus on the sensible objects which arise in awareness can make us blind to the awareness in which those objects are arising, the field of vision upon which the images and sensations of life are projected. While the sensible objects in awareness come and go, the awareness itself, the soul which perceives these objects, does not come or go but rather exists outside of time. This soul is therefore the natural power which Plotinus refers to as never failing, and is eternity itself. For Plotinus claims that we should not attempt solely to understand eternity abstractly as though it was something existing outside the human soul, but rather should see that it exists within us (see also 7.1–5, 11.1–4 and 12.4–12, IV.4.15.15–20, IV.7.10.1–2, IV.8.2.31–38). For through devotion and concentration on this divine principle, we are able not only to be that nature that we already possess but also to live in full realisation of this truth. Indeed, Plotinus' claim that this eternal awareness does not fail matches Porphyry's account in his *Life of Plotinus* that Plotinus reduced sleep through "continuous turning in contemplation to his intellect" (*VP* 8.19–24) and that he "never, while awake, relaxed his intent concentration upon the intellect" (*VP* 9.16–18). Taking Plotinus at his word, if this awareness is truly eternal then the life of the soul must transcend all states such as waking and sleeping, as well as the life and death of the body (see for example, I.6.6.9–11, in which Plotinus describes the continuation of awareness after death in a state of aloneness). Plotinus therefore requires us to shift our focus from the temporal realm, which is the usual focus of our lives, to the eternal space which is usually in the background, so that eternity may flood our vision and transform us.

3 *εἰ οὖν* (*line 12*)—*ἐμφαινομένης* (*line 18*)

Anything which is eternal is necessarily everlasting (see my comments on 3.1–6). As we have already seen, although that which is eternal necessarily transcends time, it is also the case that by transcending time, that which is eternal exists at all points in time and so can be described as everlasting. Take for example the natural power which Plotinus refers to as the eternal nature within man. If it is true that this natural power (of awareness) is eternal, then it must also be the case that it is everlasting. This is because the natural power which exists outside of time and which is aware of thoughts, perceptions and sensa-

tions occurring in time, is necessarily aware of these things at each point in time in which each of these things arises. However, not everything which is everlasting is eternal, for both time itself and the sensible universe are everlasting without being eternal (cf. III.3.6.24; see also Strange, 1994, 34n.34.) Furthermore, Plotinus defines eternity as that which admits of no addition since if it could receive something more than it already had, it would need some future time to fulfil its destiny and would therefore be subject to time (see also my comments on 3.11–20, 4.20–28 and 5.1–7). This passage echoes many others in which addition is associated with alienation from and opposition to pure Being (see for example, I.1.2.19–21, I.1.12.10–21, I.6.5.39–45, II.6.1.53–58, III.6.6.23–32, V.5.13.9–11, VI.5.12.15–22, VI.7.41.14–17). Indeed, since Being is already perfect and still, any addition to it results in imperfection and motion. Thus, the eternal 'is', when added to, becomes the 'was' and 'will be' of time. Addition to the eternal present therefore causes a person to fall away from eternity and dwell instead in everlasting time, which imitates eternity by continuing in perpetual "desire for Being" (4.29–31).

4 *ὅθεν σεμνὸν* (*line 18*)—*ἐν ζωῇ* (*line 22*)

Plotinus here describes eternity as majestic: a word Plotinus uses to describe Intellect as well (see V.3.13.2–3 and my comments on 2.5–9), and associates it with Intellect (the hypostasis which eternity allows man to access). The whole passage conveys a devotional and mystical attitude, since eternity is described both as a god and as an immanent aspect of Being wishing to reveal its own nature and that of Intellect to mankind. Plotinus' description here therefore heightens the religious sense which already accompanied the word αἰών during his own lifetime (see Nock 1934, 78–99; Festugière 1944–1954, 4:176–199; and Zuntz 1992, *passim*). Furthermore, although eternity is identified as majestic by virtue of its proximity to Intellect, it is also majestic in a way that Intellect is not since it 'proclaims' itself to human beings as that which is: the present which has no past or future and which constitutes the essence of experience. Eternity is therefore tied to human subjectivity in a way that Intellect is not, since eternity is internally accessible to human beings through their contemplation of stillness and presence. Therefore, although Intellect and eternity are equally accessible to man, the former remains an objective and external feature of man's experience, whereas the latter manifests itself to man as the still voice of his own nature, thereby proclaiming its identity to man from within. And thus, Plotinus describes eternity as fully grounded in 'life', a word which carries the specific connotation of the power of human subjectivity in animating and illuminating the intelligible realm (see my comments on 3.11–20). Nevertheless, eternity remains connected to Intellect as an aspect of Being, which we can see

from Plotinus' use of Parmenidean terms: for as well as being majestic (see also 2.15–17, V 8.3.18 and Pl. *Phlb*. 53c6), eternity is ἀτρεμὲς ("unshakeable": III 2.2.16, VI 9.5.14 and Parm. fr. B8.4 DK), ταὐτὸν ("self-identical" or "the same": Parm. fr. B8.29 DK), and βέβαιον ("firm": VI 5.1.9 and Pl. *Ti*. 29b6).

5 *εἰ δ'ἐκ πολλῶν* (*line 22*)—*εἶναι* (*line 30*)

By virtue of being the subjective aspect of Being, eternity allows man to perceive all beings (both sensible and intelligible). Therefore, Plotinus warns against thinking that eternity cannot exist with multiplicity or that these two concepts are mutually exclusive in any way. On the contrary, since eternity is the life of Being, it is present to everything at all times and is made up of the many (see also VI.5.12.1–7). Therefore, Plotinus' vision of eternity is not that of a separate transcendent realm in the heavens but rather of an immanent presence pervading all things. The ability to access eternity is therefore not dependent upon travelling to a different reality away from the multiplicity of beings in the sensory world, but rather of changing one's disposition and cleansing the doors of perception so that its reality can become manifest to us (see 11.1–4) in everyday experience. Since the many is accommodated by eternity, it is indeed possible to say that it is made up of many *parts* (see Armstrong 1966–1988, 313, 1–2) although the Greek is simply "ἐκ πολλῶν". However, this interpretation may lead us into difficulties since in and of itself, eternity is partless (see 2.17–19, 4.37–43 and 6.47–50). We explain this apparent tension in Plotinus' philosophy by claiming that while eternity is in and of itself partless, there is no contradiction in perceiving multiplicity in eternity, since it unlocks access to Intellect, which is itself a multiple (see for example V.3.10.7–14). Therefore, as the empty presence of awareness, although eternity is not many things in itself (unlike Intellect), it is filled with the things which it allows man to access in the realms of Intellect and Soul. And thus it is the partless aspect of Being which allows man to perceive Being in relation to its parts.

Chapter 6

1 *Ἐπειδὴ δὲ* (*line 1*)—*εἶναι* (*line 9*)

Plotinus here refers to *Ti*. 37d6 as evidence that Plato believed that eternity was a manifestation of the One, but it is probable that this passage from Plato points back to Parmenides' conception of Being in B8.29 DK, and therefore that Plato was associating eternity with the unity of Being rather than with the One. From Plotinus' perspective, however, eternity derives its partless nature from the One (see IV.8.6.9) and like the One cannot be conceptualised solely in relation to

the intelligible realities (like Intellect can) or the sensible realities (like Soul). It therefore shares in common with the One an esoteric nature which cannot be grasped through objects alone (for the One is 'simple before all things': V.4.1.5). This makes eternity a different emanatory expression from Intellect, which shares with the One a hypostatic and exoteric nature as the source of beings (see III.2.1.20–26, III.8.9.44–51, V.1.7.9–10, VI.2.20.25–29 and VI.8.18.32–41). And thus eternity is the '*life* of Being around the One' (cf. 3.11–20 and my comments): for eternity is the subjective expression of the One which animates and enlivens the intelligible realities (while the One itself is beyond life: see III 8.10.2–3, V 3.16.35–38). Furthermore, by virtue of the ever-present and everlasting nature of eternity, Plotinus claims that eternity "dwells": an activity of the One-Good itself (see I.7.1.18–19 and VI.8.16.25–26) which on the level of Being becomes contemplative life (see V.5.5.1–14, VI.7.15.1–13; Pl. *Ti.* 29b6–7; and Aubenque 1976, 82). Indeed, although eternity exists as a unified whole, it is not by its own merit that it does this, but because unity is an expression of the One. Thus, eternity receives its unified nature from the ultimately simple and pure principle of the One (see V.2.1–5) which transcends everything (see for example V.3.12.47–50 and V.5.6.8–10). Here, we could argue that Plotinus clarifies the aim of the spiritual exercise in the previous chapter (8–12), which entails contemplating eternity by a 'natural power that never tires'. For through stillness, which is the hallmark of eternity, we may find that we are capable not only of discovering eternity, but also of ascending to the One (see V.5.4.1–10).

2 *τὸ γὰρ* (*line 9*)—*ἀιών*(*line 21*)

Eternity, as the principal activity of Being and Intellect, is necessarily timeless since all activities of Intellect contain their own end without requiring extension in time (see Arist. *Metaph.* Θ6, 1048b18–35, McGuire and Strange 1988, 252–253; and Kalligas 2000, 32). According to Sorabji 1983, 113, Plotinus' conception of eternity as a timeless present is the first of its kind and had a great influence on the philosophers of the Middle Ages through Boethius (see *De trin.* 4.64–77; *De consol. philos.* V 6.9–31; and Beierwaltes 1967, 198–200). Since eternity is the timeless present, its characteristics are different from both time and everything existing within it. Time contains 'this and that' in the sense that it is comprised of past, present and future whereas eternity does not (see again 3.15–19). If the present is 'this', the past and future are 'that'. It is possible to differentiate between the 'this' in the present and the 'that' which has gone into the past, as well as the 'that' which is yet to arrive in the future. By contrast, eternity exists only as 'this' and its Being is neither relative to the 'that' of the past nor of the future. For this reason, it has no extension and cannot

be 'unrolled' (see also III.8.8.32–38 in which the word ἐξελίσσω is also used to describe the decline of the Intellect from the ultimate simplicity of the One to a state of multiplicity), 'stretched', or 'prolonged'. Furthermore, since eternity, as the life of Intellect, is partless and unextended in such a way, human beings are able to come into contact with the intelligibles suddenly in the timeless present (see V.3.17.24–30 and V.8.7.12–17) rather than over an extended period of time.

3 *ὅταν δὲ* (*line 21*)*—ὡς μὴ ἐπιλείψοντός ποτε* (*line 26*)

Plotinus here warns us that saying that eternity *always* exists can lead to a misunderstanding with regards to the true nature of eternity. The danger with associating eternity with the word 'always' is that we may get the impression that eternity is a permanent feature of time; that it persists through it and increases in being with each passing moment (see 2.28–29, 3.1–6, V.1–7 and my comments above). Furthermore, just as myths draw down eternal realities into temporal sequence in order to communicate meaning to the reader (see III.5.9.24–29), so Plotinus must use words which designate things of a lower order of reality, such as 'ἀεί' signifying everlasting existence in time, to describe things pertaining to the higher order like eternity. Therefore, the word ἀεί does not signify that eternity exists everlastingly within time but rather that it is necessarily present to each possible temporal point given that it transcends time (cf. Procl. *In Ti.* I 239.2–6, who distinguishes two distinct meanings of ἀεί and *Leg.* X 904a8–9 where Plato makes the distinction between the "eternal" (αἰώνιον) and the "indestructible" (ἀνώλεθρον). See also Strange 1994, 40 and Sorabji 1983, 114–116). Thus, even if one rightly describes eternity as something which always exists and which at no time has not existed nor will cease to exist, he may still have an incorrect understanding of eternity by interpreting the word 'always' in the way that it is usually understood: namely as a state of endless continuation in time, rather than the mode of being which transcends time. Therefore, we can identify the difference between the everlasting and the eternal: the everlasting always exists through never-ending existence within time, whereas the eternal always exists by transcending time.

4 *τὸ δὲ* (*line 26*)*—τὸ πᾶν* (*line 36*)

Since eternity is Being, Plotinus believes that it would make more sense simply to say that eternity exists, rather than that it always exists. For to say that eternity always exists could mislead people into thinking eternity is temporal in some sense (see my comments above; cf. Weiss 1941, 235). However, due to the incorrect attribution of Being to bodies by Aristotle and the Stoics (see Pl. *Ti.* 35a2–3; Apul. *De Plat.* I 6, 193–194) people misunderstand what Being really

is. Indeed, people mistake existence for becoming because the only things that they perceive existing are things which exist in time. Therefore, Plotinus must temporarily accept the deficient definition of existence which they have presupposed and add 'always' (ἀεί) to it in order to restore its true and original meaning. Plotinus compares this linguistic concession to one used to remedy the distortion of the meaning of the word 'philosopher' by sophists and mere scholars (see Plotinus' views on Longinus for example in *VP* 14.20). For when sophists and mere scholars make people believe that philosophy is something other than it really is, it is necessary to make a distinction for the layman between a 'philosopher' and a 'true philosopher' (here Plotinus most likely draws upon Plato, *Soph.* 235a1–2 and Aristotle, *Metaph.* T 2, 1004b17–26; cf. Beierwaltes 1967, 202). He may then be able then see that what he calls philosophy is not really philosophy at all, but a kind of imposter posing as philosophy. Only when he sees this can he embark on investigation into the truth. Plotinus therefore helps us to see that adding the words 'always' and 'true' to the words 'existence' and 'philosophy' do not help us distinguish two types of existence or two types of philosophy but rather to discern the difference between existence and philosophy in themselves and their respective imitations, which are mistaken for the things in themselves. As a result, Plotinus encourages us to replace 'ἀεὶ ὄν' ('always existing') with 'ἀληθῶς ὄν' ('truly existing') in our minds, since we can now attest to the fact that eternity does not always exist in the way that everlastingness does (see my comments above), but rather always exists by being outside of time. This substitution signifies that we are aware that the only things which truly exist are those which always exist (in the atemporal sense), such as eternity and the intelligible realities.

5 *πᾶν οὖν* (*line 37*)*—λέγοιτο* (*line 42*)

Here Plotinus continues the theme of setting opposition between things in themselves and their imitations. Having already pinpointed the difference between eternity and its imitation in everlastingness and having alluded to the difference between philosophy and its imitations, Plotinus turns his attention to the concept of perfection. We learn that perfection can be ascribed only to eternity and eternal things. This is because the eternal is not deficient in any respect and exists as a whole outside of time, impervious to corruption by it (see my comments on 4.12–20). To possess wholeness means to be perfect since the wholeness is complete, and perfection requires that nothing needs to or could be added or taken away from the thing claiming perfection (see III.6.6.10–32). For if something *needed* to be added or taken away, it would be imperfect by definition and if it *could* be added or taken away it would

be imperfect by virtue of being subject to alteration and destruction (as we have seen in 4.33–43). The eternal is thus the model of perfection. By contrast, things existing in time may seem to be perfect but can in fact never truly be so. For example, although the heavenly sphere and celestial bodies are of a higher order than earthly bodies, they are still imperfect because of their corporeal natures (see II.1.8.19–28, 4.28–33, 12.15–19 and II.1.2.6–10; cf. *Resp.* VII.530B2–3). The case for the perfection of certain things in time is compelling at first: since everything in the hierarchy of reality is in the right place in relation to everything else according to its level of unity and internal harmony, there can be no mistakes in the allocation of bodies to souls. For this reason, there is a sense in which the allocation of a body to a soul is an act of perfection, since each body is wholly appropriate for the soul which embodies it. However, Plotinus rejects this kind of perfection as another category error since perfection in itself has the qualities of atemporality, wholeness and true existence. Thus, while a body may be appropriate for a soul, it can never be perfect in itself because it does not possess these qualities. Indeed, Plotinus reaffirms the necessary connection between the temporal and the deficient and thus outlaws the tenability of calling things in time perfect, reminding us of his claim that the names of archetypes should be reserved for the archetypes alone (cf. III.6.17.21–37). For on the one hand perfection, existence and philosophy are the archetypes; and on the other, those things which attempt to copy these archetypes and fail to live up to their standards are their imitations.

6 *ὅτῳ δὲ ὑπάρχει* (*line 43*)—*καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ* (*line 50*)

Eternity cannot be measured because it has no duration. Thus, while it is possible to say that a finite object lasts a certain length of time (according to the distance between its beginning and end point) and that there is such a thing as an endless length of time, which has no beginning or end, eternity cannot be regarded as lasting any length of time because it transcends time. Thus, asking how long eternity lasts would be like asking about the feathers of an elephant. Both questions presuppose associations which do not in fact exist. And Plotinus argues that eternity cannot be associated with time or duration because it exists prior to them. This does not mean that eternity existed before duration in time. For this would simply trap eternity within time, given that any 'before' or 'after' must necessarily happen within time since both are concepts regarding relative positions within time itself. Instead Plotinus means that eternity exists logically prior to time (see 1.16–20), that it is on a higher level in the hierarchy of reality, existing on the level of Being which is beyond both time and space. For this reason, eternity cannot have any contact with time

because if it did, it would get caught up in it and be a part of it, rather than a whole. And Plotinus reiterates what we already know, namely, that eternity is a "pure partlessness" both in itself (see 2.17–19 and 4.37–43) and in the way that it is internally accessible to human beings, as life (see also 3.15–19). Plotinus therefore emphasises the fact that eternity cannot contact time in any way because if it did, it would become involved with temporal extension and therefore cease to be eternity altogether.

7 *τὸ δ' "ἀγαθὸς ἦν"* (*line 50*)—*εἰλῃχότων* (*line 57*)

Plotinus contends that when Plato says, "he was good" (*Ti.* 29e1), he suggests temporal priority in order to convey an essence which possesses logical priority alone. Thus, we should not take Plato's use of the past tense literally but see it as a way of expressing, allegorically, he who precedes time and its subjects (see Kalligas' introduction to III.1 [2014, 249–253]; Pepin 1964, 86–94; and Sorabji 1983, 268–267). And this God who is "he" is usually the One-Good for Plotinus (see for example I.1.8.8–12, I.2.6.3–7, I.6.3–12 and II.2.3.18–22). However, since in the *Timaeus*, "he" is the Demiurge who exists below the level of the Good and who creates the cosmos, we should take the "he" here to be the Plotinian equivalent of the Intellect and intelligible realm, existing as an intermediary level between the Soul and the One (see V.1.6.41–46). Like both eternity and time, the physical universe transcends the (other) sensible realities because it has neither a beginning in time nor a temporal cause. However, unlike eternity, the universe has a kind of atemporal beginning provided to it by Intellect which is logically prior to it (cf. I.5.7.25–27; III 2.1.20–26; and Baltes 1976–1978, 1:133–134). In order to support his interpretation that Plato also believed the creation of the universe to be non-temporal, Plotinus points out that Plato rejects the attribution of past and future to the intelligible realities (see *Ti.*37e4–38a2), while claiming that they exist 'always' (see *Ti.* 51a1). And thus, Plotinus infers that the creation of the universe happened outside of time: for if the intelligible beings always exist outside of time, it follows that their acts of creation do as well.

Chapter 7

1 *Ταῦτα οὖν* (*line 1*)—*αἰῶνος* (*line 5*)

As Plotinus makes clear in 1.7–16, we must not simply repeat other people's statements but seek to reach an understanding of eternity and time ourselves. Reaching an understanding of eternity requires not only a theoretical grasp of its nature but also the willingness to direct attention towards it until it becomes

one's natural state of being (5.7–12, 11.1–4). Plotinus wishes to show us that our very ability to investigate the nature of eternity shows that eternity is not alien to us but, on the contrary, integral to our being. Indeed, here Plotinus may have taken inspiration from Plato's *Meno* 80d–e, in which Socrates states that we cannot enquire into something without first knowing the object of enquiry. For since knowledge of eternity already belongs to the soul, we must ourselves make contact with the knowledge that the soul already has in order to bring understanding of it into our lives. This process of recollection, which is not a temporal remembering but a bringing into action of the knowledge of the higher soul (see again IV.3.25.27–35) requires both the avoidance of simply repeating others' opinions without reflection, and the purposeful connection to the transcendent part of the soul which can facilitate the return to intelligence and thus the re-identification with the intelligible realities (cf. IV.8.4.21–31 and Gerson 1994, 119–120). And only through recollection of such a kind can one immediately link the knowledge of our ability to investigate the intelligible realm to the conclusion that we must have a share in it. Indeed, by virtue of the fact that we are not *tabulae rasae* but souls with perfect knowledge (see IV.7.12.8–11), not in the sense of possessing correct propositions about the truth but by being the truth (see 4.11–12), we must always already have a share in everything which is perfect, including eternity (see also I.1.2.5–25).

2 ***ἀλλὰ ἐν χρόνῳ* (*line 5*)*—κατέβη χρόνος* (*line 10*)**

However, Plotinus recognises the problem of reconciling three different claims. The first is that eternity does not have contact with time (see 6.47–50), the second that we exist in time and the third that we have a share in eternity. At this point, Plotinus wishes only to raise the question of how these three claims could be compatible and believes that we will be able to find the answer when we have discovered what time is. We know that the answer must have something to do with Plotinus' belief that a part of a person's soul is undescended and exists beyond time in the intelligible realm or with the One, with a corresponding part which is lower (see IV.8.1.1–11, IV.8.4.21–31, IV.8.8.1–13, III.4.3.18–27 and V.1.10.1–18) and bound to Soul and temporality (see for example, 11.15–35). However, in order to understand fully the sense in which we exist in time, we first have to discover what time is, which will be the central focus of the rest of the treatise. Plotinus even claims that we must discover what time is in order to know what it means to be in eternity since human beings have a share in both, and thus, without knowing how we exist in time, we will never fully understand how we exist in eternity. It is only with knowledge of both eternity and time therefore, that we will come to know the rela-

tionship between the two principles and the way in which we exist in both simultaneously. Since time is the image of eternity (1.19–20) and exists with Soul on a lower level than the intelligible realm (see IV.4.15.1–4), we must descend from eternity by shifting our investigation from this higher realm to the lower plane of time. However, Plotinus informs us that we are not descending all the way into non-being in contemplation of time, but are rather stopping somewhere in between, since time is the image of eternity (3.22–36, 5.21, 6.6–8, 11.59–62).

3 *εἰ μὲν περὶ* (*line 10*)—*λόγος* (*line 17*)

In 1.16–20, Plotinus claimed that once we had found out what eternity was, it might soon become clear to us what time was as well since time is meant to be the image of eternity. Even though Plotinus does indeed conclude that time is the image of eternity, he changes direction here by saying that we should consider the arguments of the 'blessed ancients' and work out our account of time with their arguments in mind, rather than simply attempting to deduce the nature of time from the nature of eternity which we have now discovered. The method Plotinus prescribes for investigating the nature of time reflects not only his approach to the investigation of eternity (see 1.13–16) but also his broader methodological approach. This entails enquiring into the remarks of the ancients and assessing their veracity in relation to his own account, which is reached both through reason and through reflection on his own experience (cf. 1.13–16 and Armstrong 1974, 171–194). Indeed, we cannot rely solely on rational thought and argumentation but must rather discover whether the conclusions we have reached lie in harmony with the voice of our pre-rational intuition, or internal awareness (ἐννοίᾳ). This internal awareness is vital for accessing higher knowledge: for as Kalligas notes (2014, 599–600), Plotinus most likely used the term ἐννοίᾳ with Middle Platonists such as Plutarch in mind, for whom the word signified innate concepts existing within the descended soul which provided the foundation for scientific reasoning (see *Quaest. Plat.* I 4, 1000e: "innate conceptions" [ἔμφυτοι νοήσεις], the anonymous commentator of the *Theaetetus* (Anon. *In Tht.* 47.44–45), and "Alcinous" (*Didasc.* 4, 155.26–34)—cf. also Cic. *Tusc.* I 24.57). As a set of innate concepts, this internal awareness could therefore provide the means to a recollective process by linking the soul with pre-existing intelligible truths (cf. Strange 1994, 26–28; and Opsomer 1998, 206–210).

4 *τριχῇ δ' ἴσως* (*line 17*)—*τῆς τεταγμένης* (*line 27*)

Plotinus suggests that we separate the investigation of time into the three categories into which ancient explanations of time fall: **1.) the identification of**

time with motion, **2.) the identification of time as what is moved** and **3.) something belonging to motion**. Plotinus rules out the idea that time is rest or associated with rest in any way based on the fact that time depends upon an endless sequence of instants correlating to the 'before and after' (πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον; cf. Arist. *Ph.* IV 11, 219a33–b1) which are always different to one another, with the result that time is never the same, and therefore never at rest (cf. Wagner 1996b, 76). There are a further six subcategories of belief about time which correspond to the three primary categories.

1a) **Time is all motion:** comes from Aristotle, *Ph.* IV 10, 218b9–18, who identifies it as a common belief: "But as time is most usually supposed to be motion and a kind of change …" (trans. ROT). However, "Aetius" I 22.7 (*Dox. Gr.* 318 = *SVF* 2:514) claims that "the majority of Stoics" thought time was identical to "motion itself"; cf. Clark 1944, 337.

1b) **Time is the motion of the universe:** comes from Aristotle *Ph.* IV 10, 218a33–b1: "some assert that it is 'the movement of the whole' ". According to Simplicius *In Ph.*700.17–21, commentators including Eudemus, Theophrastus and Alexander (cf. op. cit. 705.5–7) attributed this view to Plato (cf. "Aetius" I 22.1 = *Dox. Gr.* 318a9–10; and Diog. Laert. III 73).

2) **Time (as what is moved) is the sphere of the universe:** also comes from Aristotle *Ph.* IV 10, 218a33–b1: "some assert that … it is 'the sphere itself' ". This view was ascribed to the Pythagoreans based on the claim of "Aetius" (op. cit. 318a2–3), but others may have attributed this view to the Pythagoreans based on a misunderstanding of Archytas, who associated time with the 'interval of the all' (see [Archyt. *Cat.*] 24.16).

3) **Time is something belonging to motion**: comes from Aristotle *Ph.* IV 11, 219a9–10: "Since, then [time] is not motion, necessarily it must be something belonging to motion." This general category is then split into three further subcategories.

3a) **Time is the interval of motion:** comes from Zeno the Stoic (see *SVF* 1:93—"Zeno declared time to be 'the interval of motion' "—and 2:510; cf. 2:515). This view was accepted by many Platonists in a modified form as "the interval of the motion of the universe": see "Alcinous" *Didasc.* 14, 170.24–25; "Aetius" I 20.2 = *Dox. Gr.* 318a4–5; Sext. Emp. *Math.* X 170; and Runia 1986, 217.

3b) **Time is the measure of motion:** is the view held by Aristotle (see *Ph.* IV 12, 220b32–221a1, and 221b7) with the idea that since the units used to measure motion are temporal, time is the measure of motion in general.

3c) **Time is the accompaniment of motion:** is primarily an Epicurean doctrine: see Usener 1966, 2.11 [fr. 2.94.10–11); cf. Epicurus *Ep. Her.* 72–73; and

Lucr. I 459–460: "likewise, time does not exist in itself, but there ensues upon events themselves a sense of it ...." Cf. also Demetrius Lacon apud Sext. Emp. *Math.* X 2.19–27: "accident of accidents". However, it also found expression as a Stoic doctrine propounded by Chrysippus (*SVF* 2:509): "the interval concomitant with the motion of the universe". Cf. Verbeke 1973, 196–197 and Rist 1969, 273–280. Finally, certain Peripatetics also defined time as "an accompaniment of motion" (παρακολούθημα κινήσεως) and attributed this view to Aristotle (see Themist. *In Ph.* 91.15–16, and cf. Arist. *Ph.* IV 12, 22la24–25).

3d) **Time is something belonging either to all motion or only to ordered motion:** 3d.) is not a subcategory of 3.) like the others but rather specifies the kind of motion which time is meant to be associated with. As Kalligas 2014, 602 notes, the belief of the ancients regarding whether time should be associated with all motion or solely with ordered motion was correlated with their position in the Platonist debate as to whether the universe was created outside of time or within time (see my comments on 6.50–57). On the one hand, those who claimed that the universe was created outside of time believed that neither time nor the universe had a beginning, and therefore, given that time was at least as primordial as motion, that we should associate time with all kinds of motion, both orderly and disorderly. On the other hand, those who believed that the universe was created in time had to explain Plato's claim that the creation of time took place alongside, rather than before, the formation of the orderly motion of the heavenly bodies by the Demiurge (*Ti.* 37d5–e4). They did this by claiming that time could be associated with the orderly motion in which the universe was fashioned. This association of time with orderly motion meant both that time was logically prior to the universe (given that the latter was created in accordance with the former) and that it was created concurrently with the universe according to Plato's claim. This in turn meant that time could not be associated with disordered motion, which Plato claimed preceded the creation of the universe by the Demiurge. And thus, Plutarch in *Quaest. Plat.* VIII 4, 1007c–d (trans. Cherniss), claims that "Plato said that time had come to be simultaneously with heaven but there had been motion even before the generation of heaven. Time there was not, however, for there was not order either ... but motion indeterminate (κίνησις ἀόριστος) ... Time, then, since it is thus necessarily implicated and connected with the heaven, is not simply motion [cf.1.a.)] but ... motion in an orderly fashion that involves measure and limits and revolutions." Cf. also Procl. *In Ti.* I 276.31–277.7; and Baltes 1976–1978, 1:43–45.

Chapter 8

1 *Κίνησιν μὲν* (*line 1*)*—χρόνος δὲ οὔ* (*line 8*)

Here the two options included in 3d.) are addressed: namely the idea that either time is all motion or only ordered motion, the former of which is also the conclusion found in 1.a). Plotinus' first argument is that time can neither be ordered motion nor all of motion because all such motion exists in time (and thus Plotinus subscribes to Aristotle's claim in *Ph.* VI 4, 235a11 that "every motion occurs in time."). As Kalligas 2014, 602 notes, Plotinus' criticisms are levelled only at the idea that time is a kind of physical motion for he will come to identify time as a kind of non-physical motion in 11.43 (cf. Callahan 1979, 100). Furthermore, even if motion were not in time, it could not then claim the identity of time itself, since, given that time is the standard upon which movement is measured (cf. Arist. *Ph.* IV 12, 221a4–7, b21–22), this would mean that movement was measuring itself which is impossible. Plotinus' second argument is that movement cannot be time because movement can totally cease but time never does, since time measures both that which is in motion and that which is motionless (cf. Arist. *Ph.* IV 221b7–9).

2 *εἰ δὲ* (*line 8*)*—εἰς τὸ ἥμισυ ἡκούσης* (*line 14*)

Plotinus now addresses 1b) which presents the claim that time is the unceasing motion of the universe (see Arist. *Cael.* II 1, 284a2–6). This unceasing motion is manifest through the revolutions of the universe. After each revolution, the universe returns to the point at which it started, known as the 'Complete' (τέλεος) or 'Great Year' (μέγας ἐνιαυτός) (see van der Waerden 1952, 129–138). Plotinus believed in the existence of repeated revolutions of the heavens (see V.7.1.23–25) and most likely had Plato's description of the Great Year in mind here (see *Ti.* 39c5–d7). However, he disagreed with the claim that time was identical to the revolution of the heavens on the grounds that this could imply that time was not uniform to all things. For if two 'Great Years' took different times to reach completion, for example, if the heavens took half the time to complete a revolution in year 2 than in year 1 (and thus double the time in year 1 than in year 2), and time were identical to the revolutions themselves, then time would be half of itself and double of itself at once. But this is impossible, because time must be the uniform standard upon which the motion of the heavenly bodies (including the 'Great Years') is measured, and not itself subject to change. For this reason, Plotinus claims that time is not the motion of the universe.

3 *καὶ τὸ ὀξυτάτην* (*line 14*)—*καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ* (*line 19*)
We may also interpret 1b.) to mean that time is not the motion of the universe but the speed of that motion. Each revolution of the outermost sphere takes less time to complete (and is greater in length than) those of the other heavenly circuits. Therefore, the movement of the outermost sphere is quicker than that of the other heavenly circuits. Since time is uniform to all things (cf. Arist. *Ph.* IV 10, 218b13 and Clark 1944, 339–340), it cannot be the speed of any, or all, of the spheres because they possess different speeds. Furthermore, time could not be any particular speed because it is the standard by which speed is measured.

4 *Εἰ τοίνυν* (*line 20*)—*χρόνος εἶναι* (*line 22*)
Plotinus then rejects the conclusion that time is the sphere of the universe itself (2.) by claiming that this association could only be posited on the basis of the motion of the sphere (cf. Aristotle *Ph.* IV 10, 218b5–9), which has already been distinguished from time (see my comments on lines 8–19 above).

5 *Ἆρ' οὖν* (*line 23*)—*ἅμα ἔσονται* (*line 30*)
Now that we have ascertained that time cannot be identified as movement, Plotinus next turns to the Stoic claim that time is the interval that motion traverses (3a.). Plotinus rejects this definition on the basis that the claim threatens the uniformity of time. For different movements have different intervals. Therefore, if time were the interval belonging to all movements, then there would be infinite times corresponding to the different intervals of the infinite number of movements. Furthermore, if time had infinite iterations and were not uniform, there would be no marker by which to measure and compare the different intervals of movement.

6 *εἰ δὲ* (*line 30*)—*ἡ κίνησις αὕτη εἴη* (*line 32*)
Plotinus next turns to the Platonic modification of the Stoic claim in 3a.): namely that time is the interval of motion of the universe. Plotinus has four objections to this definition. Firstly, if interval (διάστημα) here denotes the temporal rather than spatial interval of movement, then the claim that time is the same as the duration of motion is in fact no different from the claim that time is motion itself, which Plotinus has already refuted.

7 *Τοσήδε μέντοι* (*line 32*)—*τὸ διάστημα ἕξει* (*line 37*)
Secondly, time is not the distance of movement in any spatial sense either. This is because we can only measure distances travelled in space with spatial markers. For example, the distance that a revolution of a heavenly circuit achieves in miles is a spatial and not a temporal determination. This claim therefore confuses time and space.

8 *ἀλλὰ τοῦτο* (*line 37*)—*ἐν χρόνῳ* (*line 53*)

Thirdly, one can posit the quantity of movement not only in spatial terms but also in terms of movement itself, as the sum total of a particular movement (cf. Strato fr. 76, Boethus of Sidon apud Huby 1981, 399, = Anon. *Schol. in Arist. Org*. 20.17–22, 1:45 Waitz). However, time is not the quantity of movement. This is because there are an infinite number of movements (for which reason, movement is a 'multiple'). To call movement, which is a multiple, time, would be akin to calling any particular degree of heat, temperature. This is a mistake because there is no one degree of heat, such as ten, twenty or thirty degrees, which can be defined as temperature itself. Temperature transcends all these degrees of heat and exists separately to the heat which it measures. Similarly, time is not any or all of the quantities of movement, which relentlessly appear and reappear like the waves of the ocean, because then there would be several quantities of time and no constant by which to measure the quantity of movement. Thus, while the quantity of movement belongs to the concept of movement itself, time must transcend this quantification, in the way that the concept of temperature transcends all degrees of heat. Indeed, since movement is a 'multiple' which manifests in the physical universe, it cannot be a uniform or abstract measure of all quantities of physical movement like time can. Therefore, since there are multiple quantities associated with multiple iterations of movement, and time is not a physical quantity, we can claim that time is not the sum total of any particular movement. Furthermore, all three interpretations of the term 'interval of movement'—distance, duration and quantity—are all associated with that which exists over time non-instantaneously. Since they are non-instantaneous and exist within time, they cannot be time itself.

9 *εἰ δὲ* (*line 53*)—*ἔξω τιθέμενος* (*line 62*)

Fourthly and finally, Plotinus rejects the claim that time could be the interval of movement in relation to extension (παράτασις). For extension must either refer to temporal duration, spatial duration, or quantity of movement, which all exist within time (meaning it cannot be identical to time). But the essence of time must transcend that which exists within it. For this reason, if one were to identify time as an interval, it would have to exist on a different ontological level to the interval of motion which exists within it.

10 *καὶ γὰρ αὖ* (*line 63*)—*ἔξωθέν ἐστιν* (*line 69*)

Furthermore, it would be impossible for space to be motion because space also includes both that which is in motion and that which is at rest. For just as the same time passes for the earth (which moves around the sun) as for the sun itself (which stays still), so too does space remain constant while objects are in motion and at rest.

Chapter 9

1 *Ἀριθμός δὲ* (*line 1*)—*σκεπτέον* (*line 2*)

Plotinus now turns to 3.b): Aristotle's definition of time as the number of movement (*Ph.* IV 11, 219b1–2: "for this is what time is: the number of motion in respect of the before and after"; cf. also *Cael* I 9, 275a14–15). He adjusts Aristotle's definition by changing 'number' to 'measure' on the basis that motion is continuous and 'number' suggests that it is finite (according to the critique of Strato, fr. 75: "for he [sc., Strato] does not admit time to be the number of motion, since a number is a discontinuous quantity (διωρισμένον πόσον), while motion and time are continuous (συνεχές), and the continuous is not numerable (τό δὲ συνεχές οὐκ ἀριθμόν)." Cf Alex. Aphrod. *Mund.* A 69).

2 *πρῶτον μὲν* (*line 2*)—*μέτρον ὄντα* (*line 15*)

Plotinus then questions whether it is possible to have a measure for all movement when a.) disordered movement exists and it is not clear how it would be possible to measure something which is disordered and b.) ordered movement exists alongside disordered movement, meaning that we have two types of movement which may require different measures (if it is even possible to measure disordered movement in the first place). Plotinus suggests that two measures are not required for the two types of movement similar to the way in which two numerical systems are not required for counting two different types of animals. Just as you can say that there are ten animals if you see five horses and five cows because they are both types of animal, so you can measure two different types of movement with the same measure on the basis that they are both kinds of movement. However, the discovery that time may measure both ordered and disordered movement alike does not reveal the essence of time but only its function. For time exists independently of the movements it measures similar to the way in which number exists independently of the things (such as horses and cows) that it counts. And therefore we can only discover the essence of time by looking beyond the physical motion which it will end up measuring.

3 *εἰ μὲν* (*line 15*)—*μοναδικοῦ* (*line 17*)

However, if time exists abstractly and independently like number, in what way can we say that it is different from number? (The term μοναδικός here means "consisting of abstract units": see LSJ, s.v.I; and cf. VI.3.13.5–7 and Pl. *Phlb.* 56d4–e3.)

4 *εἰ δὲ* (*line 17*)—*ὅση ἡ κίνησις* (*line 31*)

Plotinus now examines Aristotle's definition of time as the measure of motion (see *Ph.* IV 12, 220b32–221a1, and 221b7), which presents time as a continuous magnitude rather than a numerical multiplicity. Here, Plotinus claims that if time is a measure then it must consist of a certain length, like a ruler (doing the measuring) which is itself of a certain magnitude. Time is thus conceived as a line which runs parallel to movement which measures the movement. But if time existed as a line like this, its length would be determined by the length of the movement. In which case, how could we more plausibly say that time was that which measured movement rather than the other way round (cf. Arist. *Ph.* IV 12, 220b14–18)? For if time is a measurable magnitude, then not only do we revert to 1a) which claims that time is identical to motion; we must also admit that it cannot itself be an independent measure. Plotinus invites us to consider that we may be able to use the measurement of a given magnitude in order to measure time itself (see chapter 12). As Kalligas 2014, 606 notes, Plotinus seems to suggest that time depends upon a person to measure movement with the implication that time is related to human subjectivity rather than being absolute.

5 *ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν* (*line 31*)—*μέτρον γίνεται* (*line 35*)

He who holds that time is a measure of movement which is not uniform will have to show how time can be a measure of so many types of movement at once. On the other hand, proving that time is the measure of ordered movement alone (a difficulty raised by Aristotle in *Ph.* V 4, 228b16–18), as a uniform and single entity, will be easier, since one would only have to demonstrate time measuring a single phenomenon. By analogy, it is easier to demonstrate how something could be a measure of one type of thing like solids rather than two things at once like solids and liquids, which cannot be measured in the same way (since the former possess area whereas the latter has volume).

6 *εἰ δὲ δὴ* (*line 35*)—*ὃ τοσόνδε ἐστίν* (*line 50*)

Plotinus now considers the possibility that time is the magnitude of movement which has been measured (another variation of 3b.), rather than that which measures the movement. However, the question remains as to what actually measures time now that time is assumed to be that which is measured rather than that which does the measuring. Moreover, if time is that which is measured, it is either the magnitude of the movement (reverting to 3a.) which has been measured, or the number which quantifies the magnitude of this measured movement. But if time is the number doing the quantification of the

magnitude, then it is not a continuous measure running alongside time but a definite quantity, and it is not possible for a definite quantity to measure that which is continuous. Furthermore, by conceiving time as a number, we are able only to achieve a glimpse of time in relation to a particular magnitude, as a certain quantity, and this is not time itself but only an interval of time (and thus the numerical conception of time also collapses into 3a.). In order to know the essence of time, we cannot be satisfied with finding out a particular length or interval of time but must instead search for that which possesses such length or magnitude, and this cannot be done by appealing to the concepts of length and magnitude alone.

7 *ἀλλ' ὁ ἀριθμὸς* (*line 51*)—*ἡ δεκάς* (*line 55*)

Here Plotinus investigates the possibility that the essence of time could be an absolute number (cf.9.15–17) which is completely independent from movement but which can nonetheless be used to measure the magnitude of movement. Plotinus may here have in mind the Peripatetics who believed that time could not itself be quantified numerically but could rather be used to quantify and number other things (see Simpl. *In Ph.* 714.32–34; 729.7–15; Philop. *In* Ph. 738.24–32). We are therefore presented with the possibility that the essence of time could be something radically different from its measuring function. For if the essence of time is completely abstract, this would suggest that it transcends the physical world, and therefore that it could exist without the physical motion which it measures (see Strange 1994, 43–37). The view that the essence of time transcends physical motion is supported by Plotinus' characterisation of time as a primordial activity of the desiring human soul (see 11.15–20/43–45/12.19–22) which causes and is thus logically prior to either the physical universe or physical motion (see 11.4–14). We will therefore see that the essence of time is an activity arising in the human soul (while it is still in the intelligible realm) which sets into motion the activity of Soul and the generation of the physical universe (see 11.27–33). Time therefore exists on a higher ontological plane to the physical motion which it measures, similar to the way in which numbers exist on a higher ontological level than the things which they quantify (see VI.6.5). For time remains aloof from sensible objects and sensible motion since it is not itself a physical phenomenon but rather a condition of possibility for phenomena. However, as we will see, although time exists on a different ontological level to the physical universe, it can be measured with the help of regular movement existing within it, which will in turn enable us to measure physical phenomena in general with the use of temporal units.

8 *ἢ οὗτος* (*line 55*)—*ὁ χρόνος* (*line 68*)

If time is the number which measures movement, then it must do so according to the 'before' and 'after'. Plotinus claims that the 'next' and 'after' (and therefore presumably the 'before') in fact begin with the original movement of the human soul as it journeys away from Intellect and eternity, before the generation of the physical universe (11.15–27). There is therefore a primordial sense of sequence before man's soul fully descends into the physical universe which is generated as a result of his restless and desiring nature. However, this primordial sense of sequence is translated into the sequence of 'nows' which exist in relation to the appearances of the physical universe, so that the 'before' and 'after' also come to be associated with physical movement. In fact, in the physical universe, the 'before' and 'after' is created by positing two distinct points in relation to a movement, which then results in a multiplicity of 'nows' (*nun*: cf. Arist. *Ph.* IV 11. 219b12–18). However, Plotinus warns us here that defining time as the 'before' and 'after' is problematic, since recourse to the 'before and after' cannot reveal to us the essence of time itself, but instead point us to that which is spatial and that which is temporal. Firstly, as Aristotle observed, the 'before' (πρότερον) and the 'after' (ὕστερον) primarily signify spatial location (op. cit. 219a14–15). To use the example of Themistius *In Ph.* 145.27–148.2, when we posit the 'before' and 'after' of a runner on a racetrack, we say that the movement of the runner at the starting line was 'before' his movement at the finishing line, which in turn happened 'after' his movement at the starting line. However, the concepts of 'before' and 'after' here embody two spatial points on the racetrack, representing opposite extremities of a particular magnitude of movement. The association of a spatial 'before' and 'after', conceived in terms of a beginning and end of a spatial magnitude, cannot be time for Plotinus, since this would amount to the reduction of time to space, for which reason Plotinus rejects 3.a.) (the identification of time with the interval of the motion of the physical universe; cf. my comments on 8.32–37). The alternative to associating time with a spatial 'before' and 'after' is to identify it with a temporal 'before' and 'after'. In the words of Themistius (ibid.) "when we divide movement and cut it up by 'nows' into many segments, are we doing anything else than speaking of time and of parts of time? For the past and the future of which time consists are nothing else than the before and after of movement, which are always determined by 'nows' and numbered as distinct from one another. Therefore time is identical with the before and after in movement, when these are determined and numbered; and they are determined in no other manner, than when 'nows' impinge upon the soul in twos, one as 'before' and limit of a prior movement, the other as 'after' and limit of a posterior movement, i.e., just as when we conceive of these as extremit-

ies and as different from the middle" and in 150.19–23 Themistius continues, "for the before and after of movement are numbered according to the passage of that which is moving, … and because that which is moving comes to be at one time at the place before, and at another time at the place after, for this reason too there come into being on the one hand the before, and on the other the after, of movement". However, for Plotinus, this identification of time with temporal magnitude is equally untenable as its identification with spatial magnitude. For a temporal magnitude is a 'before' and 'after' which both exists within and is measured by time, meaning that it cannot be identified with time either. Therefore, Plotinus rejects the definition of time as a number which measures according to the 'before' and 'after', for the number arrived at will signify either a spatial or a temporal magnitude and not time itself.

9 *ἔπειτα διὰ τί* (*line 68*)—*τοῦτο λάβοι* (*line 75*)

Since a number can only quantify a magnitude within time, it cannot reveal to us the essence of time. For employing numbers helps us to fulfil time's function, which is to measure movement, but this does not say what time is in and of itself. Therefore, we should be careful not to confuse number with time itself. For saying that number is essential to time itself (when it is in fact only essential to our ability to measure temporal magnitude) would be like saying that without our quantification of a given magnitude, the magnitude would not exist as a definite quantity. On the contrary, time exists before the numerical determination of temporal magnitudes, similar to the way in which magnitudes exist as a definite quantity before we discover this quantity through measurement. The analogy Plotinus uses here is arguably strained given that time transcends the temporal magnitudes which we measure, whereas a given magnitude is the very thing we discover through measurement, with no underlying essence left to be discovered once we determine its quantity. Nevertheless, time and spatial magnitudes exist whether or not we make a numerical determination about temporal magnitudes or those spatial quantities. Therefore, Plotinus here is not rejecting idealistic views of time (*pace* Kalligas 2014, 608) but is rather claiming that we must not confuse our understanding of temporal magnitudes, achieved with the help of numbers, with the essence of time itself. By contrast, time is dependent on the concept of the 'before' and 'after' which he associates both with physical movement and the movement of the human soul as it journeys away from Intellect (see my comments on 7.17–27; 9.55–68). And thus, we must understand that the term 'movement' (κίνησις) here signifies more than physical movement alone (cf. Arist. *Ph.* IV 11, 219a4–6).

10 *ἀπείρου δὲ* (*line 75*)*—πρὶν μετρηθῆναι* (*line 78*)

Time is not a finite magnitude but is rather infinite (ἄπειρος) and therefore cannot be numerically determined. Neither can it be a number since numbers themselves are finite (ὡρισμένος: cf. VI 6.2.1–10 and 17.3; cf. Aristotle, *Ph.* VIII 1. 251b19–26). And thus, we may distinguish time from temporal intervals (which we may refer to as temporality). For time may be conceived, as Themistius claims (*In Ph.* 148.2–6), as an infinite timeline upon which particular intervals of time may be demarcated. This infinite timeline exists whether or not human beings demarcate temporal intervals, but the demarcation of intervals cannot take place without the original timeline. Time therefore exists logically prior to the temporal intervals which are demarcated. However, the view presented here that the essence of time is infinite may be misleading. For, as we will see in 12.15–25, time is produced by the human soul and comes to an end when the desiring activity of the soul stops. Therefore, although time is potentially infinite, according to the potential for the activity of the human soul to continue indefinitely, it is actually finite in the case of each soul which returns to eternity by stopping the original activity which caused him to move away from Intellect and eternity. For this reason, the potentially infinite timeline (upon which temporal intervals can be demarcated) may come to an end at any point, in accordance with the cessation of the desiring activity of man's soul. And thus, Plotinus' conception of time includes both the concepts of the finite and the infinite simultaneously.

11 *διὰ τί δὲ* (*line 78*)*—πρὸς ἔννοιαν χρόνου* (*line 84*)

Plotinus here acknowledges that the key to unlocking the essence of time may well be found by enquiring into the human soul and human subjectivity (as he will explore in detail in chapters 11 and 12). However, he reiterates that we must not think that our measurement of temporal magnitudes brings time into being in any sense. For the existence of time precedes our attempts to try to quantify or measure temporal magnitudes, as do the temporal magnitudes themselves. And therefore, even if we discover that the human soul is required in order to measure time (or the temporal magnitudes which are demarcated within time's infinite nature), this still does not reveal to us that nature, or essence, which we are attempting to measure.

Chapter 10

1 *Τὸ δὲ παρακολούθημα* (*line 1*)—*ἐν χρόνῳ* (*line 8*)

Plotinus now turns to 3c.) which identifies time as an accompaniment of movement. Here Plotinus chooses to interpret the word 'παρακολούθημα' in terms of temporal rather than logical association even though he is aware that the word may also have a non-temporal meaning (see for example VI.3.2.6 and VI.6.4.3). This may be because he wishes to introduce time as a kind of logical concomitant to the movement of the soul in chapter 11 (see particularly 11.15–20 and 43–45). Here however, he claims that if time were an (temporal) accompaniment of movement, it would either accompany movement a.) at the same time as the movement, b.) before movement had begun or c.) after it had finished. However, in all three cases, the accompaniment of movement is conceived as existing temporally since it exists at the same time as, at a time before, or at a time after movement. Therefore, such an accompaniment of movement exists in time no matter what relationship it has with movement. This being the case, time cannot be such an accompaniment of movement.

2 *Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ* (*line 9*)—*τὸν χρόνον εἶναι* (*line 17*)

Plotinus now claims that the arguments he has levelled against 3b.) suffice to disprove the qualified claim that time is the measure of the movement of the universe (which appears in Alexander of Aphrodisias *De temp*. § 10; cf. Sharples 1982b, 69–70). This definition of time also appears in a fragment which Huby 1981, 398 ff. attributes to Boethius of Sidon (Anon. *Schol. in Arist. Organon* 21.14–18 Waitz): "Hence in measuring circular motion-which is the first and foremost of all motions-according to itself, time also measures the others, so that time will be the number of circular motion both as numbering and as numbered, while of the remaining motions only as numbering, but not also as numbered". Having raised his objections to numerous accounts of time in chapters 8 and 9, Plotinus now suggests that we must shift our focus away from what time is not towards what time is (which we shall discover in the following chapters). He points out the importance of attempting to understand the problem of time directly by claiming that we must not only engage in a historical study of the views of previous philosophers, but should also carry out our own philosophical enquiry (since we can study philosophical works either "for the sake of philosophy or of general knowledge" [φιλοσοφίας ἢ ἱστορίας ἕνεκα]: see Albinus *Is*. 5, 149.28–29 and Sen. *Ep*. 108.6; cf.1.13–16 and 7.10–17). This is especially important now that the ancient accounts have failed to define the essence of time. We must therefore turn away from the accounts of other philosophers in order to find out for ourselves what time really is.

Chapter 11

1 *Δεῖ δὴ* (*line 1*)—*ἓν ἑστῶσαν* (*line 4*)

Plotinus returns to the subject of eternity here, reminding us of his original plan to set out an account of time in relation to its archetype (cf. 1.16–20; 7.12–13). The secret of time is thus hidden in eternity and can only be unlocked by enquiring into the eternal nature which time imitates: a nature which is ἀκλινής, or 'unswerving' (a term found in Parmenides Fr B8.4–6 DK; cf. II.2.2.1–4, II.9.2.3, VI.8.9.32–33 and Plut. *De E ap. Delph*. 393a). However, Plotinus claims that we must not only return to the subject of eternity but, more precisely, to the disposition within us which exists in eternity. This 'disposition' has already been identified as the 'natural power which never fails' (5.7–12) or the higher part of the human soul which rests in the intelligible realm (see IV.2.1.1–7 and V.1.10.13–18) and contemplates Intellect and eternity. Plotinus therefore sets out the recognition of the simplicity and silence of eternity as the necessary condition for a meaningful investigation into the nature of time. This requires a shift from rational to supra-rational contemplation since our aim is not only to gain a conceptual understanding of eternity but to recognise our identity with it so that we may then dwell in it (6.8–12). This willingness to take a leap of faith and go deeply into the stillness of Being will then prepare us for the discovery of the origin and nature of time.

2 *Χρόνος δὲ* (*line 4*)—*τοῦ ὑστέρου* (*line 6*)

According to Plotinus, time at one stage did not *yet* exist. This seems to imply that eternity existed before time came into being. But we know that Plotinus cannot mean this because he insists that eternity cannot be associated with the concepts of the 'before' and 'after' on the grounds that they are temporal notions (cf. 6.43–50, 10.1–8; Arist. *Metaph*. Λ 6, 1071b8–9). Therefore, in order to understand Plotinus' statement, we must once again distinguish between temporal and logical priority. Indeed, in the hierarchy of reality, eternity exists at the loftiest height below the One (see 6.1–12; V.3.13.1–6) and is thus logically prior to time, which in turn exists as its image. However, eternity could in no way be temporally prior to time since anything claiming to be prior to time already exists within it: as Plotinus has already stated, the 'before' is a temporal concept. Therefore, we must assume that Plotinus' employment of the word 'οὔπω', meaning 'not yet', is another example of his using tensed language to describe a non-temporal reality (cf. 6.21–36 with my comments). Indeed, just as the claim that eternity 'always' exists could mislead someone into thinking that eternity is a temporal phenomenon, so claiming that time did not exist 'yet' in the eternal realm could lead to the assumption that eternity existed before

time and thus within time. We must therefore view the 'yet' here as demarcating two points on the ontological scale of reality, with eternity existing on the level of Being and Intellect and time existing on the level of Soul (cf. 11.43–56). From the point of view of the journey of the human soul, Plotinus' claim that time did (or rather does) not exist for the intelligible beings suggests that time does not exist absolutely but only for those who choose to descend into a lower level of reality. This descent is caused by the desire of human souls for something more than the present state, namely an 'after' which can replace the present (see also 11.20–27). The origin of time can therefore be located in eternity, rather than in time, since this is where the human soul attempts to enter into an exciting narrative.

3 *Τούτων δὴ* (*line 6*)—*ὧδέ πως* (*line 11*)

Plotinus here invokes the Muses, who represent the music of the spheres (cf. *VP* 22.16–17; Plut. *Quaest. conu.* IX 14.4, 745b and 14.6, 746a) and which therefore only come into existence after time does. This invocation, along with the personification of time, lends dramatic character to the passage which has the effect of making the reader feel that he is privy to divine revelation and knowledge (cf. Kalligas 2014, 450–451 on III.2.3.20 and Ferwerda 1990, 204–206). The dramatic character of the passage is further intensified by Plotinus' use of the word ἐξέπεσε in describing the 'falling off' of time, as the term refers back both to Homer's 'ἔμπεσε' in his description of the setting alight of the ships of the Achaeans by the Trojans (*Iliad* 16.113) and to Plato's description of the equally disastrous sedition which caused the overthrow of a harmonious government (see *Resp*. 545d8–e1). Therefore, through dramatisation, as well as the employment of the term ἐξέπεσε in reference to Homer and Plato, Plotinus is able to emphasise the calamitous nature of time's coming into being, which stands in stark contrast to his description of the peaceful and still atmosphere of eternity in 11.1–4.

4 *ὡς πρότερον* (*line 12*)—*ἡσυχίαν ἦγε* (*line 14*)

As the image of eternity, time can trace back its existence to eternity, since it carries the stamp of eternity within its own nature. Indeed, the roots of time can be found in eternity itself, since until it goes astray by venturing out beyond eternity, it exists in fullness and presence. Thus, time is aware both of its lesser existence and its undiminished nature as pure Being at the point of source, where there is no 'before' or 'after' (see also 3.20–36 and 4.12–28). At this source, time is not yet time at all but instead remains still and quiet as eternity. And thus, even though Plotinus agrees with Aristotle in saying that "there can be no before and after if there is no time" (*Metaph*. Λ 6, 1071b8–9; cf. Alex. Aphrod.

Mund. A 68–69), he once again uses tensed language, in this case employing the word 'before' to describe the experience of presence without temporal extension (reminding us of his use of the words 'always' and 'yet' in 6.21–36 and 11.4–6 respectively, which also refer to supra-temporal existence). Once again, Plotinus' use of temporal language to convey logical priority may remind us of the way in which myths describe eternal realities in a temporal context in order to communicate their causal relationship (cf. my comments on 6.21–24; III 5.9.24–29).

5 ***Φύσεως δὲ* (*line 15*)*—εἰργάσμεθα* (*line 20*)**

On the one hand, the undescended part of the soul remains eternal by resting in the seat of Being and not seeking anything outside of the present, such as the past or the future (see for example, IV.3.25.13–31). On the other hand, the part of the soul that descends into time itself creates time by making the choice to be autonomous (see also IV 8.5.26 and V 1.1.3–5); and thus, rather than existing with eternity and the intelligible realities in a state of acceptance and surrender, it makes the choice to set out on its own. Man's journey therefore involves the movement away from eternal unity with the other intelligible realities to the aloneness and alienation of the fragmented image of this divinity, which is time. This is an attractive option for the person who wishes to gain that which eternity cannot offer, which is the possibility of better things in the future. However, Plotinus signals that man is mistaken to believe that this choice will lead to fulfilment in time, by using the word πολυπραγμόνησις (cf. III 2.1.42–44 and VI 3.23.4), signifying the restless activity of the soul. For as Kalligas 2014, 611 notes, πολυπραγμόνησις is a concept similar both to *curiositas* (which contributed to the demise of Lucius and Psyche in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*), and to περιεργία, the 'meddling' which leads to the destruction of the soul in Plutarch, *De Is. et Os.* 352b, and the Hermetic *Korē Kosmou* = *CH Exe.* XXIII 14 (cf. Festugière 1944–1954, 3:83–85; Lancel 1961, 31–37 and Baladi 1970, 11–12). Thus, the decision of the human soul to seek happiness in the future is a calamitous one: for as we learn in I.5.6, time is not able to bring about an increase in well-being since fulfilment necessarily exists in the present and not in the past or the future. We therefore hold the view that Plotinus is here presenting a journey of the human soul rather than that of the hypostasis of Soul (in agreement with Armstrong 1966–1988, vol. III, 338, n. 1; Smith 1996, 209 and Baracat Jr, 2013, 32–33; and *pace* Beierwaltes 1967, 238–239, Rist 1983, 137–138 and Kalligas 2014, 612), and reject the view most recently supported by Gerson et al. that Plotinus' claim that 'we produced time as an image of eternity' (αἰῶνος εἰκόνα τὸν χρόνον εἰργάσμεθα) refers to the position of the Platonist school rather than the actual production of time by human souls.

For Plotinus claims that that 'which made (human) souls forget their father God and be ignorant of themselves and him … was audacity and coming to birth and the first otherness and the wishing to belong to themselves' (V.1.1.1–5) which indicates that the urge to 'govern itself and be by itself' is an attribute not only of the hypostasis of Soul but also of the human soul as it shifts its attention away from Intellect and eternity. Elsewhere, Plotinus reminds us that the human soul is not only a passive recipient of the activity of the hypostases but is also a 'cause which initiates activity' (III.1.8.4–8); an activity which signifies the shift from 'the contemplation of real being' (Ibid.) to that of its concomitant, namely 'this (sensory) world' (IV.8.7.17–24). Our interpretation therefore emphasises Plotinus' belief in the active and causal nature of the human soul as it turns its attention away from the intelligible world. And thus, we believe that in 11.27, Plotinus begins to describe a parallel process on the level of Soul, which creates time only as a consequence of the original activity of the human soul. The desire of the human soul to embark on a journey away from Intellect is still inextricably connected to the movement of the hypostasis of Soul: as Armstrong acknowledges, 'we are souls, part of universal soul and already present as it moves out from eternity' (cf. IV.3.2.1–5 and IV.3.6.4–8).

6 *ἐπεὶ γὰρ* (*line 20*)—*πρόεισιν* (*line 27*)

The power of the human soul to journey into time may be compared to the power of a seed to grow into a tree. In both cases, what is gained in extension (temporally for the soul and spatially for the seed) is lost in unity (see 2.31–34). Indeed, in the case of the human soul, that which is gained through representation in time comes at the cost of the pure presence of Being, eternity and Intellect (see also II.5.5.1–7 and IV.7.13.1–12; cf. Trouillard 1961, 131 and Simons 1985, 60–61, 72–73). The grandeur attained is only apparent, since real grandeur exists in unity and simplicity and not in extension and the acquisition of experience. Indeed, that which is extended is necessarily weaker than that which is not extended, since that which is extended exists only as a part which is subject to generation and destruction, rather than as a whole which is eternal and impervious to alteration (see 6.47–54). However, extension in time and space is not only a digression from eternity but an imitation of its Being: for by attempting to become greater the human soul goes from a state of timeless presence, to one of continual searching for more and more present moments which are identified as the 'next' and the 'after'. By searching in this way, the soul continually misses its eternal target (see again 4.29–31), since identity with Being cannot occur through movement towards a goal in time, but only by resting in the stillness of presence.

7 *οὕτω δὴ* (*line 27*)—*περιλαβοῦσα* (*line 33*)

Similarly, the Soul attempts to acquire being by moving in a circular motion in what Plotinus calls a desire for Being (see also 4.28–33 and IV.4.16.23–31). Its movement is more harmonious and beautiful than other kinds of movement by virtue of being circular (see II.1.8.15–19) but still falls short of the standard of Intellect. For Soul's movement in time can only imitate the procession of Intellect from the One, which is eternal (see II.2.3.20, II.4.5.25–28 and III.8.8.32–38). Therefore, the cause of time is the very attempt by both the human soul and the hypostasis of Soul to become more powerful through extension into that which does not yet exist (in the future). The sensible universe and human souls exist within the hypostasis of Soul and subsequently receive time from Soul since Soul moves into time and then endows the sensible universe and human souls with temporality: see IV.3.9.29–36 and IV.4.15.10–20. Here we find an example of a nuanced divergence from Plato, who claimed that the creation of time and the heavenly bodies happened simultaneously (*Ti.* 37d5–e3). For Plotinus believes that the essence of time is logically prior to its manifestation in the physical universe, since the former is the psychical cause of the latter, which is natural (cf. Simplicius *In Ph.* 792.11–16 on this distinction). This is why he claims that psychical time comes first (11.29: πρῶτον) and only then (11.31: ἔπειτα) enters into the sensible universe to fulfill its ordering function. We therefore agree with Manchester 1978, 129–130 (*pace* Kalligas 2014, 613) that there are two kinds of time: we call the former kind of time, which arises as a desiring motion of the human soul and hypostasis of Soul, 'psychological time' or the essence of time. On the other hand, we call the latter kind of time, which is the exoteric product of psychological time and Soul, 'mechanical time'. For we argue that such a distinction is necessary for explaining why Plotinus claims in 12.4–22 that we can return to eternity in our present embodied state. There Plotinus states that if we were able to stop the desiring activity of our soul, then time would be destroyed and we would return to eternity (19–22). According to the belief that Plotinus does not distinguish between kinds of time, we would have to choose between two equally unlikely interpretations of 12.19–22: one alternative is that man's return to eternity would necessitate his physical death since the physical body cannot exist without time and Plotinus claims that the return to eternity means the end of time. The other alternative is that Plotinus is conducting a thought experiment and does not really believe that we can return to eternity. But this approach would seem to contradict his suggestion that we must attempt to achieve this very goal in 11.1–4. By presupposing two kinds of time, on the other hand, we can claim that we can escape from psychological time while remaining in an embodied state in mechanical time (see my comments on 12.4–22).

8 *ἐν ἐκείνῃ γὰρ* (*line 33*)*—δοκοῖ τι λέγειν* (*line 45*)

Moreover, Plotinus claims that the sensible universe moves in the time of Soul (οὐ γάρ τις αὐτοῦ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς τόπος ἢ ψυχή). Therefore, whereas Soul is associated with the essence of time as its co-creator, the sensible universe is a product of time, so that its connection to the essence of time exists only through the human soul and the hypostasis of Soul. As a conduit to the essence of time, the discursive reasoning of Soul is one of succession rather than simultaneity: cf. I.8.2.9–19, III 9.1.34–37, IV.4.1.11–16, V.3–17.21–29, VI.9.5.8–10; Beierwaltes 1967, 57–58; Blumenthal 1971a, 107; and Porph. *Sent.* 44, 50.10–22. See also Max. Tyr. XI 9, 139.14–17: "Whereas the divine intellect, like the sun beating down, has sight of every place on earth at once, the human intellect is like the sun in its progress, passing at different times over the different parts of the whole." This in turn means that all events exist in time since succession implies a before and after, and that which exists before or after anything else is temporally situated (see also 12.4–13). Since the life of Soul manifests itself through successive events, the continuation of the life of Soul itself is also temporal. Finally, Plotinus claims that time is the life of soul (here he refers to the human soul rather than the hypostasis of soul). Here we penetrate into the essence of time: for the essence of time is not something existing externally to man but is rather embedded in his subjective experience as the mode in which all things in Soul appear to him. As Kalligas 2014, 614 notes, Plotinus' approach to time here bears similarities with that of Immanuel Kant who claimed: "Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state" (see Kant 1998, 180 [A 33 = B 49]). See also Sorabji 1983, 138–139.

9 *εἰ γὰρ αἰών* (*line 45*)*—τὸ ἐκείνου μιμήσεται* (*line 59*)

Having linked the life of Soul to time on the basis of Soul's production of succession, Plotinus now defines time as the life of Soul coming to achieve this succession as it goes from one event to another. He reminds us that time is associated with a motion of succession, in contrast to the motion of the Intellect which exists in simultaneity (see 4.28–31 and 11.27–28 and IV.4.1.11–16). Furthermore, we are reminded that time is the image of eternity (cf. Pl. *Ti.* 37d5–7; *Soph.* 235d6–236b), which in turn is described as unchanging and identical (cf.3.15–23; Pl. *Phd.* 78d2). Indeed, time can be understood as the image of eternity insofar as it exists as a mode of experience below eternity which permits human beings to experience the realm of Soul. And since time exists primarily in relation to Soul, it could be said to be the image of eternity similarly to the way in which Soul is described as the ghostly image of Intellect (V.1.6.46–49). For it is through the perpetual motion of time that Soul seeks to achieve the eternal full-

ness of Being which Intellect possesses (see 4.20–22/24–37). Similarly, time's uninterrupted perpetuity (see 8.35–36) can be ascribed to its attempt to close the gap between distances in order to achieve the unity which eternity possesses by virtue of never having created a 'before' and 'after' which separates objects and events (3.34–38). Finally, by coming into being, time attempts to achieve in parts, through infinite extension, what eternity possesses by already existing as a whole (2.17–19, 3.15–19, 4.37–43 and 6.47–50). Thus, time is a state of alienation from Being which results from the attempt to progress towards the future instead of remaining in the present (cf. 4.24–28, 11.11–14 and Gloy 1989, 317–318). Furthermore, whereas eternity recognises itself as Being and is willing to rest in it (see also 3.23/34–36, 5.21 and 6.6–8) time continually seeks something more than Being and subsequently moves away from it (see 11.15–33).

10 *δεῖ δὲ* (*line 59*)—*ὁ αἰών* (*line 62*)

Just as eternity is the life of Being and Intellect (3.7–15/36–38, 5.19–22/25–28, 6.6–12/17–21/47–50, 11.1–4/45–46), so time is the life of Soul (11.35–56, 12.1–12/20–22, 13.23–30). As the life of Soul, time is not a temporal accompaniment of Soul, just as it is not a temporal accompaniment of physical motion (as we saw in 10.1–8). Rather, it exists as a logical concomitant of the desire of Soul to move away from Intellect, which then produces temporality. Furthermore, whereas eternity and Intellect are the subjective and objective manifestations of Being, respectively, time and Soul are the subjective and objective manifestations of the journey away from Being. By journeying away from Being (4.19–24/28–31, 11.15–33), time can only represent eternity and, as a result, become its image (1.19–20, 11.20/29/46–47/54). Thus, just as eternity is the life of Being and Intellect, or the desireless state of subjectivity which corresponds to unchanging presence, so time is the life of Soul, or the desiring state of subjectivity relating to the succession of the 'before' and 'after'.

Chapter 12

1 *Νοῆσαι δὲ* (*line 1*)—*τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔχον* (*line 4*)

Time progresses quietly because we do not notice it, since it is the uniform and uninterrupted activity of the Soul. Thus, whereas movement is perceptible, since it has several iterations which come and go and vary in speed and length, time recedes from our attention by existing as the constant phenomenon behind that which captures our attention by constantly changing.

2 *εἰ δὴ πάλιν* (*line 4*)—*τὸν χρόνον γεννᾷ* (*line 22*)

Plotinus now provides us with a spiritual exercise aimed at helping us to fully experience the divine unity of eternity (which may ultimately derive from the myth in Plato's *Statesman*: cf. 272d6–273a4 and Num. fr. 12.17–22). We must imagine that we are turning the descended part of our soul (and not the hypostasis of Soul, as Kalligas suggests in 2014, 615–616; cf. my comments on 11.15–20) which helps to produce time and the things which come along with it, towards eternity, so that this part of our soul becomes inactive and still. While doing this exercise, we refuse to seek happiness and meaning in time and become inwardly still and quiet. Although motion continues around us, we now connect to a part of ourselves which is not in time but rather witnessing the world of motion from a place of stillness, which accompanies Being. We thus enter into eternity, which is the realm of pure subjectivity, since in this state, one's attention is no longer directed either to worldly activity, a memory of the past, or any expectation or desire in the future. Instead, attention is redirected back to itself and rests in the unity of the realm of experience which seeks nothing and therefore lacks nothing. Thus, by imagining ourselves turning this descended soul back to eternity, we shift our attention and identification from the descended part of our soul which is concerned with movement, time and the acquisition of being, to the undescended part of ourselves which is resting in Being and exists eternally, impervious to alteration, generation or destruction. One may be puzzled by Plotinus' claim that we can turn back the lower part of the soul, since some passages (such as IV.8.8.1–13, III.4.3.18–27 and V.1.10.13–18) suggest a strict and unalterable dualism within the soul such that the lower part of the soul has no communication with the intelligible realities. This in turn would mean that the road to enlightenment has nothing to do with any activity or orientation of the lower part of the soul, since the lower part of the soul, which is called 'lower' because it enters into a body which is divisible (IV.3.19.1–8), is necessarily precluded from the realm of intelligible being which is indivisible and whole. Since a body cannot exist without a soul (IV.3.9.29–36), one might think that this lower soul is destined to remain so until the death of the body. Other passages such as IV.8.3.21–31, however, are comparable to this passage in suggesting that the lower part of the soul can ascend to the intelligible realm and return to its pure and indivisible nature. It is possible to reconcile this apparent contradiction by observing the different stages of the journey of the human soul. At first, when the human soul desires something more than its present state (11.15–20), one part of it enters into a state of distension in time and space while the other remains still in the intelligible realm (at which point the higher and lower parts can be distinguished). However, when man puts a halt to his desiring consciousness and his attention returns

to a pure state of stillness, he destroys the cause of his embodiment, and thus the lower part of the soul, while still being divided until the death of the body, recognises its original identity with its higher part and returns to eternity and Intellect. By turning one's attention back to eternity, one can thereby 'escape to the upper world' and avoid further incarnations (see III.4.2.12–15 and VI.7.7.17–23. Plotinus' belief in the possibility of avoiding reincarnation explains *VP* 1.1–2, in which Porphyry claims that Plotinus seemed ashamed of having a body). The duration of time between man's cessation of his desiring state and his total identification with the higher part of the soul in the intelligible realm signifies the level of activity of the desiring soul: if the desire is strong and persistent, this ascent will take longer than it will for a soul with weaker desire. Either way, after the death of the body, the non-desiring subjectivity of man ensures that he remains in a state of formless unity and timelessness in the realm of Intellect. The fact that time vanishes when the soul enters this non-desiring state is ample proof for Plotinus that soul first generates time through desire.

3 *διὸ καὶ εἴρηται* (*line 22*)—*ὁ δὲ ἐν χρόνῳ* (*line 25*)

Both time and the sensible universe arise simultaneously through the desiring activity both of the Soul and individual human souls (11.20–30). However, while they arise and dissolve simultaneously (see also Pl. *Ti.* 38b6–7), the universe can be said to exist within time (see also 11.31–35 and IV.4.15.15–20). This is because time is the desiring mode in which the human soul is able to experience the physical universe, whereas the sensible universe is the objective manifestation arising out of this desiring mode. And thus the production of time is logically prior to that of the physical universe, since time, as a subjective mode, provides the condition of possibility for the physical universe and not vice versa. However, since man experiences sensible objects and the sensible universe as soon as he enters into this subjective mode, one can say that both time and the universe arise simultaneously.

4 *εἰ δέ τις λέγοι* (*line 25*)—*τοῦ χρόνου* (*line 36*)

Although Plato appears to identify the heavenly circuits with time in *Ti.* 39d1, Plotinus employs different parts of the *Timaeus* (38B6, 38C6, 39B2) and *Epinomis* 978D1–6 to support his claim that the movement of the stars and the heavenly circuits are not themselves time but rather the means of measuring it, similar to the way in which the alternating sequence of day and night gives us the concept of the number two (cf. *Ti.* 39b6–c1, 47a4–6; and [Pl.] *Epin.* 978d1–4). Indeed, since time is the state of desiring subjectivity, it is immeasurable because it has no extension in and of itself but only produces extension by

means of the before and after (see 11.11–20) and the physical universe at large (see 11.27–30). For this reason, time cannot be measured directly but only indirectly through the sensible world which accompanies it. This can be done by selecting things which have an (apparently) regular interval such as two sunrises and then by using this interval to measure this elusive and non-physical phenomenon called time (see also 12.12–19). Thus, the indivisible and ungraspable subjective state called time is measured through the divisible, quantifiable and objective universe which both appears with and exists within it.

5 *οὐ γὰρ* (*line 37*)—*καὶ μὴ μέτρον* (*line 40*)

Plotinus once again rejects Aristotle's definition of time as the measure of motion (in *Ph.* IV 12, 220b32–221a1, and 221b7; cf. my comments on 9.17–31). For he claims here that it makes no sense to define time as a measure (or for time to define itself as such, to continue the theme of personification we encountered in 11.11) because it does not have determinate extension. This is why it 'will not be torn apart' as we see in 13.67–68; why it is invisible and ungraspable (see my comments on 25–36 above); and why we cannot perceive it as a fixed standard by which to quantify anything else. Instead, time is the very thing which is in question and therefore that which we attempt to measure rather than to use as a measure.

6 *ἡ οὖν κίνησις* (*line 40*)—*τῆς δηλώσεως* (*line 49*)

Time measures movement incidentally because the regular, observable intervals of movement which we use to measure time yield temporal units which can then be used in the measurement of all other movement. For example, once the earth's orbit round the sun is used to define what a year is, we then say that this recurring orbit takes a year to complete and can also measure other intervals of motion relative to that temporal unit (for example, by saying that each season lasts roughly one quarter of the year). And thus we can use temporal units (such as the orbit of the earth or the Great Year: cf. 8.8–14) to measure all other kinds of movement. Since we cannot measure movement without first measuring time with the help of the heavenly bodies, we cannot say that time is the direct measure of movement but only that it incidentally measures movement (cf. Matter 1964, 198–199). For since time is indivisible and ungraspable, we need to turn to an observable and repetitive interval of movement in the sensible world before we can then go on to measure other kinds of movement using temporal units. Therefore, in the words of Kalligas 2014, 617, the movement of the planets acts as a kind of cosmic clock: for while the movement is not itself time (*pace* Guthrie 1962–1981, 5:299–300), it makes time manifest and enables us to measure it.

7 *τὸ οὖν μετρούμενον* (*line 49*)—*κατὰ συμβεβηκός* (*line 55*)

The heavenly circuit therefore does not produce but rather measures time by being the regular and recurrent interval or limited motion by which we are able to say that time has passed. After we create temporal units in accordance with this instance of limited motion, we are then able to measure all instances of motion according to these units (thus, having measured the revolution of the earth on its own axis with respect to the Sun, we say that it is a day long, and can then measure all things as being equal to, more than or less than a day in duration). Therefore, time only becomes the measure of motion by proxy, since it is the limited motion and not time itself which enables us to create the temporal units which end up measuring motion. Furthermore, time must be different from the limited motion itself because it is abstract and unlimited, whereas the limited motion is observable and contingent. For which reason, time is not only an incidental measure but is also measured incidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), since once measured, it is shown to transcend the contingent nature of the limited motion doing the measuring. Thus, having defined a day as the regular interval of the earth revolving on its own axis with respect to the sun, the temporal unit of a day represents a certain quantity of time which exists separately from the specific and limited motion of the earth. This shows that time is indeed different from the limited motion by which it both measures and is measured.

8 *καὶ οὕτως ἄν* (*line 55*)—*ὅσος ὁ τόπος*(*line 61*)

Plotinus here uses spatial examples from Aristotle *Ph.* IV 12. 221a2–4 in an attempt to clarify what he has just said. He first compares defining time as a temporal interval to identifying a particular length (such as a cubit) with the concept of length itself. For similar to the way in which a cubit is a certain length but not the concept of length itself, so a temporal interval (for example, a year) pertains to time without itself being time. Similarly, to define time as a specific temporal interval is like saying that that movement is a certain distance in space (like a mile). For just as one can never arrive at the concept of movement from the concept of space alone, so we will never arrive at an understanding of time simply by observing temporal intervals. We must instead endeavour to define time and movement so that we know what it means for something to be a temporal interval or to have traversed a certain distance.

Chapter 13

1 *Χρόνον οὖν* (*line 1*)—*καὶ ταῦτα ἐνηλλαγμένως* (*line 13*)

Plotinus reiterates that the heavenly circuit and motion in general exist within time (cf. 11.31–35 and 12.25), but that time does not in turn exist within these things since it exists on a higher ontological level, being the activity of Soul which produces the condition of possibility for succession and becoming through the 'before' and 'after' (11.11–20). However, although time does not exist within the heavenly circuit, its existence is revealed through the heavenly circuit because the regular and ordered movement of the heavenly circuit mimics the uniform and uninterrupted progression of the passage of time (see 8.35–36). Indeed, although many things which exist in time are at rest at any given moment, and could also reveal the existence of time, it is easier both to become acquainted with time and to keep track of it by observing something in motion than at rest (cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* X 18), since that which is in motion moves forward in imitation of time's extension, whereas that which is at rest copies the unchanging and still nature of the intelligible realm (cf. 7.20–22 and 11.11–14). And this is why it is movement, and not rest, which measures time, as we have already seen (see above my comments on 12.25–36). Furthermore, due to the elusive nature of time and the compelling nature of movement, it is easy to make the same mistake as the Peripatetics and confuse the function of time with that of motion: for in fact, time is not primarily that which measures motion but that which is measured by motion (cf. Callahan 1979, 141).

2 *ἀλλ' ἴσως* (*line 13*)—*γράφοντες* (*line 18*)

Plotinus gives the benefit of the doubt to those, such as Aristotle, who claim that time is a measure by suggesting that they could mean that time is that which is measured rather than that which measures. Here Plotinus may be thinking of passages such as *Ph.* IV 12, 220b14–16: "not only do we measure motion by time, but also time by motion". In this case, the object measured is the measure, and the subject doing the measuring is the noun at the end of the clause (e.g. "the line is the measure of the ruler"). Plotinus claims that we should not blame his predecessors for their lack of clarity because their writings were intended for students who already knew which interpretation was correct from their lectures. However, it is possible that Plotinus' position on the ambiguity of his predecessors' claim signals the desire to soften the blow of his reversal of their conclusion rather than genuine puzzlement as to what they were trying to argue.

3 *ὁ μέντοι* (*line 18*)—*ἐργάζεται* (*line 28*)

Plotinus' account of time falls more closely in line with that of Plato than any of his other predecessors since in *Ti.* 39b2 Plato seems to imply that the creation of the movement of the heavenly bodies helps to reveal the nature of time through number. However, Plotinus goes one step further than Plato by claiming that time is directly measured by the heavenly circuit. Furthermore, Plotinus directly follows in Plato's footsteps by identifying time as the image of eternity (borrowing from *Ti.* 37d5 and 38b8) and by reiterating that the sensible universe and time both come into existence simultaneously (see 12.22–25).

4 *ἐπιστραφείσης οὖν* (*line 28*)—*οὐκ ἔχων* (*line 30*)

Furthermore, Plotinus restates his belief that just as the sensible universe and time come into being together, so they dissolve together when the desiring activity of the human soul finally stops (cf. my comments on 12.4–22). For while it may be impossible for the life of Soul itself to return to unity, Plotinus suggests human beings are able to achieve this reversion by trading the life of desire for that of stillness and presence (cf. 11.1–5).

5 *εἰ δέ τις* (*line 30*)—*τὴν μετάβασιν αὐτῶν* (*line 40*)

Plotinus argues that we cannot abstract the 'before' and 'after' of time (which is discussed in 9.55–68 and 11.35–45) from Soul because the 'before' and 'after' of Soul is the condition of possibility for the 'before' and 'after' of time. Indeed, the hypostasis of Soul constructs time with the help of the human soul by unfolding from presence (11.15–27) and the germination of this unfolding is logically prior to the succession of events in the sensible universe which time presides over. However, since Plotinus claims that time is not itself temporal because it encompasses that which is temporal (IV.4.15.18–20), we may be able to identify the 'before' and 'after' of Soul as the psychical 'before' and 'after' of the essence of time before it is perceived in relation to sensible objects and events (cf. IV.4.16.1–16; Beierwaltes 1967, 285; and Smith 1996, 211). Thus, Plotinus wishes us to trace back the 'before' and 'after' of the physical universe to that of Soul so that we recognise that physical temporal succession has its roots in the kind of succession which is the essence of time, namely the movement of Soul away from eternal Being (cf. Smith 1998, 337–340). Indeed, the point at which Soul departs from Being signifies the birth of desire for physical existence, and this 'before' and 'after' is not yet temporal, although our language makes it seem like that (reminding us of 6.21–36 and 11.4–6 where Plotinus uses tensed language to describe non-temporal reality). Instead, its 'before' and 'after' is a split in subjectivity from its non-

desiring state of unified contemplation to a reaching out to something other than itself, which results in the creation of temporality and the sensible universe.

6 *διὰ τί οὖν* (*line 41*)—*αὐτῆς ἔχει* (*line 47*)

The imperceptible movement of the hypostasis of Soul (12.30–31) begets time and the movement of the sensible universe and at the same time enslaves itself in time (see 11.27–33). On the other hand, the movement of the human soul, which is the original cause of time, is inherently atemporal, and is therefore logically prior to both Soul and time (11.15–27). For the human soul retains a part which abides in eternity (the undescended soul) while having a part (the descended soul) which falls by becoming fixated through its 'restless nature' and 'unquiet power' by progression and extension (cf also my comments on 12.4–22). Thus, the movement of the human soul arises in eternity and produces time, whereas the movement of Soul falls into temporality. Soul itself, however, as a hypostasis abstracted from its movement, possesses an atemporal nature (cf. IV 4.15.12–13).

7 *πῶς οὖν* (*line 47*)—*ἡμῶν μέρους* (*line 49*)

Since the life of Soul is time (11.43–45), the universe which Soul produces is temporal (12.24–25). Since the universe is contained within the prior principle of Soul, there is no part of the universe which exists outside of Soul and therefore no aspect of it which exists outside of time (11.27–33). Therefore, just as the soul is omnipresent in the human being (IV.9.1.1–4), so Soul and its temporal activity are ubiquitous in the sensible universe (see V.1.2.30–40 and VI.4.1.1–8).

8 *εἰ δέ τις* (*line 49*)—*τρόπος λόγων* (*line 53*)

Therefore, time neither exists in anything unreal (since Soul is real), nor is it itself unreal. For one cannot at the same time affirm the 'was' and 'will be' of the body and soul (as Plotinus does: see IV.7.1.20–22 and IV.4.15.10–17 respectively) while denying the existence of that by which the 'was' and 'will be' are produced. Thus Plotinus goes against those, such as the Peripatetic Critolaus (fr.14), who claim that time is simply "a concept or measure, not something subsistent (οὐκ ὑπόστασιν)"; see also Glucker 1994, 20–23. Furthermore, such a view may also amount to an evasion of our own responsibility to recognise our natural resting place in the eternal seat of Being (11.17–20). For if we do not believe we are in time in any way, there is no reason to attempt to lead ourselves back to eternity in the way that Plotinus suggests in 11.1–4 and 12.4–22.

9 *ἐκεῖνο δὲ* (*line 53*)—*τὰ ἴσα διειστήκει* (*line 62*)

The movement of the human body corresponds to and is caused by the psychical movement of the human soul. For each instance of man's physical movement embodies a particular interval of his soul as he progresses towards the 'next' and the 'after' (11.15–20). The relationship between the human soul and the human body is therefore analogous to that of Soul and the sensible universe: for in both cases the movement of the former produces and dictates the extent of the movement of the latter (see above my comments on 13.30–40) with the logical consequence that the movement of the latter manifests that of the former (see also my comments on 12.22–36). Furthermore, the original, psychical motion of the human soul is not chaotic and random but is rather 'separated out equally', proceeding in a regular and ordered sequence. This is because, like the hypostasis of Soul, the human soul moves 'with a motion not belonging to that eternal world but which resembles that motion and wishes to be an image of it' (11.27–33). The original movement of the human soul therefore exists on a higher ontological level than the physical motion it begets in the human body, since the movement of the human soul constitutes the essence of time, whereas physical motion exists only within time.

10 *τὴν οὖν κίνησιν* (*line 62*)—*τοῦ παντός ὡσαύτως* (*line 66*)

The movement of the human soul does not have a cause other than its own desiring state, since that which exists prior to such movement is eternity itself, which exists without interval. Eternity cannot, therefore, be held responsible for that which moves away from it since it exists in a state of unity and stillness. Since that which is prior to the movement of the human soul does not cause or determine it in any way, the movement itself must have primary existence (see also III.1.8.4–8). Thus, while everything in the sensible universe exists as a consequence of the activity of the human soul, the movement of the human soul is primary and self-caused.

11 *ἆρ' οὖν* (*line 66*)—*τοῖς ὁμοειδέσι πᾶσιν* (*line 69*)

Plotinus concludes by reiterating that time is within us, reminding us that it is caused by our movement away from eternity (11.15–20) and is thus an activity of our individual soul (12.22–25) as much as it is of the hypostasis of Soul (11.59–62). However, time only exists in souls 'of this kind', namely those who have not 'escaped to the upper world' (III.4.2.12). Time is thus the subjective condition of desiring consciousness which belongs to those souls who desire to gain more than what is available to them in the eternal present, and it is by virtue of this condition that all such souls share common ground. Since it is a subjective mode, it cannot be directly split up or divided (see 12.28–31) but can

only be made manifest through motion (of the heavenly circuit, for example: 12.22–36). Similarly, eternity is also indivisible by virtue of being a subjective condition, but its condition is one of non-desiring consciousness (see 12.4–22) and is knowable only to beings who pledge their allegiance to a life of timeless presence (4.33–37).

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Plotinus' Ennead III.7 is a treatise concerning the journey of the human soul first descending into time and then reclaiming its original identity in eternity. The treatise also conceives eternity as the key which grants access to the forms, and time as the portal through which the soul enters the physical universe. Plotinus supports his analysis by drawing upon a rich philosophical tradition including the thought of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicureans, Peripatetics and Pythagoreans. This book contains an extensive introduction, alongside the Oxford Classical Text of III.7, a translation, and a line-by-line commentary to guide the reader through the text.

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